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52 Ind. 68

Scranton v. Stewart

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided November 15, 1875

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1875-11-15

<p>JUROR.—Challenge.—Opinion Formed and Expressed.—It is not a good cause for the challenging of a juror, that he testifies that he has formed and expressed an opinion upon the merits of the cause and the rights of the parties, as the result of a conversation with one of the parties or from rumor, biU that the opinion formed will readily yield to the evidence presented on the trial, and that he can hear the evidence and decide the case as impartially as though he had not formed and expressed an opinion.</p> <p>Evidence.—Privileged Communication. — Attorney.—•Husband and Wife.— On the trial of an action brought by a married woman to recover possession of her separate real estate from her vendee, a witness may not, over her objection, detail a conversation had with her by him as the attorney of her husband in relation to the sale of certain personal property purchased with money derived from the sale of such real estate. In such case the attorney will be regarded as the attorney of both the husband and wife.</p> <p>SAME.—-Judgment Procured by Fraud.—Where a court may ascertain by inspection of its own records that a judgment, the record of which is offered in evidence, valid on its face, was procured by fraud, it is error to admit such evidence over objection.</p> <p>Married Woman. — Infancy and Coverture.—Contract.— Disaffirmance.— A deed of conveyance of the separate real estate of a married woman, or of an infant married woman, executed by her alone, is void; if her husband join therein, the disability of her coverture is wholly removed, and, if she be an infant, that of her infancy renders the joint conveyance not void, but voidable, and vests the title to the land in the grantee, subject to the female grantor’s right of disaffirmance upon her arrival at the age of twenty-one years, and until divested by some act done-by her to disaffirm the contract; which, though she remain a feme covert, must be done by her within a reasonable time after her arrival at age, although she is not required to bring her action to recover possession during the continuance of her coverture.</p> <p>Same.—Act of Disaffirmance.—A written notice given by such feme covert after her arrival at age, that she disaffirms such executed contract, is a sufficient act of disaffirmance.</p> <p>Same. —Reasonable Time.—Such an act of disaffirmance done within three years and a half after the female grantor’s arrival at age was held to have been done within a reasonable time.</p> <p>Same.—Evidence.—Ratification.—On the trial of an action brought by a married woman to recover possession of her separate real estate, conveyed by her and her husband to the defendant, on the ground that when the conveyance was made she was an infant and a feme covert, and that she had given to the defendant written notice of her disaffirmance of the conveyance within three years and a half after her arrival at age, acts and declarations of the plaintiff done and made after her arrival at age and before her disaffirmance of the contract, tending to prove a ratification of her conveyance to the defendant, were admissible in evidence.</p> <p>Same.—Estoppel.—In such case, the fact that when the female grantor became of age the defendant was indebted to the husband of the female grantor upon notes given for the purchase-money of said real estate, in a large sum, which was afterwards paid by the defendant, would not estop her from subsequently disaffirming the contract, unless she knew that such purchase-money was unpaid and the defendant was ignorant of the fact that the plaintiff was an infant when she executed the conveyance.</p> <p>New Trial.—As of Right.—Practice.—When a motion for a new trial for cause, in an action for the recovery of the possession of real estate, is overruled, and an order is thereupon entered that the party who made such motion shall have a new trial as of right upon payment of costs within one year, such order is nugatory, the maker of such motion not being precluded by the overruling thereof from taking a new trial as of right, as provided by section 601 of the code.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1875-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 43 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2015 · most notably Sims v. Everhardt (1880), Guetig v. State (1879)

42 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Pettit, J.

¶1I concur in the conclusion of the court in this case, but to that part of the opinion which holds that a notice of disaffirmance was necessary before suit could be-brought, I dissent, for two reasons:

¶21. Because I think that question is not in the case. Notice was given, and the court holds that it was sufficient and given in time. Why, then, hold that notice of disaffirmance was necessary to be given in such a case before suit could be brought?

¶32. If it ever was the law in this State that notice of disaffirmance in such a case must be given before suit brought,, it could only have been on the foundation or reason that the defendant, thus having notice of an intended suit, might, quitclaim or release any interest in the property, and thus save himself from costs in the threatened suit. It cannot now be the law, for on the subject of such actions as this our legislature has enacted: If in such cases the defendant disclaim in his answer any interest or estate in the property, or suffer judgment to be taken against him without answer, the defendant shall recover costs.” 2 G. & H. 284, sec. 613. Thus it seems that a defendant notified would be put in a worse condition than one not notified before suit brought. In the former case, he would have to make a release or quitclaim deed to avoid costs, while in the latter case he would only have to stay away from court to avoid costs. *99See the notes to this section. See, also, sec. 396 and notes, 2 G. & H. 225-6.

¶4The reason of the law requiring notice, if it was ever law in such a case, having ceased and failed in this State, the law does no longer exist. This is true of all laws, religious and moral, in their localities, national, international, state, municipal, and of society.

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