511 F. Supp. 2d 539 - MacK v. AAA Mid-Atlantic, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. · Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald · Guy v. Liederbach
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. (2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“As part of her AAA membership, [the fiancée] is entitled to emergency road service for any vehicle in which she is present, whether she is the driver or merely a passenger. This will naturally create incidental beneficiaries, because the driver of a vehicle in which [the fiancée] is traveling may receive towing services under [the fianeée’s] policy. But such incidental benefits do not create contractual rights, and these incidental beneficiaries are not themselves independently entitled to any services from AAA.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) that the snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians travelling thereon; (2) that the property owner had notice, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such condition; [and] (3) that it was the dangerous accumulation of snow and ice which caused the plaintiff to fall.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.