¶2The appellant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(2), Code of Alabama (1975), in the district court of Mobile County. He was fined $250.00 plus court costs and ordered to attend D.U.I. school. Thereafter, appellant appealed his conviction to the Mobile County Circuit Court and a trial de novo was held in front of a jury. The appellant was again found guilty; he was sentenced to 30 days in the county jail, fined $500.00 plus court costs, and ordered to attend D.U.I. School.
455 So.2d at 185.¶4 "[W]e find the language of the statute clearly sets out the standard of guilt. A person is guilty of violating § 32-5A-191(a)(2) if he drives a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, regardless of the degree of that influence.
¶5 "This statute is not vague because the legislature plainly stated in the statute which conduct is prohibited. We hold that § 32-5A-191(a)(2) is therefore constitutional and is not void for vagueness."
¶7 "Christopher T. Jemison, did unlawfully operate a motor vehicle upon a public roadway by driving said motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of § 32-5A-191 of the Code of Alabama, and contrary to the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."
¶8This court has previously said:
Matthews v. State, 401 So.2d 241, 245 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert.denied, 401 So.2d 248 (Ala. 1981). See also Wilder v. State,401 So.2d 151 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 167 (Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606,70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981). It is clear that the appellant was sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the offense to enable him to prepare a defense.¶9 "Pursuant to § 15-8-25, Code of Alabama 1975, an indictment must state the facts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, in such a manner as to enable a person of common *49 understanding to know what is intended. It must likewise inform the accused not only of the nature of the offense, but also of the particular act or means by which it was committed. Harrison [v. State, 384 So.2d 641, 643 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980)]."
¶11In the case sub judice, the officer administering the test was a state trooper and the following transpired at trial:
¶12 "[Prosecutor]: During your training, were you taught that the procedures on this card [procedures for administering the P.E.I. test] that you attached to the ticket, were approved by the State Board of Health?
¶13"[Officer]: Yes, ma'am, we were."
¶14The officer's certification card was admitted into evidence; he testified that he had administered the P.E.I. test hundreds of times before; he further testified that before he used the instrument on the appellant, he checked to insure that it had been tested for accuracy; and he testified that he followed the apparatus procedure card in administering the P.E.I. test on the appellant. It is clear that the proper predicate was laid for the admission of the P.E.I. test results, which showed that the appellant's blood-alcohol content was 0. 19 percent.
¶16 "[T]he law says that a person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while 1) there is .10 percent or more by weight, of alcohol in his blood; 2) under the influence of alcohol."
¶17Thus, the trial judge charged the jury on both §32-5A-191(a)(2) and § 32-5A-191(a)(1). However, this court has recently held that a jury charge which instructed the jury as to the elements of both subsections, although the appellant was only indicted under § 32-5A-191(a)(2), as in the instant case, was proper. Jones v. State, 513 So.2d 50 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). In finding that the judge's instructions did not constitute a fatal variance from the solicitor's *50 complaint, this court stated that "the instructions of the trial judge did not authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of an offense with which he was not charged.Boyd [v. City of Montgomery, 472 So.2d 694 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985)]. Here, the defendant was not convicted of the same crime under a different set of facts than those charged in the complaint."Id. As in the present case, the appellant in Jones was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.
¶19AFFIRMED.
¶20All the Judges concur, with PATTERSON, J., concurring in the result only.