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52 Vt. 247

Benedict v. Cox

Supreme Court of Vermont

Decided January 15, 1880

Supreme Court of Vermont · decided 1880-01-15

<p> Promissory Note. Principal and Surety. Parol Evidence to Vary Written Contract. Statute of Frauds. </p> <p>Where the language of a promissory note is, “ We jointly and severally, each as principal, promise,” &c., and the word surely is not affixed to any of the signatures thereto, the signers thereof are, as to the holder, all principals. Thus, where in general assumpsit by the payee of such a note against one of the makers, defendant asserted that he was in fact a surety for his co-maker, and objected to the admission of the note in evidence, for that it did not support the declaration, it was held that the note was admissible.</p> <p>Defendant offered to prove by parol that it was agreed between himself and his comaker that he should be held for but six months. Held, but an offer to vary the written contract, and inadmissible.</p> <p>He also offered to prove that after the expiration of the six months he applied to the plaintiff to have him collect of his co-maker, who was then solvent but afterwards became otherwise, when plaintiff told him the co-maker was good, and that he would look to him for payment. Held, inadmissible, because defendant was, as to plaintiff, not surety but principal, and because’it did notappear that any valid contract upon consideration was then made between plaintiff and defendant, nor that, relying on plaintiff’s representation, defendant forebore to protect himself.</p> <p>He also offered to prove that plaintiff afterwards verbally agreed with defendant’s comaker, for valuable consideration, on an extension of time. Bdd, that the contract was within the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds, aud that the evidence was inadmissible.</p>

Relies on Samuel Sprigg v. The Bank of Mount Pleasant · People's Bank v. Pearsons · President, Directors & Co. of Claremont Bank v. Wood

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1880-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently October 1938

5 state decisions

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¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Redfield, J.

¶2I. The note offered in evidence was joint and several, and recited that “ each as principal ” signed the note; and although, as between themselves, one was principal and the other surety, so far as the creditor is concerned both are principals. Claremont Bank v. Wood, 10 Vt. 582. This case has ever been recognized as authority. The remarks of Bennett, J., in People's Bank v. Pearsons, 30 Vt. 711, were not intended to impugn its soundness ; but, on the contrary, it was expressly affirmed. And we think the profession would be reluctant to have so sensible a doctrine, having the judicial imprint of Chief Justice Royce, disturbed. The defendant must, then, be treated as having waived, by the express terms of his contract, all rights incident to the relation of surety, so far as pertains to the interpretation and enforcement of the contract. Dunham v. Downer, 31 Vt. 249 ; Sprigg v. Bank of Mount Pleasant, 10 Pet. 257, 263.

¶3II. The offer to show, by parol, a contemporaneous agreement that defendant should be holden but for six months, was an attempt to engraft a new stipulation by parol upon the written contract, which was clearly inadmissible.

¶4III. The third offer was properly denied, because, as we have seen, the defendant was not a surety, so far as the plaintiff is con*251cerned. Secondly, it does not appear that any valid contract was made upon consideration ; nor that confiding in, and relying upon, plaintiff’s representations, the defendant forebore to protect himself.

¶5IV. The fourth offer, if otherwise admissible, would have been unavailing under our statute. Gen. Sts. c. 66, s. 4.

¶6 Judgment affirmed.

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