Volume 51 — Iowa Reports

<p> Appeal from Des Moines Circuit Court. </p>

This action was brought upon a bond given by the defendants to indemnify one H. Mann, a constable, for hólding and selling two mules upon an execution against one P. D. Mickel.

Action in chancery. There was a decree in the District Court granting the relief jirayed for by plaintiff. Defendant Davis appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

The plaintiffs, having a judgment against the defendant Seaton, caused an execution to issue thereon, and his supposed debtor garnished. Such debtor admitted an indebtedness to the partnership of Seaton & Spaan.

Plaintiff filed a claim in the Circuit Court against the estate of which defendant is the administrator for one-third of the rents and profits of certain lands which the decedent in his life-time occupied and cultivated. The court allowed upon the claim three hundred and twenty dollars and seventy-five cents, and ordered that amount to be paid by the administrator, who appealed from the decision.

The plaintiff alleged that he purchased of the defendant’s agent at Fairfield a ticket to Eldon, on the line of defendant’s road; that he took defendant’s train, expecting to make connection at Eldon with a train going east on the Keokuk & Des Moines Eailroad; that upon his arrival at Eldón he was too late to make the connection desired, and that he repaired to defendant’s waiting room to await the arrival of a train on said Keokuk & Des Moines Railroad, said waiting room…

The Des Moines Gas Company was tlie owner of lots 5 aud 6, in block 28, in the city of Des Moines. On the 5th day of May, 1873, said company conveyed said lots, with all its property, rights and franchises, by a deed of trust or mortgage, to F. E. West, trustee, to secure the payment of one hundred bonds of said company, of one thousand dollars each.

This action was originally brought at law to recover possession of the north half of the north-west quarter of section 23, township 81, range 28. Upon the answer and cross-petition of the defendants the cause was transferred to the equity docket. The court found that the plaintiff is the owner of the . land in controversy, and quieted his title thereto. The defendants appeal. The material facts are stated in the opinion.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace •of Perry township, Tama county. At the return day all of ~the parties appeared before the justice. The plaintiff filed a motion for change of venue, which was granted.

The petition states that the defendants are justly indebted to the plaintiffs “in the sum of two thousand one hundred and seventy-one dollars on account for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered to said defendants at their'special instance and request, on twelve months’ time, as will more fully appear by a copy of the account hereto attached.” The account is omitted from the abstract.

<p>1. Gounty Treasurer: deposit of public money. The fact that tlie county does not provide a safe or suitable place wliere its money may be kept will not release the treasurer from liability if he deposits it in a bank where, lty reason of the failure of the bank, it is lost.</p>

The plaintiff is county superintendent of Carroll county, and in his petition stated that he filed with the county auditor a sworn statement of the time, he had been engaged in official duties; that said statement was presented to said board, and payment demanded, which was refused; that it was the duty of said board to direct the county auditor to issue a warrant on the county treasury for the amount shown by the sworn statement to be due.

<p>1. Corporations: powers of. A corporation organized for the manufacture and sale of musical instruments was held to have the authority to purchase of an agent a note which he had acquired by the sale of an article manufactured by the corporation.</p>

Action in chancery to foreclose a chattel mortgage. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for by plaintiffs. Defendants appeal. The facts of the case appear in the opinion..

<p>Certiorari. Original proceeding.</p>

Action to recover specific personal property. Trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Appe'al from Grundy Circuit Court. The plaintiff, in his original petition, claimed of defendant Biglow one hundred and fourteen dollars on an account for lumber furnished to said Biglow to build a school-house in one of the sub-districts of said district township of Colfax. He also claimed a mechanic’s lien upon said school-house for said lumber.

The defendant was indicted for an assault with intent to murder. He was tried and convicted of the crime of assault and battery. He appeals to this court for a reversal of the judgment against him.

The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant Mintern, and to satisfy it levied upon certain land standing in the name of the defendant Maxfield. The land was formerly owned by Mintern, and was conveyed by him to Maxfield. The plaintiff bid in the land, obtained a sheriff’s deed, and now brings this action to set aside the deed made by Mintern to Maxfield, on the ground that the deed was made to defraud Mintern’s creditors. Other facts are stated in the opinion.

The petition states that in September, 1874, the plaintiff was a resident of Chicago, and continued to be such until May,, 1876; and that during said year, previous to May, he was not the owner of any personal property in the State of Iowa; that in January or February, 1876, “the assessor of the town of Osceola, Clarke county, Iowa, fraudulently, wrongfully and unlawfully” assessed the plaintiff as the owner of eleven thousand nine hundred and ninety-four dollars’ worth of…

On the 18th day of November, 1874, the defendant conveyed to the plaintiff certain real estate situated in Hamilton county. The conveyance was by deed, with covenants of general warranty. This action was brought for an alleged breach of the covenants in the deed, the plaintiff claiming that defendant did not have, title to twenty acres of the land.

On the 24th day of August, 1872, the plaintiff and one T. K. Armstrong were the joint owners of one hundred and forty-nine bushels of wheat. On that day they delivered said wheat to the defendant, who was a dealer in grain, and used and operated a grain elevator at Tama City. Upon receiving said wheat the defendant delivered to Armstrong and the plaintiff the following ticket or memorandum: “Tama City, August 24, 1872. “Bought of T. K. Armstrong, for C. II.

The plaintiff brought an action to set aside, on the ground of fraud, a conveyance to the defendants of six hundred and eighty acres of land. Held: commencing November 22, and ending November 30, 1875, and another term of saicl court was held commencing April 24, and ending April 27, 1876. No action in said cause was had at either of said terms, or in the vacations between said terms.

In the fall of 1876 the plaintiffs entered into a parol contract with the defendant by which they agreed to do all the work, •and furnish all the materials, necessary to be done and furnished in erecting and' completing a brick building for the defendant, excepting the excavating, and the brick and stone work. This action was brought to recover a balance of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six dollars, which was alleged to be due on said contract.

This cause was before this court at a previous term, on an appeal from the ruling of the Circuit Court upon a demurrer to the petition. 43 Iowa, 466.

Action to recover upon a school order. The defendant • denies the validity of the order. The facts are stated in the opinion. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiffs, who are the owners of a large amount of real estate in the township, appealed from the action of the board to the Circuit Court, by which the action of the board was reversed. From the judgment of the Circuit Court the defendants appeal.

Action upon a promissory note, of which the following is a copy: “$100.

