State v. Veith

                                                                 Office of the Director       New Mexico
                                                                  11:51:07 2022.08.31         Compilation
                                                                                '00'06-       Commission


          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: February 3, 2022

No. A-1-CA-39059

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

APRIL L. VEITH,

       Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
Curtis R. Gurley, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
John Kloss, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Caitlin C.M. Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

                                         OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1}    Defendant April Veith was charged by criminal complaint in magistrate court with
petty misdemeanor battery, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-4 (1963). The
magistrate court dismissed the criminal complaint, and the State appealed to the district
court. The district court determined Defendant’s arrest was illegal and remanded to
magistrate court for imposition of the magistrate court’s dismissal order. The State
appeals the district court’s remand order and argues (1) NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-6
(1983) provided statutory authority for Defendant’s arrest; (2) Defendant’s warrantless
arrest was not a violation of the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) the district court erred
in concluding dismissal was the appropriate remedy. We reverse.
BACKGROUND

{2}    The parties stipulated that the following facts from the arresting officer’s probable
cause statement were true for purposes of resolving Defendant’s motion. Deputy
Deprez was dispatched to a middle school parking lot based on a call in which someone
reported that “April” (later identified as Defendant) was attacking the caller’s mother
outside of the school gym. Upon his arrival at the school, Deputy Deprez observed
multiple people attempting to keep Defendant and Jennifer Hebert apart. Deputy Deprez
noticed Hebert was taking deep breaths, seemed emotional, and that Defendant had
blood on her face. He made sure neither party needed medical attention before
beginning his on-the-scene investigation.

{3}     Deputy Deprez spoke to Hebert, Defendant, Defendant’s husband, and two
witnesses while at the scene. Hebert told Deputy Deprez that as she was getting ready
to leave and as she was putting her children in her car, Defendant walked up to her and
told her she did not have any “beef” with her, but then got in her face and started yelling
at her. Hebert stated that Defendant was trying to get her to fight. Hebert explained she
told Defendant she did not want to fight and yelled for Defendant’s husband to come get
Defendant. Hebert told Deputy Deprez that Defendant pushed her, grabbed her by her
shirt, shoved her against a wall, and asked if she was scared of her. Hebert went on to
say that Defendant began to choke her so she defended herself by punching Defendant
in the face. She said they both fought until Defendant’s husband and another person
separated them.

{4}   Deputy Deprez spoke to Defendant who said she had wanted to confront Hebert
about a guy they both previously dated, but that she did not have any “beef” about it.
Defendant stated Hebert pushed her and she had to defend herself. Later, Defendant
changed her story and stated Hebert initially pulled her hair. Deputy Deprez could smell
alcohol on Defendant’s breath and asked her if she had anything to drink that day.
Defendant answered that she had been drinking.

{5}    Deputy Deprez spoke to Defendant’s husband who explained that when he and
Defendant arrived at the school, Defendant approached Hebert. He stated he knew the
two had a previous conflict so he attempted to avoid the situation by remaining in his
car. He said he did not see who started the altercation, but saw the two fighting so he
separated his wife from the situation. Deputy Deprez also spoke to two witnesses who
explained Defendant initiated the physical altercation. After completing his interviews of
the parties and witnesses, Deputy Deprez arrested Defendant without a warrant and
took her to the detention center. Defendant was later charged with battery.

{6}    During proceedings in magistrate court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or in
the alternative to suppress evidence, arguing the arrest violated the misdemeanor arrest
rule and that the criminal complaint should be dismissed or statements and evidence
should be suppressed because they were tainted by her unlawful arrest. The magistrate
court entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The State appealed to
the district court, and in response, Defendant renewed her motion to dismiss or in the
alternative to suppress evidence. After a hearing on the motion, the district court
remanded the matter to the magistrate court for imposition of the dismissal order.

DISCUSSION

{7}      The State pursues three related but distinct arguments: (1) Section 30-3-6
provided statutory authority for Defendant’s arrest; (2) the arrest was a reasonable
warrantless arrest under the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) even if the arrest was
illegal, dismissal was not the appropriate remedy.

