Commonwealth v. Maguigan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

62 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The purposes and necessities of the relations between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, on the part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosure to the attorney of the client’s objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the attorney’s honor and fidelity. To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance. Based upon considerations of public policy, therefore, the law wisely declares that all confidential communications and disclosures, made by a client to his legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged; — that the attorney shall not be permitted, without the consent of his client, — and much less will he be compelled — to reveal or disclose communications made to him under such circumstances.” 2 Mechara on Agency, 2d Ed., § 2297.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Investigating Grand Jury · Commonwealth v. Sims

2. “In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Estate of Wood · In Re Investigating Grand Jury

3. “Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States cited a similar provision in the Iowa Professional Responsibility Code for Lawyers in Nix v. Whiteside, [475] U.S. [157], 106 S.Ct. 988 , 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), noting that an exception to the attorney's duty of confidentiality is a client's announced intention to commit a crime. Although this decision is not binding upon us, we find it persuasive. Thus we must reject appellee's assertion that the information concerning Aquino's whereabouts is privileged. Our conclusion as to the impact of the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility is also buttressed by the following formal opinion of the American Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, which addressed an almost identical factual circumstance: When the communication by the client to his attorney is in respect to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing wrong, the communication is not privileged. One who is actually engaged in committing a wrong can have no privileged witnesses, and public policy forbids that an attorney should assist in the commission thereof, or permit the relation of attorney and client to conceal the wrongdoing. A defendant in a criminal case when admitted to bail is not only regarded as in the custody of his bail, but he is also in the custody of the law, and admission to bail does not deprive the court of its inherent power to deal with the person of the prisoner. Being in lawful custody, the defendant is guilty of a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 221 N.J. Super. 187 - Matter of Nackson