Appeal from Polk District Court. The defendant was convicted of the crime of seduction and sentenced to the penitentiary for two years. He appeals.

<p> Appeal from Des Moines Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action in chancery to restrain defendant from closing a-public highway. The ease was sent to a referee, and upon the coming in of his report a decree was entered in accord therewith granting the relief prayed for in the petition. Defendant appeals.</p>

Action to foreclose a mortgage. There was a trial on the issues joined to the court, a,finding and decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

The defendants were endeavoring to sink a well for the use of their distillery, and the water flowed therein so rapidly that the required depth could not be attained except by the more expeditious removal of the water. To accomplish this they hired of the plaintiffs a pump, and man to operate the same, and this action is brought to recover for the services rendered.

The defendants were brought before the mayor of Marion on a charge of violating a city ordinance by disturbing the peace. The defendants filed, in due form- of' law, a motion for a change of venue, which the mayor overruled, to which ruling the defendants excepted. Upon the hearing the mayor assessed a fine against each of the defendants o.f twenty-five dollars.

This cause was before this court, June Term, 1876, and the judgment was reversed. Upon being remanded the plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court an amended and substituted petition, which is as follows: “1.

Aptpeal from Webster District Court. The defendant, upon an indictment for the murder of Philip McGuire, was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for eight years. He brings the case on appeal to this court.

<p>1. Homestead: judicial sale : exhausting other property. A sheriff’s sale in the foreclosure of a mortgage embracing' the homestead will not be set aside where the sheriff first offers the land in forty-acre tracts, according to the government subdivisions, and, receiving no bids, then offers and sells the whole of the land, including the homestead.</p>

A judgment upon default was entered against tbe principal, the guardian. Upon an amended petition, charging that the surety had transferred his property without consideration, and praying that it be held subject to the payment of plaintiff’s claim, the cause was transferred to the chancery docket. A trial upon the merits was had, and the petition as to the surety was dismissed.

This cause was tried in the court below upon an agreed statement of facts. The statement is somewhat voluminous. For the sake of brevity, and as conducing to a better understanding of the questions involved, we condense the facts as follows: 1. On the 1st day of October, 1872, the plaintiff was the -owner in fee of lots 3 and 4, in block 26, and lots 1, 2 and 3, in block 27, in the town of Shelby, Shelby county, Iowa.

Action in equity. The defendant claims to be the owner of certain real estate described in the pleadings, such title being derived through A. J. Berry, against whom the First National Bank of Newton had a judgment under which the land was sold and conveyed to the defendant by the sheriff. The plaintiffs claim the land did not belong to A. J. Berry but to James W. Berry, against whom they have a judgment, and they bring this action to set aside the defendant’s title.

This is an action on account of materials furnished for a building, and to establish a mechanic’s lien. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for $40.70. The plaintiff appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion,

Action upon a promissory note against the defendant W. W. King for five hundred and sixty-three dollars, and upon-an account a,gainst the defendant Julia King for one hundred and ninety-two dollars and fifty cents. The defendant W. W. King made default, and judgment was rendered against him for the amount of the note.

Action to enforce a mechanic's lien under an alleged contract made in 1872. The action was commenced in 1874^ The petition and amendment thereto claim that the plaintiffs furnished to the defendant a large number of ties, which were used in the construction of defendant’s road. A part thereof were furnished under a written contract, and the residue ¡under an oral contract.

It is averred in the petition that on the 16th day of November, 1875, the defendants, being indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of six hundred and forty-eight dollars and thirty-three cents, to secure the payment of said sum, conveyed to plaintiff, by their mortgage deed, certain real estate; that said mortgage contained the following covenants of warranty: “To have and to hold the premises above described, with all the appurtenances thereto belonging, unto the said second…

Madison District Court. Defendant was convicted upon an information charging him with selling, contrary to law, beer and other malt liquors within two miles of the city of Winterset. The proceedings were first prosecuted before the mayor of the city. Upon an appeal to the District Court defendant was again convicted. He now appeals to this court.

An attachment was issued upon allegations of the petition that defendant was about to dispose of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, and was about to convert his property into money for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of his-creditors. The defendant, among other defenses, pleaded a. counter-claim for damages on account of the wrongful issuing-of the attachment., There was a verdict and judgment for defendant in the sum of three thousand dollars.

<p>1, Practice: certificate of trial judge. It is not competent for the parties to stipulate that the judge render his decision in vacation and grant a certificate indicating a question of law upon which it is desirable to have the opinion of the Supreme Court.</p>

This is an action upon a promissory note, made by the defendant, N. P. Jackspn, and for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed to secure the same. The note is dated April 22, 1873, and is as follows: “Four years after date I promise to pay Sarah J. Willcox,. or bearer, six thousand and eighty-eight dollars and seventy cents, for value received of her, bearing ten per cent interest from date.

-The plaintiffs, being judgment creditors of the C., C. & D. B. Co., caused executions to issue thereon, and garnished the defendant as its supposed debtor. The question as to his liability was tried to the court, and judgment rendered against defendant, and he appeals.

Action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of an insufficient and defective county bridge, from which it was alleged he was precipitated. The allegations in the petition were denied, and there' was a jury trial, verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

The plaintiff appeals from an order of court striking from the files a motion of plaintiff. The facts appear in the opinion.

One A. E. Noyes entered into a written contract with Harrison county, by which he bound himself to construct what is known as the “Spooner ditch.” A. E. Noyes afterward entered into a contract with John H. Noyes, plaintiff herein, by which the construction of said ditch was sub-let to him.

Action at law. A demurrer to the petition by defendant Scarff was sustained, and, plaintiff standing upon his petition, judgment was rendered upon the demurrer, from which he appeals.

This is an action to recover for injuries which the plaintiff alleges he sustained by being forcibly ejected from the defendant’s passenger train at a point about one mile distant from a station. There was a jury trial, and a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for one thousand dollars. The defendant appeals.

The appellants, wbio are residents of Polk county, were served with garnishee process in a cause pending in Shelby county. Their answer denying indebtedness to the defendant in the action was controverted in a reply, filed by plaintiff, and an issue thereon was thus joined, and the cause was docketed for trial. Thereupon the garnishee moved to have the venue of the cause changed to Polk county, on the ground that they resided in that county.

Justice Beck. The plaintiff is a convict in tbe Iowa penitentiary. The defendant is the warden'of the penitentiary. The plaintiff applied for and obtained a writ of habeas corpus, for the purpose of testing the legality of his imprisonment. The facts from which the legality of his imprisonment is to be determined appear from the petition and answer, and are as follows : Two indictments were found against the petitioner by the same grand jury.

