Kiser v. Huge’s Empirical Analysis
517 F.2d 1237 · 1974
Citation profile
13 federal appellate · 5 district · 15 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently September 2011 · most notably Copeland v. Marshall (1979), Nicholas J. Larionoff, Jr. v. The United States of America, Nicholas J. Larionoff, Jr. v. The United States of America (1976)
13 federal appellate · 5 district · 15 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 291 · 29 U.S.C. § 141 (§ 1 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)) · 29 U.S.C. § 186 (§ 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act))
Relies on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin · Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. · F. D. Rich Co. v. United States Ex Rel. Industrial Lumber Co. · Trustees v. Greenough · Board of Com'rs of Jackson County Kan v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to recover a liquidated debt on which interest is payable by contract or by law or usage the judgment for the plaintiff shall include interest on the principal debt from the time when it was due and payable, at the rate fixed by the contract, if any, until paid.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[p]ermanently retired from and ceased work in the Bituminous Coal Industry after May 28, 1946, following regular employment in a classified job ... as an employee of an operator signatory to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950....”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The inequity that a five-year signatory service requirement would create in the context of this case is even greater than in Kiser , since in order to qualify for a pension under Resolution No. 56, a miner needed to establish only that lie had worked some amount of time for a signatory employer immediately before his retirement from the coal industry. Hypothetically, then, there is an X who retired before 1 February 1965 and applied for a pension on 1 January 1966. X had worked just two weeks for a signatory employer during his career in the coal industry, but those two weeks had been his last in the industry. Assuming X met all the other eligibility criteria of Resolution No. 56, his pension application was granted and he has been paid benefits by the Fund to this day. On the other hand, Y is a member of the plaintiff class who. retired before 1 February 1965 and applied for a pension at the same time as X. Y had accumulated four years and eleven months of signatory service but retired from a job with a non-signatory operator. The Trustees denied Y’s pension application under the signatory last employment requirement of Resolution No. 56. Y would continue to be denied a pension if we or the District Court imposed a five-year total signatory service requirement, while X, with just two weeks of such service, would continue to receive a pension. As we pointed out in Kiser , this is the sort of inequity that Roark, II sought to preclude.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.