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52 So. 3d 273

52 So.3d 273

10 La.App.3Cir. 196

State v. Johnson

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Decided November 24, 2010

Louisiana Court of Appeal · decided 2010-11-24

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently June 2019

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“It is imperative to note that the bill of information sets the parameters and dictates the mode of trial. Based solely upon the information on the face of the bill of information, the defendant in this case was properly tried before a six person jury, as the sentencing range for a fourth offense DWI, as listed in this particular bill of information, is not mandatory hard labor. Specifically, La. R.S. 14:98(E)(1)(a), in effect at the time of defendant's offense, provided that operating a vehicle while intoxicated, fourth offense, carried the following penalty range with or without hard labor: ... on a conviction of a fourth or subsequent offense, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and regardless of whether the fourth offense occurred before or after an earlier conviction, the offender shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than ten years nor more than thirty years and shall be fined five thousand dollars. Two years of the sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. (emphasis added). Given that the enhanced sentence to which the evidence made defendant subject was not apparent on the face of the bill of information, we specifically decline to create a duty requiring a trial judge to look beyond the face of the bill of information or the indictment, and the Title 14 penalty range. Nor is it the responsibility of a trial judge to interrogate the district attorney or indepen”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Ellender

“Because Defendant, charged with fourth offense DWI, was previously required to participate in substance abuse treatment and was placed on home incarceration the law mandates he be tried before a jury of twelve persons. As Defendant was tried before a jury of only six persons, contrary to the provisions of our State Constitution requiring trial by twelve jurors for his offense, his conviction is null and is hereby set aside; his sentence is vacated; and the matter is remanded for a new trial. Defendant's assignment of error asserting his sentence is excessive is moot.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Ellender

Relies on 364 So. 2d 588 - State v. Nedds · 922 So. 2d 508 - State v. Jones

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2010-11-24

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

COOKS, Judge.

¶1 |, FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Curt E. Johnson (Defendant) was convicted by a jury of six persons of driving while intoxicated, fourth offense, a violation of La.R.S. 14:98. Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He appeals his conviction and sentence, alleging his conviction is null because he was tried by an insufficient number of jurors and, alternatively, if his conviction is valid, his sentence is excessive. In accordance with the provisions of La.Code Crim. P. art. 920, we review all criminal appeals for errors patent on the record. We find there is an error patent on this record which requires reversal of Defendant’s conviction. For reasons stated below, we reverse Defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand the case for a new trial before a jury of twelve persons.

¶3 LEGAL ANALYSIS

¶4 Defendant was charged by bill of information with driving while intoxicated, fourth offense. He previously pled guilty to other third and fourth offense DWU charges in 2004. On the prior conviction of third offense DWI, Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor, with all but thirty days suspended, and placed on probation for three years. Defendant was also sentenced for the previous fourth offense DWU to fifteen years at hard labor, with all but sixty days suspended, and placed on probation for five years. These sentences were to be served consecutively. Defendant was on probation for these offenses when he was arrested and charged with the current fourth offense DWI. As part of each of the previous sentences, Defendant was required to undergo an evaluation to determine the nature and extent of his substance abuse disorder. His sentences in 2004 both required four to six | aweeks of inpatient treatment for his substance abuse disorder and home incarceration for the suspended portions of his sentences. The record contains the transcript of his prior guilty pleas and sentencing establishing these facts.

¶5 Under the provisions of La.R.S. 14:98(E)(4)(a), Defendant was subject to a mandatory prison sentence at hard labor for a minimum of ten years and a maximum of thirty years for the current offense. The statute provides:

If the offender has previously been required to participate in substance abuse treatment and home incarceration pursuant to Subsection D of this Section, the offender shall not be sentenced to substance abuse treatment and home in *275 carceration for a fourth or subsequent offense, but shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than thirty years and at least three years of the sentence shall be imposed without benefit of suspension of sentence, probation, or parole.

¶6 La.R.S. 14:98(E)(4)(a) (emphasis added)

¶7 The Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 17 (emphasis added), provides:

[A] case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.

¶8 The State admits in brief the law requires this Defendant be tried before a jury of twelve persons and it was error to try him before a jury of only six persons. In State v. Nedds, 364 So.2d 588 (La.1978), the Louisiana State Supreme Court held that a jury verdict rendered by either more or less than the correct number of jurors is null. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court partially abrogated the decision in Nedds in its more recent decision State v. Jones, 05-226 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 508, upholding a conviction by a unanimous verdict of twelve in a case requiring only six jurors, the law has not changed regarding the impropriety of trying a criminal defendant before a jury of six when a jury of twelve is required. Because Defendant, charged with fourth offense DWI, was previously required to participate in substance abuse treatment and was placed on home incarceration the law mandates he be tried |3before a jury of twelve persons. As Defendant was tried before a jury of only six persons, contrary to the provisions of our State Constitution requiring trial by twelve jurors for his offense, his conviction is null and is hereby set aside; his sentence is vacated; and the matter is remanded for a new trial. Defendant’s assignment of error asserting his sentence is excessive is moot.

¶9 CONVICTION VACATED, REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

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