<p> Appeal from Clinton District Court. </p> <p>On the 11th day of January, 1873, the plaintiff conveyed a certain tract of timber land to the defendants. The deed contained the usual covenants of general warranty, and described the land as containing “thirty acres, more or less.” The purchase money agreed to be paid was nine hundred dollars. Three hundred dollars were paid before the conveyance was made, and the defendants executed to the plaintiff their promissory note for three hundred dollars, payable in one year, with interest at ten per cent per annum, and also another note for the like amount, dated at the same time and payable in two years, with interest at ten per cent per annum.</p> <p>This action was commenced by the plaintiff on the 16th day of October, 1871, to recover a balance alleged to be due upon the first above described note.</p> <p>The defendants filed an answer and cross-petition in which they averred in substance that the plaintiff was guilty of fraud in pointing out the boundaries of said land previous to the purchase, and that the land actually conveyed was but eighteen and eighty one-hundredths acres, and that if the tract had. included the land within the boundaries pointed out by plaintiff it would'have contained twenty-five and forty one-hundredths acres only; that the land was chiefly valuable for the timber standing and growing thereon, and that if it had been bounded, located, and of the number of acres as represented by plaintiff it would have been worth nine hundred dollars, but that said eighteen and eighty one-hundredths acres as it was actually located was not worth to exceed four hundred and seventy-five dollars. They averred that the plaintiff knew said representations to be false, and that defendants relied thereon to their damage in the sum of four hundred and twenty-five dollars. And they further averred that the plaintiff was still the owner of the last above described note, which was wholly unpaid. They prayed a decree requiring the plaintiff to produce said two promissory notes in court for cancellation, to the extent of the damages sustained by the defendants, and for other relief.</p> <p>On the 16th day of January, 1876, the defendants amended their answer and cross-bill by alleging that at the time of the purchase it was agreed that the land should contain thirty acres, and that defendants should pay therefor the sum of thirty dollars per acre, and that defendants had no knowledge, other than that derived from the plaintiff, of the quantity of said land, and purchased the same upon the faith and belief that the plaintiff’s knowledge of the number of acres it so contained was correct, and that the plaintiff and defendants were mutually mistaken as to the number of acres said land contained at the time of the purchase aforesaid; that subsequent to filing the original answer the defendants paid the last above described note to another party, who claimed to be the owner thereof, before due and in good faith, and without notice. They prayed that an abatement be made from the purchase money for said land equal to' the deficiency in acres at the contract price per acre, and that an amount equal to the balance due upon the note sued upon be set off against the same, and that plaintiff be decreed to pay the defendants the balance thereof.</p> <p>There were replies filed by the plaintiff putting in issue the material allegations of the cross-petition and the amendments thereto.</p> <p>The proper order was made for a trial upon written evidence, and such trial was had by the court. There was a judgment rendered for the plaintiff for the balance due upon the note on which suit was brought. Defendants appeal.</p>

Action upon a judgment rendered in a court of record of the State of Nebraska. There was a trial to the court without a jury, and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action on a promissory note which the petition states was assigned to the plaintiff before maturity. ■ To the third division of the answer there was a demurrer, which was overruled, and the plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff claims title to a certain forty acres of land by virtue of a sheriff’s deed, executed August 8, 1877, and prays judgment for the immediate possession thereof.

The facts in the foregoing actions being identical they have been submitted on the abstract in the first case. The plain'tiff seeks to recover on a negotiable promissory note, executed by the defendant, which was assigned to the plaintiff before maturity. The defendant alleged the note had been altered after its execution. There was a trial to the court, judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

The defendant was indicted for tbe murder of John 0. Dayton. He was convicted of murder in tbe second degree, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. He now appeals to this court for a reversal of the judgment against him.

The defendants pleaded usury. The action was brought originally in the District Court and transferred to the Circuit Court by an agreement of the attorneys, and a decree was there rendered in accordance with an agreement of the attorneys. The defendants afterward filed a motion to set aside the decree, which was supported by affidavits and resisted by counter-affidavitss In the matter of a hearing upon the motion the defendants moved for a continuance, -which was denied.

Joseph Dobbins being indebted to the plaintiff, Thomas Reese, executed to him a mortgage upon certain real estate to-secure such indebtedness. After the execution of said mortgage Joy.eph Dobbins conveyed said real estate to the appellant, William Dobbins, by a deed with covenants of general warranty.

The petition states that the defendant, without reasonable or probable cause, filed an information before a justice of the peace charging the plaintiff with having sold and disposed of certain personal property, which had been mortgaged to the defendant, to secure an indebtedness to him which remained unpaid; that said property was sold without the consent of the defendant; that plaintiff was recognized by the justice to appear at the' next term of the District Court, when…

Action to recover for fifteen stacks of grain, alleged to have been burned by fire in operating an engine upon the defendant’s road. The defendant for answer averred that if the property was destroyed as alleged it was purely accidental, and without fault or neglect on the defendant’s part. As a further defense the defendant averred that the loss occurred by reason of the negligence of the plaintiff.

On the 14th day of September, 1876, the plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Jeremiah Willcox, deceased, filed her petition claiming of the defendant one hundred and thirty-four dollars and eighty-four cents. On the 26th day of September, 1876, the defendant filed his answer, denying every allegation of the petition.

On the 19th day of November^ 1875, the plaintiff filed its petition in the court below for the enforcement of a mechanic’s lien, for supplies and materials furnished to the Iowa Southwestern Construction Company, defendant, and used in the construction of the railroad of the Chicago, Clinton & Western Railroad Company, defendant. Said petition prayed the appointment of a receiver.

This action was brought before a justice of the peace for forcible entry and detention of real property, under sections 3611 and following, of the Code. Upon the return day the parties appeared and stipulated that the cause should be transferred to the District Court of Winneshiek county for trial. The justice of the peace, pursuant to this stipulation, returned-the original papers in the cause to the District Court.

The plaintiff filed in the court below an application to have all of McKean’s addition to Mount Vernon, lying north-west of Jefferson street and south-east of Washington street, severed from and stricken out of the limits of said city. The territory described in the application was laid out and platted into blocks, lots, streets and alleys, as an addition to the city, by the plaintiff in the year 1857. There was a demurrer to the application, which was overruled.

Appeal from Tama District Court. Indictment for murder. Verdict, guilty of murder in the second degree, and judgment thereon. The defendant appeals.