{8}     The question we must address is whether Defendant was lawfully arrested
without a warrant. Our state strongly prefers arrests be made pursuant to a warrant.
State v. Rivera, 

, 

, 

. Under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In United States v. Watson,

 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court applied Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
to uphold the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest supported by probable cause and
explicit statutory authority. The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests when
the arrest is supported by statutory authority and probable cause. See State v.
Paananen, 

, 

 (holding a warrantless arrest with
probable cause, see NMSA 1978, § 30-16-23 (1965), which permits warrantless arrests
with probable cause for shoplifting, did not violate the Fourth Amendment based on
Watson). Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution requires that all
warrantless arrests be “reasonable.” Campos v. State, 

, ¶ 5, 

, 

. Under our New Mexico Constitution, warrantless arrests based on
statutory authority are presumed constitutional, but require an exigency that precluded
the arresting officer from procuring a warrant. Id. ¶ 14.

{9}     To address the State’s appeal, we must first determine if Section 30-3-6 provided
statutory authority for the warrantless arrest. We then turn to the State’s contention that
the arrest was reasonable under the New Mexico Constitution. Because the appeal is
based on Defendant’s motion to suppress, we are presented with a mixed question of
law and fact. We review “factual matters with deference to the district court’s findings if
substantial evidence exists to support them, and [the appellate courts] review[] the
district court’s application of the law de novo.” State v. Almanzar, 

,

.

I.     Section 30-3-6 Provided Statutory Authority for Defendant’s Arrest

{10} The State first appeals the district court’s determination that Section 30-3-6 did
not apply to the facts of this case. The State argues that the plain language of the
statute provides that so long as an arresting officer has probable cause that a battery, or
one of the other crimes listed, has occurred, the officer has authority to perform a
warrantless arrest. Defendant answers that the Legislature did not intend to create such
a broad exception to the misdemeanor arrest rule, and that the statute applies only to
arrests that occur in licensed liquor establishments. We agree with the State.

{11} Because Defendant’s appeal centers on our interpretation of Section 30-3-6, we
interpret the statute de novo. See State v. Gonzales, 

, ¶ 7, 

. “In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s
intent.” State v. Trujillo, 

, 

, 

. “If the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language
and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” State v. McWhorter, 

, 

, 

. However, we will not give effect to the plain meaning
of the statute if “this leads to an absurd or unreasonable result.” State v. Marshall, 2004-
NMCA-104, ¶ 7, 

, 

. If it will, we construe the statute “according
to its obvious spirit or reason[.]” State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 

, ¶ 3,

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{12} “[W]e additionally consider the context surrounding a particular statute, such as
its history, its apparent object, and other related statutes.” State v. Becenti, 2021-
NMCA-060, ¶ 5, 

 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted). We are required to “read the entire statute as a whole so that each provision
may be considered in relation to every other part[.]” State v. Bernard, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reading the statute
as a whole, we are also to consider “its purposes and consequences.” State v. Martinez,

, 

.

{13} We start by considering the misdemeanor arrest rule, which provides context for
our discussion of the statute in this case. “The misdemeanor arrest rule provides that
generally, in New Mexico, an officer may execute a warrantless misdemeanor arrest
only if the offense was committed in the officer’s presence.” Milliron v. Cnty. of San
Juan, 

, 

 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). “The misdemeanor arrest rule is a holdover from the common law
distinction between warrantless arrests for felonies and for misdemeanors.” State v.
Ochoa, 

, 

, 

. However, New Mexico has
several exceptions to this rule. Id. ¶ 12 (“[P]ermitting officers in specific circumstances to
make warrantless arrest if the arresting officer has ‘reasonable grounds, based on
personal investigation which may include information from eyewitnesses’[.]” (quoting
NMSA 1978, § 66-8-125(B) (1978)); see also NMSA 1978, § 31-1-7(A) (1995)
(permitting warrantless arrests for domestic disturbances); State v. Lyon, 1985-NMCA-
082, ¶ 18, 

, 

 (allowing for a police-team exception to the “in
the presence” requirement of the misdemeanor arrest rule); § 30-16-23 (permitting
warrantless arrests for shoplifting). The Legislature has the authority to enact an
exception to the misdemeanor arrest rule, insofar as it does not violate the New Mexico
Constitution, see Carrillo v. My Way Holdings, LLC, 

