Dulak v. Dulak’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 25 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . Thus, before a testament may be set aside on the grounds of undue influence the contestant must prove: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) the effective operation of such influence so as to subvert or overpower the mind of the testator at the time of the execution of the testament; and (3) the execution of a testament which the maker thereof would not have executed but for such influence. See: Stewart v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App. (1925), 271 S.W. 311 , wr. refused; Olds v. Traylor, Tex.Civ.App. (1944), 180 S.W.2d 511 , wr. refused. “. . . It is the law in Texas that a will cannot be set aside on proof of facts which at the most do no more than show an opportunity to exercise influence. Burgess v. Sylvester, Tex.Civ.App. (1944), 177 S.W.2d 271 ; affirmed, 143 Tex. 25 , 182 S.W.2d 358 . The establishment of the circumstances of having an opportunity to exert such influence due to being in a position of caring for the person upon whom the influence is supposed to be exerted is equally consistent with the theory of innocence as it is with the theory of wrongdoing. Price v. Taliaferro, Tex.Civ.App. (1952), 254 S.W.2d 157 , wr. ref. n. r. e.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Texas A & M University v. Ward · Stieler v. Stieler

2. “. In Griffin Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), decided today, this court has ruled that the Family Code has abolished the doctrine of virtual representation where by the husband could act for and represent the wife in an action concerning their joint community property. Section 5.22 of the Family Code terminated that practice, and in the case of joint management community property, the wife is now a joint manager. She is as individual as is her husband. Her rights, like his, may be affected only in an action which calls her to answer the same as any other joint owning individual.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Roper v. Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc.

3. “In Cooper, supra, we made the further ruling that the omission of one of the spouses as a party in an action concerning their joint community property no longer renders a judgment void. Since jurisdiction with respect to the non-joinder of parties is now de-emphasized by force of amended Rule 39, we conclude that failure to join Helen Dulak in the suit below was not a jurisdictional defect and the judgment, unless otherwise erroneous, is binding upon those who were parties to the suit.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dr. Donald R. Klein & Associates, M.D., P.A. v. Klein