Appeal from Des Moines District Court. The defendants were convicted and sentenced for the crime of unlawful assembly, and now appeal to this court.

There was filed before a justice of the peace an information charging the defendant with the commission of an assault and battery. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and a former conviction for the same offense. Being convicted the defendant appealed to the District Court, where there was a trial on the same issues, the defendant was again convicted, and he appeals.

It is alleged in the’petition that the defendant Stone purchased certain real estate at tax sale on the 2d day of October, 1860, and that the treasurer of the county executed and delivered a tax deed for the same to said Stone on the 2d day of December, 1863 ; that on the 7th day of October, 1867, said Stone conveyed a part of said real estate by deed tooneScanlan, and the residue to one Sanders; that said Scanlan has since conveyed the part held by him to the defendant…

Action at law upon the covenants of seizin and against incumbrances in a deed for land executed by defendant to plaintiff. There was a verdict and judgment for defenda.:!. Plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

It was admitted in the court below that the facts of this case are as follows: “1. That this cause comes before this court for trial on appeal from W. G-. White, J. P., of Marion township. Defendant, Colwell Martin, as appellant, and Nathan Beynolds, plaintiff, as appellee. “2.

The petition states that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby the former undertook to negotiate a loan for the latter, according to certain terms, and in accordance with plaintiff’s customary rules and regulations, which were to be complied with by the defendant; that if plaintiff should succeed in negotiating said loan in accordance with said rules and regulations the defendant was to pay him the sum of ninety dollars for his services; that plaintiff…

Action on an account for goods sold and delivered. The amount claimed was three hundred and thirty-eight dollars, and forty-four cents. The petition was verified.

This is an action for the setting aside of a sheriff’s sale to-the defendants of the undivided half of the south half of lot 3, in half block I, in town of Sabula.

Appeals from Woodbury District Court. These cases are submitted together as involving substantially the same questions. The intervenors entered into a contract with the defendant, by which they agreed to transport for it certain lumber from Stillwater and Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Sioux City, Iowa.

On the 5th day of October, 1875, Hugh Taylor executed to the defendant Daniel Gray two promissory notes, each for the sum of four hundred dollars, one due on the 1st day of October, 1876, and the other due on the 1st day of January, 1877. The defendant Gray transferred these notes by indorsement to plaintiff, waiving demand, notice and protest, and to secure the payment of the notes executed a mortgage to plaintiff upon certain real estate.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace, the plaintiff claiming of defendant one hundred dollars. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. The cause was referred to J. C. Traer, Esq. In accordance with the report of the referee, on the 3d day of January, 1879, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for forty-three dollars and costs, taxed at one hundred and twenty-nine dollars and live cents. The defendant appeals.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of incest committed with one Amelia Ann Elinn, the daughter of the wife of defendant by a previous marriage. There was a verdict of guilty, anda judgment against the defendant. Defendant appeals.

The above cases are submitted together upon the same ■abstract. The plaintiff, M. A. Judd, claims of the defendant, Ira W. Anderson, seven'hundred dollars on account of an ■alleged breach of warranty in the sale to the plaintiff of certain land described in the petition.

■ This is an action upon the following order, indorsed to plaintiff without recourse: “State of Iowa, July 10, 1876. “The treasurer of district township of Coffin’s Grove, in Delaware county, one year after date, will pay N. C. Gillespie, or order, the sum of three hundred and seventy-five dollars-, without interest, out of the contingent fund belonging to this district township, for rods on school-houses in sub-districts Nos. 1, 2, 3, d, 5, 6, 7, 8, in this district…

Jane Dobbins was the owner of one hundred and sixty acres of land in Buchanan county. She died intestate in the year 1860, leaving no husband surviving her. Her son, W. C. Dobbins, and a daughter, Ann. E. Dobbins, plaintiff herein, who has since married J. W. Kinney, were her only heirs. On the 23d day of June, 1862, said W. C. Dobbins conveyed the land as his own, by a deed with the usual covenants, to one A. E. Dutton, for a full consideration.

Action on a promissory note for six hundred and fifty dollars. The petition was verified. The answer is quite lengthy. It in substance stated — First, that the execution of the note sued on is admitted; second, that it was given as part of the purchase price of a steam engine which was bought for the purpose of running a grist-mill.

Action upon account for goods sold. The defendant pleaded a counter-claim. He avers that being in insolvent eircumstances lie contracted with the plaintiffs to secure a compromise for him with all his creditors at fifty.cents on a dollar, and paid the plaintiffs in advance, for services to be rendered for him in that respect, the sum of five hundred and seventy-five dollars.

Action to recover for injury to stock alleged to have been done by the defendant, and by reason of a want of a fence. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Action in equity to set aside a deed executed by the plaintiff whereby he conveyed certain real estate to the defendant Joseph Lown. There'was a decree granting the relief asked. The defendants appeal.

On November 13, 1876, the defendant Sigg executed to the, plaintiff a negotiable promissory note, and also a mortgage,' to secure the same, which was recorded March 13,1877. On January 2, 1877, he executed a like note and mortgage to Spielman on the same premises covered by plaintiff’s mortgage. This mortgage was recorded January 13, 1877. The. note was payable one year after date.

This action was commenced in January, 1875. The petition alleges that plaintiff is the owner of forty acres of land adjoining and abutting Fourth street, in the town of Delhi, Delaware county; that said street is a regularly laid out street in said town, as shown by the recorded plat thereof, and was used by the public generally and the plaintiff as a public highway; that the defendant, about the 19th day of May, 1873, wrongfully closed and obstructed said street, by…

