Bell v. Bell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 federal appellate · 2 district · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[The requirement that] prosecutors disclose tacit agreements is undoubtedly the correct result, as the same policies justifying the disclosure of explicit agreements also compel the disclosure of tacit agreements. Like explicit agreements, tacit agreements are likely to be relevant to credibility, and therefore should be disclosed to the jury. Indeed, tacit agreements may be more likely to skew the witness’s testimony. In the case of an explicit agreement, the testifying witness will know what he can expect to receive in exchange for his testimony, and will know the conditions he must fulfill. When a witness is instead led to believe that favorable testimony will be rewarded in some unspecified way, the witness may justifiably expect that the more valuable his testimony, the more valuable his reward. The threat of incorrect jury verdicts is further increased by tacit agreements because, when testifying, a witness whose agreement is tacit, rather than explicit, can state that he has not received any promises or benefits in exchange for his testimony.... Likewise the prosecutor can argue to the jury that the witness is testifying disinterestedly, 16 which artificially increases the witness’s credibility-artificially, that is, because the premise of the argument is false.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Douglas v. Workman

2. “In Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ], the Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87 , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 . “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” Owens [v. Guida], 549 F.3d [399] at 415 [ (6th Cir.2008) ] (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). A defendant is prejudiced when there is “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Akrawi v. Booker

3. “The government is free to reward witnesses for their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without disclosing to the defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.... [T]he fact that a prosecutor afforded favorable treatment to a government witness, standing alone, does not establish the existence of an underlying promise of leniency in exchange for testimony.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rippo v. State