Volume 510 — United States Reports

This is a list of all United States Supreme Court cases from volume 510 of the United States Reports:

Held: Sassower is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant cases, pursuant to this Court's Rule 39.8, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari nor any petitions for extraordinary writs from him in noncriminal matters, unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the important reasons discussed in Martin v.

Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that, in certain circumstances, a court may order that parents be reimbursed for unilaterally withdrawing disabled children from schools that do not comply with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), is a US labor law case in which the Supreme Court of the United States clarified the definition of a "hostile" or "abusive" work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a determination about whether a work environment is hostile or abusive requires a consideration of all relevant circumstances.

Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. The single question Izumi presented to this Court for review is whether the courts of appeals should routinely vacate district court final judgments at the parties' request when cases are settled on appeal.

Held: Absent exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to afford notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture. Pp. 48-62. (a) The seizure of Good's property implicates two "`explicit textual source[s] of constitutional protection,'" the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 70.

Held: Because the GAC 50 free funds are "plan assets," Hancock's actions in regard to their management and disposition must be judged against ERISA's fiduciary standards. Pp. 94-110. (a) The import of the pertinent ERISA provisions, read as a whole and in light of the statute's broad purpose of protecting retirement benefits, is reasonably clear.

Held: The Court of Appeals' decision was based on a manifest error. The District Court did not make the immunity finding as claimed by the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals overlooked evidence strongly supporting Burden's contention regarding an immunity deal.

Held: To give effect to § 5322(a)'s "willfulness" requirement, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the structuring he or she undertook was unlawful, not simply that the defendant's purpose was to circumvent a bank's reporting obligation.

Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994), is a Supreme Court of the United States case which held that commissioned military officers, who are appointed by the president of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, may be assigned to act as military judges without the need to be confirmed a second time by the Senate.

Held: The Mine Act's statutory-review scheme precludes a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act. Pp. 207-218. (a) In cases involving delayed judicial review of final agency actions, this Court finds that Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative body where such intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.

Held: Although this Court undoubtedly has the discretion to reach the State's argument that granting relief to Schiro would require the retroactive application of a new rule, in violation of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, the Court will not do so in the present circumstances, where the State did not raise the Teague argument either in the lower courts or in its brief in opposition to the…

National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) could apply to enterprises without economic motives; anti-abortion protesters could thus be prosecuted under it. An organization without an economic motive can still affect interstate or foreign commerce and thus satisfy the Act's definition of a racketeering enterprise.

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that there is no substantive due process violation that creates liability under Section 1983 when the police arrests someone for conduct that is not unlawful. It was a plurality decision.

Held: Manso's false testimony under oath before the ALJ did not preclude the Board from granting him reinstatement with backpay.

Held: Section 11503 does not limit the States' discretion to exempt non-railroad property, but not railroad property, from generally applicable ad valorem property taxes. Pp. 338-348.

Held: inter alia, that the Airlines have an implied right of action under the AHTA, but not the AAIA, and no cause of action under the Commerce Clause, and that the challenged fees are not unreasonable under the AHTA. The Court of Appeals affirmed in principal part, but held that the Airport had misallocated fees for the cost of providing "crash, fire, and rescue" (CFR) services. Held: 1.

Held: Because the State argued in the certiorari petition, as it had in the courts below and as it does in its brief on the merits, that the nonretroactivity principle barred the relief sought by respondent, this Court must apply Teague analysis before considering the merits of respondent's claim. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 466-467.

Held: Because the Uintah Reservation has been diminished by Congress, the town of Myton is not in Indian country and the Utah courts properly exercised criminal jurisdiction over petitioner. Pp. 409-422. (a) This Court declines to consider whether the State of Utah, which was a party to the Tenth Circuit proceedings in Ute Indian Tribe, should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the reservation boundaries.

Held: In admiralty cases filed in a state court under the Jones Act and the "saving to suitors clause," federal law does not pre-empt state law regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Pp. 446-457.

Held: FSLIC's sovereign immunity has been waived. Pp. 475-483. (a) Meyer's constitutional tort claim is not "cognizable" under § 1346(b) because that section does not provide a cause of action for such a claim.

Held: The Privacy Act forbids the disclosure of employee addresses to collective-bargaining representatives pursuant to requests made under the Labor Statute. Pp. 492-504.

Held: however, that the Al-Azzawy decision could not be used to Elder's advantage. Although typing the qualified immunity inquiry a pure question of law, the court read this Court's decision in Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, to require plaintiffs to present to the district court, as "legal facts," the cases showing that the right asserted was clearly established.

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the standards governing awards of attorneys' fees in copyright cases. The Copyright Act of 1976 authorizes, but does not require, the court to award attorneys' fees to "the prevailing party" in a copyright action. In Fogerty, the Court held that such attorneys'-fees awards are discretionary, and that the same standards should be applied in the case of a prevailing plaintiff and a prevailing defendant.

Held: Required recusal under § 455(a) is subject to the limitation that has come to be known as the "extrajudicial source" doctrine. Pp. 543-556. (a) The doctrine—see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 583—applies to § 455(a).

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court copyright law case that established that a commercial parody can qualify as fair use. This case established that the fact that money is made by a work does not make it impossible for fair use to apply; it is merely one of the components of a fair use analysis.

Held: generally ought not entertain a request for an injunction or declaratory judgment regarding the validity of an administrative regulation unless it is brought by someone who has actually been concretely affected by the regulation. Id., at 57-58. The mere existence of the regulation, we held, was not enough; rather, the regulation must actually have been applied to the plaintiff.