<p>Appeal from Scott Circuit Court.</p> <p>The defendant John Noth was duly appointed administrator of the estate of George Noth, deceased, by the Circuit Court of Scott county. On the 21st clay of April, 1876, there was filed in said court an administrator’s notice of appointment, with proper proof that the same had been duly published, on the 6th day of March, 1876, by posting in three public places. On the 28th day of April, 1876, an administrator’s bond, signed by the defendant John Noth as principal, and the defendants John G. Baumier and Fried. Kautz as sureties, was filed and approved by the court. On the 16th day of July, 1877, Andrew Weber, the plaintiff, filed a claim against said estate for four thousand dollars. The affidavit of the plaintiff to the correctness of the claim was attached thereto, and it was indorsed as follows:</p> <p>“Examined and allowed the 18th day of July, 1877, in the sum of four thousand dollars, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum from December 28, 1876.</p> <p>“John Noth, Executor.”</p> <p>On the 7th day of December, 1877, the said administrator filed his second and final report, by which it appeared that there was in his hands as assets of said estate the sum of eight hundred and ninety-three dollars and twenty-eight cents, with interest at six per cent per annum from July 21, 1875. It was further shown, by said report,.that the debt due the plaintiff was the only claim filed against the estate, except the claims for expenses of administration, including attorneys’ fees. The administrator asked that his report be approved, and that an order be made directing him to pay the costs of administration, amounting to sixty-five dollars, and to pay the balance in his hands, with interest as aforesaid, to the said Andrew Weber. On the saíne day the court made the order as prayed. In this order the claim of the plaintiff, Weber, “was allowed and approved as a good and valid claim against the estate of said deceased.” The administrator failed to pay the amount found in his hands to be due to the plaintiff, and application was made to the court, under the provisions of section 2435 of the Code, for judgment upon the bond of the administrator against the principal and sureties thereto. There was a trial by the court. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and against the administrator, for the amount found to be in his hands. It was further found that the sui*eties in the administration bond were not liable for the claim of said Weber by reason of the statute of limitations. Andrew Weber appeals.</p>

Aptpeal from Scott District Court. Action to replevy two horses of the value of eighty dollars. The horses were the property of one Prosch, but the defendant had acquired a landlord’s lien upon them by reason of their having been used upon a farm owned and leased by defendant to Prosch. Before the commencement of this action the defendant had caused the horses to be seized under a landlord’s writ of attachment.

The plaintiffs claiming to have certain mechanics’ liens against real estate owned by the defendant procured judgments thereon in the District Court of the county in which the property was situate. Executions were issued and the real estate sold, the plaintiffs being the purchasers. The effect of such sale was to satisfy the judgments. This action is brought to set aside the sale and satisfaction. The District Court refused the relief asked, and plaintiffs appeal.

On the 8th day of January, 1879, the plaintiff filed a petition in substance alleging that about the month of October, 1878, the plaintiff, by virtue of authority vested in it by law, determined to open up a certain' street or avenue, from the intersection of Chestnut and Broadway streets to the Union Pacific depot, in said city, and ordered the condemnation of private property for the establishment and opening of said street; that the defendant was the owner of eertain real…

On the 25th day of April, 1874, the defendant John M. Myers borrowed of the plaintiff the sum of one thousand dollars. He executed a promissory note for that amount, payable to plaintiff’s order, with interest at ten per .cent per annum; and to secure the payment thereof he and his co-defendant, Anna M. Myers, his wife, executed to the plaintiff a mortgage upon certain real estate.

Action in equity. A preliminary injunction was granted, a demurrer to the petition sustained, the injunction dissolved, and plaintiffs appeal.

The plaintiff commenced an action in equity to foreclose a mortgage. At the first term of the court after the filing of the petition the defendant Michael Fahey appeared and filed an answer, in which he pleaded the defense of usury. Upon the filing of the answer the defendant stated orally in open court that he elected to take his evidence by deposition, and asked, as a matter of right, that the cause be continued that he might do so.

■ Action on promissory notes. The defendant pleaded an equitable defense. A judgment for plaintiff was had upon-a trial to the court. Defendant appeals.

This action was brought against the defendant M. I. Wightman on account for goods, and against the defendant R. V. Wightman as guarantor of the account. The guaranty was in writing. R. Y. Wightman alone defended, admitting the execution of the instrument of guaranty, but averring that it was without consideration. There was a judgment for the plaintiffs against both defendants. The defendant R. Y. Wightman appeals.

Action in chancery. • A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and thereupon a decree was entered dismissing the bill. Plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

Action to foreclose a mortgage which was given by the defendants to secure the payment of a note of two thousand dollars, payable to the order of Charles L. Weiser. The defense was usury. There was a trial by the court. A judgment and decree of foreclosure were entered for the full amount claimed by the plaintiffs. Defendant James D. McKay appeals.

There was a denial of the' allegations of the petition, in the answer, and it was alleged therein that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Upon the conclusion of the evidence the court, at the request of the defendant, directed the jury to find for it, which they did, and judgment having been rendered on such verdict, the plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff, being the owner of a judgment against A. M. Coonrod, caused a general execution to be issued thereon, and under said action the sheriff garnished W. F. Sebee, the appellant herein. The notice of garnishment was served on the 24th day of February, 1877, and required appellant to appear and answer as garnishee on the. third Monday in April, 1877. At the time fixed in the notice Sebee appeared and answered.

Plaintiff presented his petition to the judge of the District Court, praying for a temporary injunction to restrain the city of Davenport from selling certain lots or land situated in the city upon an assessment made thereon for the purpose of constructing a sidewalk upon the street adjacent thereto. The injunction was refused, and from this action of the judge plaintiff appeals.

Action at law to recover compensation allowed by statute to plaintiff for services rendered by him as sheriff in conveying to the penitentiary certain prisoners convicted and sentenced by the District Court of Cedar county. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

This action was brought before a justice of the peace upon an order of the defendant as follows: “$15.00. Independent District of Pleasant Valley, West Point Tp., Butler Co., Iowa, June 15, 1877. “D. if.

The defendant Edwin Bayliss commenced an action of replevin against the plaintiff for the recovery of five Massillon harvesters.

Action to recover for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while an employe of the defendant in operating its road. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was riding upon a construction train consisting of several flat cars and a caboose, the latter being the rear car. The train was near a station, where it was to be allowed to remain until the next day.

On the 28th day of November, 1877, Peter Oarmody commenced an action against defendant, claiming three thousand dollars damages for alleged violent assaults made by defendant upon the said plaintiff. On the 22d day of October, 1878, being the second day of the term, the plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion suggesting the death of plaintiff, and that A. B. Masterson, administrator of the estate of deceased, be substituted as plaintiff.

Appeal from Boone Circuit Court. Action to determine the title to real estate. Trial by the court, judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Action in chancery to restrain the collection of a tax. A demurrer to defendants’ answer to the petition was sustained, and from the decision defendants appeal. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion.

