52 F. Supp. 2d 1027 - Doe v. Hartz’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is ... elementary that one upon whom an unjustified assault is made has a civil cause of action for damages against the person making the assault.” In re Cuykendall’s Estate, 223 Iowa 526 , -, 273 N.W. 117, 119 (1937). As this statement suggests, Iowa courts have sometimes looked to the criminal code’s definition of assault as defining the elements of assault in civil actions for damages or other relief. See id.; see also Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997) (in an action for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code Ch. 232, domestic abuse under Iowa Code § 236.2 is defined as assault within the meaning of Iowa Code § 708.1 ). Although “[a]ssault can be committed in several ways,” Bacon, 567 N.W.2d at 417 , the pertinent definitions here, as in Bacon , are as follows: A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following: (1) Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. (2) Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Iowa Code § 708.1 (1) & (2); accord Bacon, 567 N.W.2d at 417 . These elements are comparable to the elements of the tort of assault as defined by the Restatement (Second) of ToRts: § 21. Assault (1) ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Stricker v. Cessford Construction Co. · 252 F. Supp. 2d 819 - Fakorzi v. Dillard's, Inc.

2. “Whether a fiduciary relationship exists depends on factual circumstances, not upon professional standards of conduct for a reasonable member of the clergy.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 884 So. 2d 747 - Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church · 905 So. 2d 1213 - Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison

3. “The court is unwilling to construe an on-going relationship between a priest and members of his congregation as a ‘transaction’ giving rise to a general and all-encompassing duty to disclose any past misconduct unknown to the congregation to everyone at the commencement of or during the course of the relationship. Although parishioners might want to know that a priest assigned to their church has a history of [past] misconduct — -just as people in a neighborhood might want to know that their next door neighbor is a convicted child molester— the court can find no duty under [the applicable] law for a priest to wear a ‘Scarlet Letter’ disclosing his past misconduct, or any duty upon his superiors to make a disclosure of his past misconduct. Lack of such a legal duty to disclose — the first element of [the plaintiffs] fraudulent concealment claim ... is an ‘insuperable bar’ to [the plaintiffs] fraudulent concealment claim, requiring its dismissal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 354 F. Supp. 2d 573 - Gaines v. Krawczyk