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← 513 F.3d 1057 - Jackson v. Brown

Jackson v. Brown’s Empirical Analysis

513 F.3d 1057 · 2008

Citation profile

75
cited by 75 later decisions
2
states following
May 2025
most recently cited

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 75 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably United States v. Stinson (2011), United States v. Mincoff (2009)

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 2 state decisions

580200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Slack v. McDaniel · Williams v. Taylor · United States v. Bagley

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[E]ven if the jury disbelieved [the false testimony] entirely ... there still is no 'reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[W]e disagree with the State’s analysis. Napue applies whenever a prosecution “ ‘knew or should have known that the testimony was false.’ ” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003)).... [T]he prosecutor has a clear Brady obligation to investigate whether the police have evidence favorable to the defendant. [Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ] (“[A]ny argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the government’s obligation to ensure fair trials.”); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (“[Wjhether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor.”). If the prosecutor has a duty to investigate and disclose favorable evidence known only to the police, he “should know” when a witness testifies falsely about such evidence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We review the district court’s decision to grant habeas relief de novo. We review de novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, whether decided by the district court or the state courts. The district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. We therefore accept its findings ‘absent a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ State court factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness, subject to eight exceptions enumerated in the previous version of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.