¶1*32Raymond A. LaFazia, Providence, R. I., with whom J. Renn Olenn and Gunning, LaFazia, Gnys & Selya, Providence, R. I., were on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
¶2William A. Friedlander, Atty., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, with whom Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., Providence, R. I., Gilbert E. Andrews, Elmer J. Kelsy and Wesley J. Filer, Attys., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.
¶3Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McEN-TEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
¶5Plaintiff Eric Nickerson and his son Warren jointly own Nickerson’s Garage in Little Compton, R. I. In January 1974 the Internal Revenue Service filed a tax lien on all Warren’s property. In June the service levied on and took possession of the garage, denying Eric access to the premises and certain of his own personal property located thereon. This levy was released two days later when Warren agreed to make payments satisfying his outstanding tax liabilities. In July Eric brought suit to obtain a declaration that the government had no right to seize property held jointly with his son or owned outright. He also sought an injunction restraining the United States from levying on these interests to satisfy Warren’s tax deficiencies. The district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and Eric appeals.
¶6It is well settled that the United States may not be sued absent • a waiver of its sovereign immunity. See, *33e. g., Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501, 87 S.Ct. 1188, 18 L.Ed.2d 244 (1967). Nickerson claims to have found such a waiver in 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a),1 which he alleges should be construed to permit such suit whenever there has been a levy even if, as in the present case, the levy has been released and is no longer outstanding. While the wording of the statute does not specifically foreclose such a construction2 at least one court has refused to enjoin a threatened first levy noting that the statute reaches only “existing” levies, American Pacific Investment Corp. v. Nash, 342 F.Supp. 797, 799 (D.N.J.1972), and no other court has exercised jurisdiction absent such a levy.3 This construction derives support from the fact that the exclusive remedies of subsection (b) seem to contemplate an existing levy. Mindful of the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed, McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27, 72 S.Ct. 17, 96 L.Ed. 26 (1951), we believe the district court correctly held § 7426 inapplicable.
¶7Nickerson also adverts to 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1) providing that the United States may be named a party in a civil action to quiet title to property in which it claims a lien, but the lien against Warren’s property does not encumber Eric’s joint interest, so this section is inapplicable. Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1964).4 Finally, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, does not confer jurisdiction but merely grants an additional remedy in cases where jurisdiction already exists. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950). Hence it does not avail Nickerson.
¶8Affirmed.