, 

 (explaining the Legislature may overturn the common law with “clear and
unambiguous language” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), and Section
30-3-6 is one such legislatively enacted exception.
{14} We next turn to examination of the statute. Section 30-3-6, entitled “Reasonable
detention; assault, battery, public affray or criminal damage to property[,]”states:

        A.      As used in this section:

                 (1)   “licensed premises” means all public and private rooms,
        facilities and areas in which alcoholic beverages are sold or served in the
        customary operating procedures of establishments licensed to sell or
        serve alcoholic liquors;

             (2)    “proprietor” means the owner of the licensed premises or his
        manager or his designated representative; and

               (3)  “operator” means the owner or the manager of any
        establishment or premises open to the public.

        B.     Any law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant any
        persons he has probable cause for believing have committed the crime of
        assault or battery as defined in [NMSA 1978,] Sections 30-3-1 through 30-
        3-5 [(1963, as amended through 1977)] . . . or public affray or criminal
        damage to property. Any proprietor or operator who causes such an arrest
        shall not be criminally or civilly liable if he has actual knowledge,
        communicated truthfully and in good faith to the law enforcement officer,
        that the persons so arrested have committed the crime of assault or
        battery as defined in Sections 30-3-1 through 30-3-5 . . . or public affray or
        criminal damage to property.

The statute has two subsections. The first, a definition section, defines “licensed
premises,” “proprietor,” and “operator.” Section 30-3-6(A)(1)-(3). “[L]icensed premises”
pertains to those premises we traditionally refer to as restaurants and bars. Section 30-
3-6(A)(1). The second subsection addresses warrantless arrests for enumerated crimes
and includes a provision addressing criminal and civil liability arising from reporting such
crimes. Section 30-3-6(B). Because we find no cases in New Mexico that have
interpreted Section 30-3-6, its scope is an issue of first impression to this Court. 1

{15} Defendant refers to Section 30-3-6 as the “barroom brawl statute that has
traditionally been understood to authorize misdemeanor arrests at bars, restaurants,
and liquor stores.” Defendant argues that the misdemeanor arrest rule is limited to three
judicially and statutorily created exceptions for crimes against businesses, crimes
related to domestic violence, and crimes arising from driving vehicles, and contends that

1Defendant cites a nonprecedential federal case, Montes v. Gallegos, 

, 1165 n.7
(D.N.M. 1992), which references Section 30-3-6. In a footnote, Montes refers to the defendant’s argument
regarding “the New Mexico ‘barroom fight’ statute” and cites to Section 30-3-6, focusing on the statute’s
probable cause requirement. However, neither the defendant’s nor the federal district court’s
characterization of the statute in Montes, is relevant to our analysis. Clearly, Section 30-3-6 permits
arrests based upon the occurrence of barroom batteries. At issue here, is whether the statute is limited to
that, and only that, context.
Section 30-3-6 falls under the exception to the misdemeanor arrest rule for crimes
against businesses. Defendant highlights two other statutes that allow for warrantless
arrests, NMSA 1978, § 30-16-16(B) (2006) (permitting warrantless arrests for falsely
obtaining services or accommodations) and § 30-16-23 (permitting warrantless arrests
for shoplifting), and suggests that these three statutes read together protect specific
businesses from low-level crimes, i.e. shoplifting from stores, fighting or damaging
property at bars or restaurants, and getting service without paying at restaurants, hotels,
and other service-oriented businesses. Defendant contends, therefore, that a commonsense reading of Section 30-3-6 indicates that it only applies when the arrest occurs on
licensed premises, that is, an establishment that sells liquor.

