Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

52 Utah 262

Barker v. Savas

Utah Supreme Court

Decided April 16, 1918

Utah Supreme Court · decided 1918-04-16

<p>1. Highways — Pedestrians—Death—Cause op Death — Evidence. Evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that plaintiff’s child was killed by an automobile, and that defendant’s automobile killed it. (Page 267.)</p> <p>2. Trial — Weight of Evidence — -Question por Jury. The truth of testimony is for the jury. (Page 267.)</p> <p>3. Highways — Sufficiency op Evidence. In action for death of child killed while riding his tricycle on a broad open highway in the daytime, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that an automobile driver was negligent, although no one saw the accident,1 (Page 268.)</p> <p>4. Highways — Persons on Boad — Duty to See Persons on Road. The law imposes the duty on an automobile driver to see persons on the road in front of him where his view is unobstructed.1 (Page 268.)</p> <p>5. Highways — Collisions—Contributory Negligence — Evidence. Evidence held to show that child on tricycle on a road killed by an overtaking motor truck was not guilty of contributory negligence. (Page 270.)</p> <p>6. Death — ‘Presumptions as to Due Care by Deceased — Burden op Proof. A child killed on the road on a tricycle by an overtaking motor truck, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, will be presumed to have been exercising due care, the burden being on defendant to rebut the presumption.2 (Page 270.)</p> <p>7. Evidence — Conclusions op Witness. Testimony that defendant had admitted driving his automobile on the B road "about the time we figured the accident happened’’ was a conclusion, and should have been stricken. (Page 270.)</p> <p>8. Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Evidence. Where there was no controversy as to the time defendant drove his motor truck along a road, a conclusion of a witness that he admitted driving it there "about the time of the accident,’’ was harmless.3 (Page 270.)</p> <p>9. Evidence — Conclusions op Witness. Testimony of a witness that he went to the scene of an accident and saw deceased lying there and saw the track of the automobile “that had run over him” was a conclusion, and should have been stricken. (Page 270.)</p> <p>10. Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Evidence. Although testimony of a witness was a conclusion, it was harmless, where every fact with which the witness was acquainted was then and there known to the jury, and the jury knew it was a conclusion, under Comp. Laws 1907, section 3285, providing that no exception shall be regarded unless the decision excepted to is material and prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party excepting.1 (Page 270.)</p> <p>11. Death — Child—Contributory Neglisence op Parent. A parent was not guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a bright six year old child to go a short distance down a road with a tricycle, where she watched him until he started to return. (Page 271.)</p> <p>12. Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Instructions. Where there was no contributory negligence, there was no prejudicial error, if error, in instructing that under the pleadings the jury could not take the question of contributory negligence into consideration. (Page 271.)</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently February 1946

2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

AFFIRMED · Decided 1918-04-16

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1On Petition for Rehearing.

THURMAN, J.

¶2Appellant has applied for a rehearing on the alleged grounds that there is no evidence of his negligence and that it is consistent with all the facts, and probable, that deceased ran his tricycle into appellant’s machine without his fault. Appellant cites authorities.

¶3These same propositions and authorities are relied on in appellant’s former brief and were urged at the oral argument. They were carefully considered by the court and its conclusion thereon is reflected in the opinion handed down. Nothing new is presented in the application for a rehearing. It would add notMng to the weight of our opinion to again review the evidence and report our conclusions. The facts *273and circumstances are sufficiently reflected in the opinion to show that it is a case in which reasonable men might differ as to the defendant’s negligence. In such circumstances we have no power to determine what the fact is as a matter of law. In Newton v. R. R. Co., 43 Utah, 226, 134 Pac. 570, the correct rule is stated:

"All that cam be said is that, unless the question of negligence is free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is, if after considering all the evidence and the inferences that may be deduced therefrom the court is in doubt whether reasonable men, in viewing and considering all the evidence, might arrive at different conclusions, then this very doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the jury and not one of law for the court.”

¶4The application for a rehearing is denied.

FRICK, C. J., and McCARTY, CORFMAN, and GIDEON, JJ., concur.
/52/utah/262 · .json · Public domain