Garrison v. Luke’s Empirical Analysis
1938
Citation profile
60 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently August 2005 · most notably City of Mesa v. Killingsworth (1964), City of Phoenix v. Yates (1949)
60 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Automatic Registering MacHine Co. v. Pima County · Coggins v. Ely · Keller v. State of Arizona · Hicks v. Krigbaum · Industrial Com. of Arizona v. Price
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“If “ * * * a literal [interpretation] of the language leads to a result which produces an absurdity, it is our duty to construe the act, if possible, so that it is a reasonable and workable law * * * ” (Emphasis added)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“such as cannot be contemplated the Legislature intended.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that we are to ascertain the meaning of the legislature, and give it effect if such meaning be constitutional. (Citing case.) In determining this intent, we take into consideration many things the language used, the object to be accomplished, whether a literal interpretation of the language will lead to an impossibility or an absurdity, the history back of the act, and numerous other matters, no one of which is absolutely controlling as to the intent. It is from a combination of all of these that we deduce such intent. (Citing case.) Of course if the language is plain and unambiguous, if it can be given but one meaning and that meaning does not lead to an impossibility nor an absurdity such as cannot be contemplated the Legislature intended, we follow that meaning, even though the result may be, in our opinion, harsh, unjust or a mistaken policy. (Citing cases.) If, however, a literal application of the language leads to a result which produces an absurdity, it is our duty to construe the act, if possible, so that it is a reasonable and workable law, not inconsistent with the general policy of the Legislature, even though in so doing we may be compelled to change the punctuation or even the precise language of the act." (Citing cases.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Harless v. Lockwood
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.