{16} We disagree with Defendant’s conclusion. Not one of the three statutes cited by
Defendant limits warrantless arrests to those taking place at specific locations. Instead,
each statute addresses warrantless arrests for specifically described crimes. See §§ 30-
16-16(B), -23; § 30-3-6. Although Section 30-3-6 includes civil and criminal liability
protection for owners—and their managers and designated representatives—of
establishments licensed to sell or serve alcohol, that protection also extends to owners
or managers “of any establishment or premises open to the public.” Section 30-3-
6(A)(3), (B). The liability protection for “licensed premises” is not a sufficient indication—
particularly in light of the fact that the statute includes the same protection for owners or
managers of any establishment or premises open to the public, see id.—that it limits
statutory authority for warrantless arrests with probable cause for assault, battery, public
affray, or criminal damage to property to be executed at only locations licensed to sell
liquor. And the statute’s mere inclusion of protection from civil liability for owners and
operators of liquor establishments or other business locations open to the public does
not bear upon the statute’s otherwise broadly stated exception to the misdemeanor
arrest rule.

{17} A plain reading of Section 30-3-6 permits a law enforcement officer to arrest
people for the enumerated crimes stated therein, including battery, without a warrant
when the officer has probable cause. See State v. Farish, 

, 

 (“We begin the search for legislative intent by looking first to the words chosen
by the Legislature and the plain meaning of the Legislature’s language.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)), rev’d on other grounds and remanded, 2021-
NMSC-030, 

. The plain language does not limit the arrests based on the
location of the alleged crime. The only limitation is that the law enforcement officer have
probable cause that one of the listed crimes occurred.

{18} Reading the entire statute as a whole, we understand the statute is about two
central subjects: warrantless arrests and protection from civil and criminal liability
relating to those warrantless arrests. While the definition of licensed premises—
restaurants and bars—is relevant to the civil and criminal liability portion of the statute, it
does not limit the provision regarding warrantless arrest requirements. We must
presume the Legislature chose to omit a requirement that the warrantless arrest occur
on licensed premises. See State v. Jade G., 

, 

, 

 (“We are not permitted to read into a statute language which is not there,
particularly if it makes sense as written.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We also note, as discussed above, the liability protection is not limited by the reference
to licensed premises, but also extends to operators of premises open to the public.
Section 30-3-6(B). Defendant’s contention that the statute only applies when the arrest
occurs on licensed premises ignores the term “operator” in the statute. Such an
interpretation would render a portion of the statute superfluous, which we decline to do.
See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. City of Albuquerque, 

,
¶ 5, 

 (“Statutes must also be construed so that no part of the statute is
rendered surplusage or superfluous[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{19} We next look at the history of Section 30-3-6. It was originally enacted in 1981
and amended once in 1983. The 1983 amendment changed the title from “Reasonable
detention on licensed premises; assault, battery or public affray” to “Reasonable
detention; assault, battery, public affray or criminal damage to property[,]” which is still
current today. Compare § 30-3-6 (1981) (emphasis added), with § 30-3-6. This deletion
provides further support to our view that the Legislature intended that the warrantless
arrest need not be based on actions that occurred at particular locations and supports
our conclusion that Section 30-3-6 requires only that the arresting officer have probable
cause for one of the crimes listed in the statute to execute a warrantless arrest.

{20} The 1983 amendment also added “criminal damage to property” to the list of
offenses and added “operator” to the class of people protected from criminal or civil
liability arising from such arrests. 2 Compare § 30-3-6, with § 30-3-6 (1981). These two
additions significantly expanded the scope of the statute by increasing both the number
and types of situations in which law enforcement is permitted to make warrantless
arrests and to extend civil and criminal liability protections to more people. And by
defining “operator” as “owner or the manager of any establishment or premises open to
the public[,]” compare § 30-3-6(A)(3), with § 30-3-6(A) (1981), the statute broadened
“licensed premises” beyond licensed liquor establishments to include the entirety of
premises open to the public. The amendments made to the statute support our
conclusion that the statute’s scope is not limited to events that occur in a barroom or
restaurant, but its scope is broad enough to include the events that occurred in this
case, in a parking lot adjacent to a school.

{21} We conclude that Section 30-3-6 provides statutory authority for law enforcement
to arrest someone without a warrant if they have probable cause that that person
committed a battery pursuant to Section 30-3-4. “An officer has probable cause to arrest
when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to
warrant the officer to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” State v.
Granillo-Macias, 

, 

, 

. Defendant was
charged with committing petty misdemeanor battery, which is “the unlawful, intentional



2The 1983 amendment to Section 30-3-6 also added the requirement that eligible parties must
communicate “truthfully and in good faith to the law enforcement officer” to qualify for liability protection.
Compare § 30-3-6(B), with § 30-3-6(B) (1981).
touching or application of force to the person of another, when done in a rude, insolent
or angry manner.” Section 30-3-4.

