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← 511 F.3d 1072 - Teigen v. Renfrow

Teigen v. Renfrow’s Empirical Analysis

511 F.3d 1072 · 2007

Citation profile

99
cited by 99 later decisions
July 2024
most recently cited

20 federal appellate · 35 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 99 later decisions — most recently July 2024 · most notably Khalik v. United Air Lines (2012), Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins (2011)

20 federal appellate · 35 district ·

740200720102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill · Village of Willowbrook v. Olech · Olim v. Wakinekona

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 99 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Such an interest arises not from the Due Process Clause of the Constitution itself, but is `created by independent sources such as a state or federal statute, a municipal charter or ordinance, or an implied or express contract.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “bare retaliation claim ... simply cannot form the basis for a constitutional equal protection violation”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The subtle distinction between the right to be selected for promotion and the right to take part in the promotion process is insufficient to salvage Plaintiffs’ due process claims. This court has explained “it is well established that an entitlement to nothing but procedure cannot be the basis for a property interest.” [Robbins v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d 1074, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006) ] (quotation omitted). This is because “[pjrocess is not an end in itself,” but instead serves only “to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 , 103 S.Ct. 1741 , 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). Although detailed and extensive procedural requirements may be relevant as to whether a separate substantive property interest exists, see [Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.1998) ], the procedures cannot themselves constitute the property interest. Here, Plaintiffs’ claimed entitlement to be considered for promotion in accordance with the state system of merit is no more than a claim of entitlement to a fair process. Even assuming state law grants every state employee the right to be fairly considered for promotion, this right is not itself a substantive right, but rather a vehicle for arriving at the ultimate promotion decision. Where state law is not sufficiently restrictive to create a property interest in the underlying decision, there can be no property interest in the procedure used”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.