Common Cause v. Bolger’s Empirical Analysis
1980
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 5 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently August 2014 · most notably Fulani v. League of Women Voters Education Fund (1989), United States v. McGhee (1996)
15 federal appellate · 5 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 2 U.S.C. § 441A (§ 315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971) · 31 U.S.C. § 321 · 39 U.S.C. § 101 (Air Carriage of International Mail Act) · 39 U.S.C. § 3210 · 5 U.S.C. § 706 · 5 U.S.C. § 908
Relies on Warth v. Seldin · Baker v. Carr · Buckley v. Valeo · Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp · Flast v. Cohen
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“This dispute over standing boils down to a dispute over the role of ... elections in our political system. If the purpose of campaigns is only to elect candidates, then defendants’ and intervenor’s arguments concerning causation and resultant lack of standing might have some weight. [National] campaigns, however, serve other purposes besides electing particular candidates to office. They are also used to educate the public, to advance unpopular ideas, and to protest the political order, even if the particular candidate has little hope of election. The First Amendment most certainly protects political advocacy of this type, and infringements of these rights can occur regardless of the success or failure of a particular candidate at the polls. Thus, the causation requirement is satisfied here, for the asserted harm, and its remedy, are not dependent upon electoral outcome, but on the existence of the franking statute and the conduct permitted under its aegis.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“accepted” Appellants' characterization of their injury. We believe we have “accepted” Appellants’ characterization only in the sense that courts routinely . "accept” legal propositions advanced by parties: namely, for the limited purpose of assessing the viability of such a proposition under the law. Like Judge Batchelder, we reject Appellants' contention that they have suffered a judicially cognizable "vote dilution” injury. However, because our survey of the case law indicates that Appellants have advanced a fairly novel view of "vote dilution,” we have undertaken a review of classic vote-dilution cases, and have endeavored to show that Appellants’ asserted injury differs from the injuries claimed in those cases in certain legally significant ways. 12 . The court noted that an organization such as Common Cause "stands in the shoes of its members in determining whether there is standing.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Where a jurisdictional challenge is repeated, however, as is the case where standing is in issue, the “law of the case” requirement is less rigid. Earlier jurisdictional rulings are entitled to important, but not dispositive weight ... If it can be shown that controlling authority has subsequently taken a clearly contrary view of the issue, then the renewed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction may be appropriately filed and may prevail.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wright v. Regan
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.