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← 52 Ohio App. 2d 70 - State v. Gideons

52 Ohio App. 2d 70 - State v. Gideons’s Empirical Analysis

1977

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
2
states following
March 2025
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 44 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently March 2025 · most notably State v. Doran (1983), Krzeminski v. Perini (1980)

6 federal appellate · 44 state decisions

170197719801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Presley v. City of Norwood · State v. Robinson · Johnson v. Securities & Exchange Commission · Herzog v. United States · Berger v. New York

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The state contends that this statute is only a partial codification of a principle of common law, and that the defendant retains the common law burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. We cannot agree with that contention. The assignment of the burden of going forward with evidence of an affirmative defense has acquired a well-recognized meaning in American jurisprudence, and there can be no substantial doubt that the General Assembly intended to adopt the majority rule. Every party who bears the burden of proof on an issue in the sense of the burden of persuasion, necessarily also bears the burden of going forward with the evidence, for the party will lose on that issue unless evidence is presented. If the General Assembly had wished to impose the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of going forward with the evidence, we may properly assume that they would have used language appropriate to do so. They could simply have provided that the defendant has the same burden of proof of affirmative defenses as the state has of making out a prima facie case, but they did not do so. The obvious meaning of R.C. 2901.05(A) is that the state bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt through the trial, and that the burden does not shift to the defendant. In order to raise an affirmative defense, which is now statutorily defined as either “a defense expressly designated as affirmative” or “a defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly w”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “(1) The challenged instruction when read as a whole did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof of guilt from the State. (2) There is presently in this circuit no appellate authority which prevents placing on the defendant the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense. 8 (3) The defendant is barred from raising a constitutional challenge to the trial instructions in any event by his failure to object to the instructions at trial on that ground. In view of the decisions in this circuit, no incompetence of counsel was shown by failing to object to a charge which is presently sustainable under recent precedents.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[a] bare assertion by the defendant that he acted in self-defense will not bring the affirmative defense of self-defense into issue in the trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.