¶1dissenting.
¶2I find that I am in accord with the opinion of the First District in this case penned by Judge Ratliff, appearing as Jordan v. State (1986), Ind.App., 499 N.E.2d 759, in which that court concluded that the post-conviction rules should be declared available as a procedure to challenge a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency when that adjudication was based upon conduct which would amount to a crime if committed by an adult. There are many ways in which the rights of juveniles, to counsel and to the reasonable doubt standard for example, parallel those rights of criminal defendants. It is plain to me that a juvenile, falling into the category identified by the First District, must as a matter of due process have some procedure available through which to challenge an adjudication after appeal time has expired, after he has turned eighteen and may yet face injurious consequences as a result of the adjudication, and most importantly on legal grounds. The statutory process of ex-pungement does not fill the requirement, because it is based, not upon a claim of illegal adjudication, but upon successful completion of the sanctions imposed by reason of the adjudication.
¶3In order therefore, not to create a new procedure to implement the due process right of the juvenile to seek post-adjudication redress, after the time for appeal has expired, I would bring cases such as this under the umbrella of the present post-conviction remedy rules. My judgment is that the number of those who would seek use of the rules for this purpose would be small, and thus the cost of applicability would be modest. On the other hand, by declaring the rule available, we would be extending a benefit which can have real consequences in individual cases, and which would narrow the inevitable gap between that which the constitutions and laws promise, and that which our human judicial institutions deliver.
¶4DICKSON, J., concurs.