512 F. Supp. 2d 792 - Silva v. Chertoff’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
1 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 621 (§ 2 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 29 U.S.C. § 623 (§ 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 29 U.S.C. § 631 (§ 12 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 29 U.S.C. § 705 · 29 U.S.C. § 791 · 29 U.S.C. § 794 · 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (§ 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) · 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (§ 101 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990)
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Conley v. Gibson · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““[T]he ‘scope’ of the judicial complaint is limited [only] to the 'scope' of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” In other words, an employee’s Rehabilitation Act claims in federal court are not limited solely to the specific claim or claims the employee made in his initial EEOC charge. The employee may also raise claims based upon any kind of discrimination which is similar or related to the initial EEOC charge’s allegations, so long as the EEOC investigation could reasonably have been expected to encompass the additional theory of liability.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“nearly identical” circumstances because the employee outside the plaintiff's protected class who allegedly received more favorable treatment did not have the same supervisor); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores (No. 471), 891 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir.1990) (determining that the plaintiff and the employee outside her protected class who allegedly received preferential treatment were not similarly situated where the employer discharged the plaintiff because the plaintiff violated its non-fraternization policy and the other employee’s conduct did not involve the employer's non-fraternization policy).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.