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51 Tex. Crim. 406

103 S.W 904

Stephens v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1907-05-01

<p>1. —Theft of Horse—Venue—Sufficient Evidence.</p> <p>Where in a trial for theft of a horse the evidence clearly supported the- verdict, to show that defendant took the animal in the county of the prosecution, there was no error.</p> <p>2. —Same—Charge of Court—Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>Where upon trial for the theft of a horse, the court in bis charge applied the reasonable doubt to all the facts in the case, as well as to the issue that the taking was in the county of the prosecution, there was no error in the objection to the charge on that ground.</p> <p>3. —Same—Indictment—Impossible Date.</p> <p>Where in a prosecution for the theft of a horse, the indictment charged the offense to have been committed on June 31, 1906, the same was an impossible date and the indictment is bad. Brooks, Judge, dissenting.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1907-05-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently March 2003

5 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1 ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.

BROOKS, Judge.

¶2 This case was affirmed on a former day of this term, and now comes before us on motion for rehearing. The only ground in the motion is that the court erred in holding that the indictment was sufficient. Appellant now, in his motion for rehearing, insists same is defective because it charges the offense to have been committed on June 31, 1906, same being an impossible date, and cites the following authorities: State v. Eubanks, 41 Texas, 291; Shoefercater v. State, 5 Texas Crim. App., 207; Hall v. State, 38 S. W. Rep., 996; Barnes v. State, 59 S. W. Rep., 882; Coleman v. State, 62 S. W. Rep., 753; McCoy v. State, 68 S. W. Rep., 686; Drummond v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 150, and Vallegas v. State, 66 S. W. Rep., 769. A majority of the court thinks this position is well taken, but the writer hereof, even conceding that any of the authorities cited support the proposition, yet the writer thinks the position is absurd. If the indictment had charged the defendant committed the offense on or about the 15th day of June, it could have been the 30th of June or the 1st of June, and yet a valid prosecution maintained. It does state the offense was committed in June, and the fact of it stating an impossible date in June would be merely surplusage, and would not vitiate a prosecution. So believing, I do not agree with the opinion, but in deference to the opinion of the majority of this court, the motion for rehearing is granted, the indictment is quashed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

¶3 Rehearing granted, and prosecution dismissed.

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