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← 519 So. 2d 622 - Staten v. State

519 So. 2d 622 - Staten v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

92
cited by 92 later decisions
2
states following
October 2023
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 85 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 92 later decisions — most recently October 2023 · most notably 668 So. 2d 954 - Terry v. State (1996), 722 So. 2d 177 - Donaldson v. State (1998)

2 federal appellate · 85 state decisions

40019881990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Blockburger v. United States · Enmund v. Florida · 515 So. 2d 161 - Carawan v. State · Brown v. Clifford Shover Building, Inc. · 67 Cal. App. 3d 267 - People v. Vela Prado

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 92 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In order to be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one must intend that the crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime.”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““Reading section 777.011 against its common law background, we do not believe the legislature intended [to punish accessories after the fact more severely than the principal]. Although Florida has abolished the common law distinctions between principals, aiders and abettors, and accessories before the fact, accessory after the fact remains as a separate offense. The accessory after the fact is no longer treated as a party to the crime but has come to be recognized as the actor in a separate and independent crime, obstruction of justice. [c.o.] At common law, all parties to a crime were equally guilty and subject to the same punishment. Under our modern codification, however, an accessory after the fact is guilty of a third-degree felony regardless of the gravity of the substantive offense committed. Thus, the culpability of the accessory after the fact is substantially different from that of a principal, reflecting an intent to punish as an accessory after the fact only those persons who have had no part in causing the felony itself but have merely hindered the due course of justice.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.