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← 516 F.3d 1273 - Huff v. Dekalb County

Huff v. Dekalb County’s Empirical Analysis

516 F.3d 1273 · 2008

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
2
states following
July 2023
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently July 2023 · most notably Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia (2008), James River Insurance v. Ground Down Engineering, Inc. (2008)

11 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

160200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 29 U.S.C. § 203 · 29 U.S.C. § 207 · 29 U.S.C. § 213

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Corning Glass Works v. Brennan · West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey · Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker · Cooper v. Southern Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It is undisputed that all Plaintiffs have advanced firefighting training. It is also undisputed that the DCFRS has equipped them with “turn-out” gear, sends them regularly to fire scenes, and requires them to be available to assist with fire suppression if they are needed _ Further, the DCFRS Fire Captains testified that if the Plaintiffs were ordered to engage in fire suppression, they must do so, or be subject to discipline. While the incident commanders evidently do not, as a matter of policy, order [firemen/paramedics] to engage in fire suppression, this does not mean that the [firemen/paramedics] do not have a “responsibility” to engage in fire suppression if ordered. Finally, fire suppression is in each Plaintiffs job description. All Plaintiffs therefore have the “responsibility” to engage in fire suppression within the meaning of § 203(y). While the actual exercise of this responsibility may be contingent on the particular demands of a fire scene, it does not make the responsibility less real.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(y) “Employee in fire protection activities” means an employee, including a firefighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue worker, ambulance personnel, or hazardous materials worker, who— (1) is trained in fire suppression, has the legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression, and is employed by a fire department of a municipality, county, fire district, or State; and (2) is engaged in the prevention, control, and extinguishment of fires or response to emergency situations where life, property, or the environment is at risk.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A district court's decision regarding striking testimony ... is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.