<p> Appeal from Fremont Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action upon a promissory note executed by the defendant and one Wood, and made payable to the order of one Ward, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff for value before maturity. The defendant, while appearing upon the note as principal, was, in fact, surety. After the execution of the note, and while it was in the hands of Ward, it was materially altered by Ward’s consent, and afterward and while the note was still in the hands of Ward the alteration was erased and the note was restored to its original form. The defendant claims that the note is invalid. There was a judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.</p>

Action to recover the value of fifty-eight dead hogs shipped upon defendant’s road from Yinton to Cedar Rapids, under a consignment to Pomeroy & Olmstead, soap manufacturers at Cedar Rapids. The plaintiffs claim that while the hogs were received by the consignees, Pomeroy & Olmstead, they were not delivered to them by the defendant company, but were delivered to them by a stranger, to whom the hogs were delivered by the company.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, for the killing of Wipka Martin, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He appeals to this court. The facts of the ease involved in the questions ruled in the case appear in the opinion.

The defendant was indicted for seduction. He was found guilty and sentenced to hard labor in the penitentiary for the period of three years. He appeals to this court for a reversal of the judgment against him.

Action to recover real estate. The answer alleged that a certain conveyance from Julia A. Tevis, which constituted a link in the chain of the plaintiff’s title, had been fraudulently obtained, and that Mrs. Tevis had subsequently conveyed the premises to one of the defendants. The relief asked was that said conveyance be set aside, and that defendants have such further relief as is consistent with equity. There was a trial to the court and judgment for the defendants.

Action at law to recover the possession of a quarter section of land situated in Shelby county. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion.

Mandamus. Upon a trial on an agreed statement of facts plaintiff’s petition was dismissed. It now appeals to this court. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

Action to replevy certain agricultural machinery. The defendant Leonard, as sheriff, had seized the same under execution, upon a judgment in favor of the defendants Hoover & Co., and against bne M. L. Hurd. There was a trial by the court and finding that the property belonged to the plaintiffs, but that no notice of their claim of ownership had been served upon the sheriff. Judgment was accordingly rendered in their favor for the property, but against them for the costs.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree, and convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to the penitentiary for eight years. He appeals.

This action was originally commenced at law for the possession of one’ hundred and twenty acres of land. The plaintiffs claim title to the land in virtue of a sheriff’s sale thereof, under a judgment by confession in the Cedar Circuit Court, in favor of plaintiffs against one Peter Flansburg.

This is an action for divorce, commenced on the 9th day of April, 1875. Upon motion of plaintiff the cause was. referred. The referee filed a report in favor of plaintiff, which was by the court confirmed, and a decree was en-. tered granting a divorce as prayed. Upon appeal to this court the decree was reversed because of error in ordering a reference of the case. See 45 Iowa, 501.

Action to recover real estate. The plaintiffs are the owners of a tract of land which is described as follows: “That part of the N. W. ¿ of the N. W. J of section 9, township 88 north, of range 8, in Buchanan county, Iowa, commencing at a point where Pine creek crosses the section line between sections 4 and 9, in said township and range, and thence running west, twenty chains and fifty links, to the north-west corner of said section 9, thence south eleven chains and…

' Action upon a promissory note purporting to be signed “M. H. & B. Y. Howard.” The defendants, each for himself, denied the signature under oath and pleaded the statute of limitations. There was no evidence tending to show that the note was signed by the defendant B. Y. Howard.

Action in chancery to quiet the title of certain land in Palo Alto county held by plaintiff. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff. Defendants appeal. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

<p> Appeal from Woodbury Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action to recover of defendant road taxes paid by plaintiff which were levied by Sioux City township. A demurrer to defendant’s answer was sustained. The defendant standing upon its answer, judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.</p>

This is an action upon four promissory notes executed by the defendant to the plaintiff for five hundred dollars each, and amounting, with interest, to nearly three thousand dollars.

This action is brought, under chapter 1, title 19, of the Code, to vacate a judgment rendered in said court in favor of the defendant Wyllis against the plaintiff. The grounds relied on are “that there was error shown in the rendition of said judgment, and fraud practiced by the said J. C. Wyllis and his attorney, and irregularity in obtaining said judgment.” The relief asked was granted, and the defendants appeal.

Action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of a breach of a contract, whereby the defendant agreed to sell and deliver to the plaintiff one thousand healthy and merchantable sheep, and upon which contract the plaintiff paid the defendant five hundred dollars at the time of its execution. The defendant admits the making of the contract, and admits the payment of five hundred dollars, but denies any breach of the contract upon his part.

Action in chancery to foreclose a mortgage. The answer pleads payments of a part of the sum secured made to plaintiff’s agent. This defense was sustained and a decree rendered for a part of the amount claimed to be due in the petition. Plaintiff appeals.

This case was submitted to the Clinton District Court upon an agreed statement of facts, as follows: “1. That Foster & Foster appeared for the State and prosecuted all the cases, as appears from their claim hereto attached, and that A. C. Perry, a private citizen, was the. informer in all the cases. “2.

Temperance Curts executed her last will, containing the following provisions: “1. I have and own in my own right the sum of two thousand dollars, received from the estate of my father, which I will and bequeath to my daughters, Amanda and Adeline, in equal shares to them and their heirs and assigns. “2.

Appeal from Dubuque Circuit Court. Action upon a policy of insurance. A demurrer to the petition was overruled. From this decision defendant appeals.

Appeal from Webster Circuit Court. Action in equity. A decree was’ entered in the Circuit Court dismissing the petition, and plaintiff appeals.

Action upon a negotiable promissory note, executed by the defendant to C. Gillespie & Co., and by them transferred for . value, before maturity, to the plaintiff. The defendant, for answer, avers that the note was given for a policy of insurance issued to him by the payees of the note, and that the note is uncollectible and void because the insurers were not authorized to transact the business of insurance in the State of Iowa.

There were two actions commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant. The said actions were consolidated, and from an order or decree made after the consolidation this appeal was taken.

The plaintiff was arrested and taken before the Police Court of the city of Des Moines upon an information charging him with selling beer and other malt and vinous liquors contrary to an ordinance of said city. At. the proper time he de'manded a trial by jury, which was denied by the court. After a jury trial was refused, said Zelle filed his motion for a change of venue, based upon the alleged prejudice of the judge of said Police Court. Said motion was overruled.

The defendant was indicted for uttering and publishing a forged promissory note with intent to defraud. Upon the trial, one of the jurors “being ill, with the consent of the defendant said juror was discharged, and with the consent of the defendant the trial, before eleven jurors, was resumed and concluded by the order of the court.” There was a verdict of guilty.

Action in chancery to foreclose a mortgage. The petition prays that a receiver be appointed to collect and disburse the rents. After the petition was filed a receiver was appointed upon an application to the judge of the District Court. From this order the defendants appeal. The facts of the case appear in- the opinion.

