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512 F.2d 881

Docket No. 75-1387

St. Jules v. Savage

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided May 12, 1975.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 16, 1975.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1975-05-12

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently January 1977

5 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Petitioners for federal habeas corpus need not exhaust state remedies when it is plain that resort to the state courts would be futile. If the state’s highest court has recently rendered an adverse decision in an identical case, and if there is no reason to believe that the state court will change its position, a federal court should not dismiss a petition for federal habeas corpus for failure to exhaust remedies.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 415 F. Supp. 1271 - Copeland v. Mississippi

Relies on Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York · Layton v. Carson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1975-05-12

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Summary Calendar.*

¶2Raul A. Rodriguez, pro se.

¶3Dunklin Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondents-appellees.

¶4Before ■ THORNBERRY, MORGAN and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

¶6PER CURIAM:

¶7Appellant St. Jules, together with 12 other petitioners, all inmates of the Texas Department of Corrections, brought a “class action” habeas claim, challenging *882the constitutionality of the former Texas enhancement statute, Art. 63 (now § 12.-42(d)) of the Texas Penal Code, Y.T.C.A., as it applied to them and others similarly situated, who are serving mandatory life terms under Article 63 after having been convicted following pleas of not guilty. Appellant contends that: (1) the enhancement statute is used as a tool to coerce guilty pleas; and (2) the petitioners have been denied equal protection as members of a class since they have been subjected to greater punishment by electing to go to trial. He admits that, with the exception of petitioner Stratman, who applied unsuccessfully for state habeas relief on the same grounds, the petitioners have failed to exhaust state remedies, but he contends that this is an unnecessary requirement under Layton v. Carson, 5 Cir., 1973, 479 F.2d 1275, because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rendered an adverse decision in Stratman’s case,1 and there is no reason to believe that the state court will change its position.

¶8The district court dismissed the petitioners’ action without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, holding that Layton v. Carson did not apply because the nature of sentencing is such that each challenge should be considered individually, and the petitioners had failed to show that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would not fairly consider the claim of each petitioner on the merits.

¶9Appellants’ challenge is aimed not at each individual sentence, however, but at the alleged systematic use of Article 63 to deprive appellants’ and members of their class of their rights to due process and equal protection. In Stratman’s case, the Texas court rejected, without opinion, this precise contention, the same contention which would be made by all other appellants. Appellants present a single constitutional challenge; individual consideration of each petition would serve no useful purpose since the Texas court has made clear that it considers the point to be without merit. This is exactly the sort of situation for which the Layton rule was devised. We reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.2

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