State v. Danh’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘Package deal’ agreements are generally dangerous because of the risk of coercion; this is particularly so in cases involving related third parties, where there is a risk that a defendant, who would otherwise exercise his or her right to a jury trial, will plead guilty out of a sense of family loyalty. “In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 364 n. 8, 98 S. Ct. 663 , 668-69 n. 8, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that these types of agreements ‘might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing tire assessment of the risks a defendant must consider.’ Other states and federal circuit courts hold that ‘package deal’ agreements are not per se invalid. E.g., In re Ibarra, 34 Cal. 3d 277 , 193 Cal. Rptr. 538 , 666 P.2d 980, 986 (Cal. 1983); United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 741 (2nd Cir. 1990); See also Bruce A. Green, ‘Package’ Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor’s Duty of Good Faith, 25 Crim. L. Bull. 507 , 516-521 (1989). However, several courts hold that this type of plea is per se involuntary if the prosecutor , did not have probable cause to charge the third party. See e.g., In re Ibarra, 193 Cal. Rptr at 545, 666 P.2d at 987 ; United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) “Many courts which have addressed this issue note that the trial court must exercise special care to ascertain the voluntariness of such pleas. E.g., United States v. Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 398 (1st Cir. 1978). In practice, however, a thorough,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bey

2. “We agree with the First Circuit Court of Appeals that “a later hearing cannot replace a full inquiry into voluntariness at the time the plea is entered.” United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 80 (1st Cir.1987). We also note that the Supreme Court has stated, “There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge against him.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (emphasis in original). Because voluntariness is equal in importance to knowingness, it should also be apparent from the record at the time of the plea. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (“It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary!)]”). Finally, this court, in State v. Casarez, 295 Minn. 534, 536 , 203 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1973), similarly held that a guilty plea must appear on the record to have been voluntarily and intelligently made. In that case, we noted that the transcripts from the appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing hearings were so incomplete that we could not determine whether the appellant had “properly waived all of his rights.” We went on to note, “Nor is there anything in the record showing that the trial judge discussed the consequences of the plea so that defendant would h”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Butala v. State

3. “In future cases, a defendant must be allowed to withdraw his or her guilty plea if the state fails to fully inform the trial court of the nature of the plea, or if the trial court fails to adequately inquire into the voluntariness of the plea at the time of the guilty plea.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Butala v. State