{22} Deputy Deprez was called to the scene where people were actively keeping
Defendant and Hebert apart. Both were visibly injured such that Deputy Deprez asked if
they needed medical intervention. He interviewed multiple witnesses who stated
Defendant initiated the physical altercation. Defendant was the only person who claimed
Hebert hit her first. Defendant also admitted to drinking alcohol and gave differing
accounts of how Hebert started the fight. These facts together sufficiently established
probable cause that Defendant committed a battery against Hebert.

{23} Having concluded that Section 30-3-6 provided Deputy Deprez with statutory
authority to arrest Defendant without a warrant, we next determine whether the
warrantless arrest was legal under the New Mexico Constitution.

II.   Defendant’s Warrantless Arrest Was Valid Under the New Mexico
      Constitution

{24} The State argues that the district court erred in its determination that no exigent
circumstances existed to excuse Deputy Deprez’s failure to obtain a warrant. As
explained above, all warrantless arrests must comply with the “reasonableness”
component of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. Campos, 1994-
NMSC-012, ¶ 5. “Warrantless arrests made under the authority of [a] statute may be
presumed reasonable but that presumption may be rebutted under our interpretation of
what is constitutional.” Id. ¶ 7. “[A] warrantless arrest supported by probable cause is
reasonable if some exigency existed that precluded the officer from securing a warrant.”
Paananen, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Exigent circumstances exist in “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent
imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent
escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Campos, 

, ¶ 11
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this is not an exhaustive list,
and there “are other situations in which an exigency not necessarily amounting to an
imminent threat of danger, escape, or lost evidence will be sufficient to render
reasonable a warrantless public arrest supported by probable cause under the totality of
the circumstances.” Paananen, 

. “An on-the-scene arrest
supported by probable cause will usually supply the requisite exigency.” 

{25} In Paananen, our Supreme Court determined that a warrantless arrest for
shoplifting met New Mexico’s constitutional standard when the responding officer
developed probable cause to arrest the defendant at the scene based on the review of
evidence. Id. ¶¶ 24-28. The officers did not have the “information or time to act on it
prior to arriving on scene, and thus could not have gotten an arrest warrant before
responding to the call.” Id. ¶ 24. Similarly, in this case, Deputy Deprez was dispatched
based on a call that Defendant was attacking Hebert. He arrived at the scene,
interviewed witnesses, and determined based on his investigation that he had probable
cause to arrest Defendant for battery. Deputy Deprez did not have information to act on
before he arrived at the scene and investigated, and he did not have time to secure a
warrant before responding. He developed probable cause to arrest based on his review
of the evidence at the scene.

{26} Further, just as in Paananen, given it was not reasonable to obtain an arrest
warrant before responding, Deputy Deprez faced three alternatives: to arrest Defendant
on the scene; detain Defendant while going to the court to obtain a warrant, which
would lead to a de facto warrantless arrest based on the time necessary to procure the
warrant; or release Defendant and secure a warrant. See id. ¶ 25. Our Supreme Court
concluded in Paananen that a warrantless arrest was “the only reasonable approach” in
this situation. Id. It determined that to secure a warrant would lead to an expenditure of
resources “seemingly disproportionate to the crime of shoplifting and a risk our
Legislature has declared unacceptable” and cited to the statute that authorized
warrantless arrests for shoplifting. Id. In this case, securing a warrant would have led to
a similar disproportionate expenditure of resources for a crime that the Legislature has
also declared unacceptable. See § 30-3-6; Paananen, 

. In our
view, Deputy Deprez chose a reasonable approach under the circumstances.

{27} Having concluded Defendant’s warrantless arrest was reasonable, we need not
address the State’s final argument that dismissal was an inappropriate remedy under
the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

{28} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

29}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Chief Judge

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge