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51 Ill. 217

Sage v. Browning

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided September 15, 1869

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1869-09-15

Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge, presiding. This was an action of replevin for a horse, originally brought before a justice of the peace, by the appellant, against the appellee, and. judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant. An appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Knox county, and a trial had before the court and a jury, which resulted in like manner. The plaintiff brings the case to this court upon writ of error.

Relies on Forest v. Tinkham · Van Pelt v. Knight

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1869-09-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently August 1930

7 state decisions

4018691870188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Justice Lawrence

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court:

¶2This case turns upon the question, whether the mortgagee in a chattel mortgage not acknowledged before the proper officer, can hold the property against a junior mortgagee who took with actual notice of the elder mortgage. In the cases of Forrest v. Tinkham,, 29 Ill. 141; Porter v. Dement, 35 ib. 478, and Frank v. Miner, 50 ib. 444, this court has held the elder mortgage to be void in such cases, notwithstanding actual notice.

¶3Counsel for the defendant in error cite Van Pelt v. Knight, 19 Ill. 535, and Hathorn v. Lewis, 22 ib. 395, as holding a different rule. The first case hardly touches this question, and the second was decided on the ground that the purchaser in that case, in buying from the mortgagor, was understood to be buying only his equity of redemption, and did not pay the full value of the property, but allowed for the mortgage. The court evidently considered him under an implied promise to pay the mortgage. This case can not, therefore, be regarded as in substantial conflict with the later decisions.

¶4Counsel refer to the rule in regard to the effect of actual notice of unrecorded deeds of realty. A comparison, however, of the 1st section of the act of chattel mortgages with the 23d section of the act of conveyances, will show there is no analogy. In the one act, a mortgage not legally executed and acknowledged, is declared void, as to all third persons; in the other, an unrecorded deed is declared void, as to creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice.

¶5The instructions of the circuit court were in conflict with the rule established by this court, and the judgment must be reversed.

¶6Judgment reversed.

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