The defendant and one Wheeler were jointly indicted for the crime of setting fire to and burning á store in the nighttime. The defendant was tried separately, and convicted and sentenced. He now appeals.

Action to recover for fees and salary as city marshal. The petition contains four counts. The first is for fees for service of orders and notices; the second is for fees for service of process in State cases; the third is for fees for service of process in city cases; and the fourth is for a balance of salary claimed to be due under an ordinance in force at the commencement of the plaintiff’s term of office.

On the 13th day of February, 1877, an instrument in writing, purporting to be the last will and testament of Mary Ames, deceased, was filed in the office of the clerk of the Clinton Circuit Court, and at the same time George W. Ames, the executor, filed his petition, asking that a day be fixed for proving the same, and that upon the final hearing said will be allowed and recorded as the last will of said deceased, and that he be •commissioned as said executor.

Action at law upon a sheriff’s official bond. The sureties were made defendants, but were not served with, notice, and the case proceeded against the sheriff alone, the defendant herein. The petition alleges that plaintiff instituted, and prosecuted to judgment, an action against one Parkinson, wherein a writ of attachment was issued, which the defendant levied upon twenty-six boxes of goods, the property of Parkinson.

Action upon a promissory note. The note was executed and delivered to the plaintiff, who was treasurer of the incorporated town of Davis City. The consideration .of the note was a license to sell wine and beer within the limits of said town. The defense was that there was no ordinance of the town in force authorizing-the issuance of such license.

The plaintiff filed a petition alleging that he is the owner of certain described lands; that on or about the 10th day of May, 1873, the defendant filed in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court a writing purporting to be a confession of judgment made by John Lawrence and Alexander Lawrence to the defendant herein; that upon the filing of said paper in said office the clerk of the Circuit Court, on the 10th day of May, 1873, entered judgment in said court in favor of…

The defendant Johnson is a constable, and, by virtue of an execution in his hands, levied on the organ in question. There was. a trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

Action upon a promissory note. Defense, the statute of limitations. The note became due more than ten years prior to the commencement of the action, but the plaintiffs claim that the cause of action has been revived by a written admission. There was a judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.

A judgment was rendered against plaintiff upon a demurrer to Iris amended petition, from which he appeals to this court. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion.

On the 5th day of March, 1858, P. S. Baldy and Isaac Baldy, being seized in fee of certain real estate in Tama county, mortgaged the same to Christian Baldy to secure their indebtedness to him of one thousand six hundred dollars. In January, 1860, said indebtedness being due and unpaid, Christian Baldy employed Isaac L. Allen, an attorney at law, to foreclose said mortgage and collect the amount due thereon.

On the 6th day of May, 1876, Willard Duffin executed to the plaintiff a chattel mortgage the material portions of which are as follows: “Know all men by these presents, that I, Willard Duffin, in consideration of five hundred dollars * * paid by J. R. Van Evera, * *' * * have sold and do grant and convey unto said party of the second part, * * the following goods and chattels, to-wit: The entire stock of drugs and medicines, oils, paints and all stock of every description…

<p> Appeal from Jackson Circuit Cov/rt. </p>

<p>1. Husband and Wife: wife as surety. Under tbe Revision a married woman did not subject iier separate property to liability by becoming surety for ber busband upon a promissory note.</p>

Action to recover of the defendant damages for the seduction of the plaintiff’s minor child; also, damages for maTieious prosecution. The plaintiff’s daughter, Jane Burtis, was employed for a short time as a servant in the defendant’s family, and about that time she became pregnant, and afterward was delivered of a still-born child. It was claimed by her that the defendant was the father of the child.

<p> Appeal from Mitchell Circuit Cowrt. </p> <p>Action to replevy certain grain. The plaintiff claims the grain by virtue of a chattel mortgage executed to him on the 30th day of June, and while the grain was growing. The defendant claims the grain by virtue of the levy of an execution against the mortgagor, made by him as sheriff of Mitchell county, on the 10th day of May previous. The grain was raised by the execution debtor upon leased premises. No actual possession was taken of the grain by the sheriff until August 30th, when it had been harvested and stacked by the ■debtor and some of it threshed. The execution in the meantime had expired and been returned, and another issued commanding a sale of the property levied upon. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the . defendant. The plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action to recover the amount of a bid alleged to have been made at a sheriff’s sale. The defendant in execution, one Partlow, owned an undivided half of four -acres of growing oats, and three-fifths of sixteen acres of growing wheat, and three-fifths of thirty acres of growing corn. The sheriff’s design was to levy upon and sell Partlow’s interest. The defendant in this action bid at the execution sale, and the property was struck off to him.

This is an action of replevin. The petition is in the usual form, and plaintiff avers therein that she is the absolute owner of a certain sewing machine; that she- acquired such ownership by purchase from one M. Backer, and that the detention thereof by defendants, “according to the best belief of the plaintiff, is that whereas M. Backer purchased the property first of an agent, and agreed to sell the same to plaintiff, and she was to pay him for the same, and he was to pay…

. It is stated in the petition that the plaintiff had been duly organized, and had properly certified to the defendant board of supervisors the amount required for teachers’, contingent and school-house fund, and had requested said board to levy taxes accordingly; that said board refused so to do, and the relief asked was a mandamus compelling the performance of the alleged duty.

The plaintiff claims of the defendant damages in the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars, for personal injuries received while repairing the defendant’s, house in October, 1876. There was a jury trial, and a verdict for plaintiff for one hundred and fifty dollars. The motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment was rendered on the verdict. The defendant appeals.

One William E. Henry, being the owner of certain real estate in Sioux City, conveyed the same to Mary E. Casady on the 2d day of July, 1858. Mary E. Casady conveyed said premises to P. M. Casady on the 20th day of February, 1865. P. M. Casady conveyed to O. C. Tredway, March 14, 1865. O. C. Tredway conveyed to John M. Tredway, the plaintiff herein, on the 24th day of January, 1877.

■ This is-an action .to recover an amount of'money paid, by the plaintiff for the keeping and. treatment of Isaac I).- Teller as a public patient in tbe hospital for the insane at Mount Pleasant.

