Bachran v. Morishige’s Empirical Analysis
1970
Citation profile
48 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 48 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc. (1992), Montalvo v. Lapez (1994)
48 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co. · Kawamoto v. Yasutake · 145 W. Va. 134 - Lawrence v. Nelson · Shawnee-Tecumseh Traction Co. v. Griggs · Franco v. Fujimoto
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Where the subject matter is technical, scientific or medical and not of common observation or knowledge, expert testimony is allowed into evidence. Such testimony is to aid the jury in the determination of the issues involved and to provide a sufficient basis for the conclusion to be drawn by the jury rather than by conjecture and speculation. Expert testimony is not conclusive and like any testimony, the jury may accept or reject it.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The defendant cites [Loui] and argues that as the plaintiff suffered neck and back injuries in both the 1962 and 1964 accidents, the damages suffered by the plaintiff should (be apportioned. This contention would be sound providing that in 1964, when the defendant’s negligence injured the plaintiff, she was still suffering pain and disability from injuries she received in the 1962 accident. On the other hand, if the plaintiff had fully recovered and was suffering no pain or disability from injuries she received in the 1962 accident, all the injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiff would be the proximate result of the 1964 accident and there should be no apportionment. [Loui ] does not require apportionment in such circumstances. We believe a fair rule is to hold that where a person has suffered injuries in a prior accident and has fully recovered, and later he is injured by the negligence of another person and the injuries suffered in the later accident bring on pain, suffering and disability, the proximate cause of the pain, suffering and disability is the negligence of that other person. In such circumstances that other person should be liable for the entire damages.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Montalvo v. Lapez“the proper procedure is for the trial court to instruct the jury that if it is unable to .determine by a preponderance of the evidence how much of the plaintiffs damages can be attributed to the defendant’s negligence, it may make a rough apportionment. ... The trial court should instruct the jury that if it is unable to make even a rough apportionment, it must apportion the damages equally among the various accidents .... In apportioning the damages, each accident must be considered, regardless of the possibility that the plaintiff may be unable to recover from persons involved in the other accidents because of the statute of limitations or contributory negligence.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Montalvo v. Lapez
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.