¶1(concurring in part and dissenting in part) :
¶2I agree that the initial arrest was legal; that the intoxicated condition of defendant, without the odor of alcohol, coupled with the presence of the pills, in plain view on the automobile seat, gave sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant for intoxication and possession of contraband; and *1200that the subsequent search of the vehicle was incident to the arrest. I also agree that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show intent to distribute; but I disagree with this Court’s harmless error treatment of the prosecutor’s improper trial conduct. If the prosecutor’s conduct was “highly improper,” and if his improper conduct “might tend to leave an unsupportable impression on the jury,” and if his conduct might have placed defendant’s character at issue because of insinuations that defendant might have been guilty of other crimes, I believe the cumulative effect of such conduct must have caused some prejudice. Because of continuous improper conduct, prejudice can creep into the trial much the same as the sea erodes the shore; and it should not be permitted to occur. To the defense counsel, the harmless error concept soon becomes like a bingo game. How many harmless errors can the prosecution commit, before it becomes recognizable error? Consequently, I would modify the sentence imposed; otherwise, I concur in this decision.