Fautenberry v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Even if we assume [the medical expert] did misdiagnose [the defendant], `[a] licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary.' Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 772 (6th Cir.2006). [The defendant] has not shown that counsel had `good reason' to believe that [the medical expert] was incompetent, and we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely upon the doctor's opinions and conclusions. See Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 531, 555 (6th Cir.2001) (holding, in a case where there was `no evidence that [the expert] was incompetent[] or that [the petitioner's] lawyers had any reason to question [the expert's] professional qualifications,' that `it was objectively reasonable for ... trial counsel to rely upon [the expert's] diagnosis'). Under these circumstances, any inadequacies in [the doctor's] expert assistance—assuming there were any—cannot be the basis for a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim. Accordingly, we find no deficiency in counsels' performance." Fautenberry, 515 F.3d at 625-26 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Carter v. Bogan · 398 Ill. App. 3d 890 - People v. JACOBAZZI

2. “The remainder of the alleged Brady evidence — evidence regarding [the third victim’s] arguments prior to his disappearance, the sexual nature of the murders, and Fautenberry’s depression and suicidal inclinations — is not material for Brady purposes. In fact, the evidence is virtually insignificant in light of the overwhelming evidence both of guilt (i.e., the confessions to [a FBI agent, a Portland police officer, and an ex-girlfriend] and the physical evidence connecting Fautenberry to [the third victim’s] murder) and the sentencing specifications (i.e., the three-judge panel’s finding that the “mitigating factors pale before the simple fact that [Fautenberry’s] actions were plotted, vicious, persistente] and utterly callous”). Considering as we must the cumulative effect of all the alleged Brady evidence, we conclude that Fautenberry has failed to establish a “reasonable probability” that the disclosure of this evidence would have altered either his decision to enter a no-contest plea or the three-judge panel’s sentence of death.... Because this evidence is not material under Brady, Fautenberry cannot show prejudice to excuse his procedural default---- And because Fautenberry cannot establish prejudice to excuse his procedurally defaulted Brady claim, he is not entitled to habeas relief on that basis.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 925 F. Supp. 2d 927 - Cone v. Colson

3. “First, the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner’s claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule. Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction. Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture is an adequate and independent state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 557 F. Supp. 2d 843 - Sowell v. Collins