Commonwealth v. Townsend

¶1In both of these cases, the defendants have challenged the constitutionality of Virginia Code § 46.2-357 and assert that a conviction based on such a charge would be a violation of each defendant’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11, of the Virginia Constitution.1 In 1999, Virginia repealed §§ 46.2-351 through 46.2-355 of the Virginia Code, which sections governed the Declaration of Habitual Offenders of the Motor Vehicle laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Acts 1999, c. 945, 987. However, the legislature left in force Virginia Code § 46.2-357, a statute that provides for the punishment of convicted violators who previously have been declared habitual offenders.

¶2Both the Commonwealth and the defense seem to agree that the General Assembly’s repeal of §§ 46.2-351 to 46.2-355 has created a classification of *262similarly situated persons subject to dissimilar treatment. They further agree that, this classification thus must be analyzed under the three tier system of review described in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). It is further undisputed that the intermediate scrutiny is inapplicable to the case at bar, thus the question before the Court is whether the correct standard of review is strict scrutiny or rational basis. After a thorough review of the authorities cited and the arguments posed, the Court feels that the proper test is “rational basis.” The Court is further satisfied that the classification bears a “‘reasonable’ relation to a single ‘legitimate’ governmental objective.” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). It is unnecessary to inquire into the legislative history and determine what the basis of the legislation was, in fact, before the rational basis test is satisfied “if the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose.” Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 452 U.S. 176, 196 (1983).

¶3There can be no question that the General Assembly had a legitimate governmental objective in changing the habitual offender statute, i.e., highway safety, and further that it has a compelling interest in punishing those who disobey its laws, including those who break its motor vehicle laws. The change in the habitual offender statutes clearly bears a reasonable relationship to this governmental objective, besides repealing the habitual offender status, the very same bill made a number of other changes in the Virginia Code.2 It *263is patently clear from those changes that the General Assembly, rather than decreasing, is increasing the penalties for driving under the influence of intoxicants and while someone who is charged with driving under the influence, driving under the influence/manslaughter, or driving under the influence/maiming,3 they can no longer be declared an habitual offender. The person who commits those offenses is much worse off under the new statutory scheme, and, while the new statutory scheme treats certain individuals differently than those after the statutory changes, nonetheless, this disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals, the Court feels, had a rational basis which is all that the Equal Protection Clause requires. Therefore, this Court declines to adopt the defendant’s position that such a conviction would be in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11, of the Virginia Constitution.