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51 Ga. 144

Arnold v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided January 15, 1874

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1874-01-15

Criminal law. Verdict. Judgment. Before Judge Bartlett. Baldwin Superior Court. August Adjourned Term, 1873. Arnold was placed upon trial for the offense of assault with intent to murder, alleged to have been committed upon the person of Elliot Flint, on July 29th, 1872, by shooting at him with a pistol. The defendant pleaded not guilty.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently January 1953 · most notably State v. Broadnax (1950), State v. Jordan (1920)

25 state decisions

70187418801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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McCay, Judge.

¶1Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment and to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be set aside unless from necessity: Code, 3561; 17 Georgia, 361; 39 Ibid., 664. And this is the general spirit of the Code, as well as the ex*146pression of the.more universal tendency of jurisprudence towards freedom from that slavish adherence to technical nicety which is the reproach of the common law.

¶2In every verdict there must be a reference to the indictment and the issue to make it have any meaning. The verdict is the response of the jury to the charge and to the issue formed upon it. Ordinarily the verdict is “guilty” or “not guilty.” The verdict is general and its legal effect is guilty or not guilty of the charge as laid in the indictment.

¶3If the charge be murder, and the jury say we find the defendant guilty of assault; it means of assault- upon the person charged at the time and place charged, and that the assault was without justification. So here the charge was assault witli intent to murder A B, at a certain time and place, illegally and feloniously, by shooting at him with a loaded pistol with intent to murder. In this'is involved, as a legal necessity, that he did shoot at A B not in his own defense ancl without justification. The jury negative the malice, the intent to murder and simply find the shooting. But what shooting? The shooting charged, but without the intent to murder. The verdict to be perfectly formal might go further and say shooting at A B not in his own defense and without justification. But we see no imperative requirement for this additional detail. All this is charged in the indictment and the verdict of the jury may just as properly be aided by the indictment as to these things, as it may by the name of the party shot at, and the time and place of the occurrence. The case of Cook vs. The State, 26 Georgia, 593, is very like this. The jury found the defendant guilty of “harboring.” Harboring what, and how? ’Why plainly the slave of A B at the time and place stated and to the injury of A B: See, also, 25 Georgia, 494; Ibid., 689.

¶4Judgment affirmed..

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