<p>Appeal from Wapello Circuit Court.</p> <p>This action was commenced before a justice of the peace, to recover one hundred dollars upon a contract. Judgment was rendered by the justice for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court, where a verdict and judgment were had in his favor. Plaintiff now appeals to this court. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>

This action was brought against the defendants, A. R. and F. N. Dickey, upon an account for goods sold and delivered, and also upon an alleged indorsement of a promissory note, which indorsement was made by the defendant, F. N. Dickey, in the name of the payee, A. R. Dickey. The action was also brought against John Stewart, as the maker of the note. A. R. and E. N. Dickey alone defend. Judgment was rendered against Stewart by default, and against the Dickeys upon trial.

Action upon a certain contract for insurance. There was a verdict and - judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

<p> Appeal from Van Burén Circuit Cowrt. </p> <p>Action in equity. The petition states that the plaintiff was the owner of an interest in certain described real estate, and also certain grades, embankments, earth-works and other improvements in the nature of a road-bed' and right of way for a railroad situated in Van Burén county, Iowa, and used by the Burlington & Southwestern Railway Company for its road; that he “sold his interest in said lands to defendant Burlington & Southwestern Railway Company for the sum of one thousand three hundred dollars, for which said company gave their notes for eight hundred dollars, and paid the balance, five hundred dollars, in cash;” that said eight hundred dollars are still unpaid, as will appear by copies of notes annexed as exhibits “A” and “B;” that said company, in pursuance of said sale, took possession of said premises, and constructed its road thereon, and now occupies the same, and that E. B. Ward leased the road and agreed to pay its debts.</p> <p>John W. Brooks and Alpheus Hardy, by an amendment to the petition, were made defendants, and it was stated they claimed to be lien holders, but that whatever lien they may have is junior to that of plaintiff. _ The relief asked was that a vendor’s lien be established on said premises for the amount due on said notes. The railway company in its answer denied plaintiff was entitled to a vendor’s lien, and denied he had any lien, title or interest in the lands described in the petition, or that any portion of the same was sold by plaintiff to said company; alleges that whatever interest said company obtained to said lands it acquired by purchase of or consolidation with the Iowa & Missouri State Line Railway Company, and in consideration thereof assumed to pay certain liabilities of said State Line Company, in which the plaintiff was a stockholder.</p> <p>Brooks and Hardy insisted in their answer they were entitled to the prior lien by reason of the execution to them of a deed of trust or mortgage.</p> <p>The reply denied the allegations of the answers, and alleged the said trust deed had been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction. Judgment was rendered against the railway company for the amount due on the notes in 1874, and the issue as to the vendor’s lien was continued from term to term until October, 1877, when a decree in substantial accord with the relief asked was granted. The defendants appeal.</p>

Action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of an assault and battery committed by one Butcher, and also for damages for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.

Action in equity to settle a partnership account. The court found that there was due the plaintiff for capital furnished the sum of ten thousand dollars; that there was due the defendant, Wilmot, the sum of two thousand two hundred and seventy-nine dollars and forty-two cents, and to Mrs. C. M. Wilmot the sum of three hundred and eighty-six dollars and thirty-nine cents. It also found that certain other .sums were due to certain other creditors respectively.

App>eal from Jones Circuit Court. This action was commenced before a justice of the peace in Jones county by attachment of property. The defendant is a resident of Benton county. He appeared and moved to dismiss the action because of such fact, which motion was overruled, and thereupon he filed an answer denying the allegations of the petition.

The defendant Sherman obtained a judgment against W. W. King, and also another judgment against Julia King, wife of W. W. King. Executions were issued thereon, and placed in the hands of Leonard, as sheriff, who, by virtue thereof, levied on and took possession of certain articles of personal property. The plaintiff, claiming he was entitled to said goods b3^ virtue of a mortgage executed by Julia King, brought this action to recover the value of the goods.

Action to recover the value of certain personal property, alleged to belong to the plaintiff, which the defendants converted to their use. Trial by the court. Judgment for the plaintiff and defendants appeal.

The defendant Pinkerton and the plaintiff entered into a contract whereby the former agreed to erect gas works and supply the city and citizens thereof with gas. To enable him to do this there was granted to Pinkerton the right to lay down mains and pipes in the streets of the city. This contract was afterward assigned to the defendant, the Oskaloosa Gas Light Company.

■ Action to foreclose a mortgage. Several defenses .were interposed.. There was a reference, and a finding of facts by the referee. The report of the referee was confirmed by the court, and judgment in accord therewith for the defendants. The plaintiff appeals.

<p> Appeal from Cedar Circuit Court. </p>

Action in chancery. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for in plaintiff’s petition. Mitchell, the intervenor, appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

<p>Practice nsr the supreme court: errors must be argued.</p>

Action in clianceiy to recover against an administrator and the surety on his bond certain money alleged to have been received by the administrator for the use of the estate, for which he failed to account. Upon a final report the administrator had been discharged. The petition asks that the administrator be required to correct his report so as to show the receipt of the money, and that he be charged therewith, and judgment be entered against him and his surety therefor.

Action in chancery to subject certain lands, the title of which is held by defendant Fedilia Bogers, to a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the other defendant, the husband of Fedilia. There was a decree dismissing plaintiff’s petition. He appeals to this court.

A decree was entered in these actions in March, 1877, by the Circuit Court, which determined the rights of 'the several parties thereto as to the validity of certain bonds secured by a mortgage executed by the gas company. The Charter Oak Life Insurance Company was adjudged to be the owner of certain of said bonds. As to fifteen of them the decree provided that any person claiming to own the same might intervene, to the end that the ownership thereof might be determined.

Certain unsettled matters between plaintiff and defendant, as members of the partnership known as Brainerd & Wilson, publishing the Iowa City Republican, were referred to arbitration under a written stipulation expressly reserving therefrom the dispute between them over the division of the income from the deputyship of the Iowa City post-office.

<p>Towns: severance ok territory</p>

<p>Practice : refusal to grant jury trial.</p>

Action on a promissory note, payable to Delahaye & Purdy, and by them indorsed to plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that the consideration of the note was certain intoxicating liquors purchased by him of the payees, and that the plaintiff' received the same with the full knowledge it was given for intoxicating liquors sold in this State. There was a trial-to the court, judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Action to recover a fine of the defendant for selling beer within two miles of the corporate limits of .the town of Centerville, in violation of an ordinance of the town prohibiting such sales.

<p> Appeal from Mahasha Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action -in equity to set aside a conveyance of real estate made by Charles ■Campbell to the defendant I. 3S¡\ H. Campbell. The petition was dismissed on the merits, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Mechanic’s lien: railroads: contract: evidence.</p>