In re Koffler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The potential for deception is a different matter, for unlike newspaper, television or radio advertising, direct mail goes only to the addressee. The temptation for deception is, therefore, greater, and the probability of exposure less, than for those more public media. Enforcement of the State’s strong interest that “the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely” (Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 , 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1831 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 ) and that, to that end, there be effective oversight of members of the Bar is less probable, therefore, with respect to mail than to media advertising (see Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 466-467 , 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1924-1925 , 56 L.Ed.2d 444 , supra; Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Assn., 362 So.2d 489, 496 [La.]). That there is a substantial State interest to which the regulations are closely related does not end the inquiry, however, for complete suppression is not constitutional if the State’s interest can be adequately protected by more limited regulation. That it can be seems hardly open to question, in view, for example, of the filing requirement for retainer statements now contained in the Appellate Division’s rule 691.20 (22 NYCRR 691.20). That similar filing of a solicitation letter assures the public ample protection was the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky (Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 [Ky.], supra).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n

2. “To outlaw the use of letters, the content of which does not violate DR 2-101, addressed to those most likely to be in need of legal services, because in addition to “advertising” the nature of the service and its price the letters implicitly or explicitly suggest employment of the writer to perform those services, ignores the strong societal and individual interest in the free dissemination of truthful price information as a means of assuring informed and reliable decision making in our free enterprise system, about which both the Supreme Court (Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 , 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2699 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 supra) and we (People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 200 , 422 N.Y.S.2d 33 , 397 N.E.2d 724 , supra) have had occasion to comment, and can only be productive of confusion for the profession (see Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System, ch. 10). To do so, moreover, is to suggest that there is necessarily something improper about an attorney’s desire to earn a fee, and that there is something different about the legal profession that makes direct mail advertising improper though it would not be for other businesses or professions and though indirect forms of advertising are not improper even for the legal profession * * *.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n

3. “There is, however, obvious tension between these interests and the societal interest, already noted, in the free dissemination of truthful price information in order to assure “informed and reliable decisionmaking” (Bates, 433 U.S. 350, 364 , 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2699 , 53 L.Ed.2d 810 supra). It is in the light of that tension that the directness of relation of regulation to purpose is to be considered.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n