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← 520 F.3d 797 - Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont

Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont’s Empirical Analysis

520 F.3d 797 · 2008

Citation profile

121
cited by 121 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
July 2019
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 7 district ·

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Erickson v. Pardus · National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan · Sedima Sprl v. Imrex Company Inc · United States v. Turkette

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 121 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Like too many legal doctrines, the “continuing violation” doctrine is misnamed. Suppose that year after year, for ten years, your employer pays you less than the minimum wage. That is a continuing violation. But it does not entitle you to wait until year 15 (assuming for the sake of illustration that the statute of limitations is five years) and then sue not only for the wages you should have received in year 10 but also for the wages you should have received in years 1 through 9. The statute of limitations begins to run upon injury (or, as is standardly the case with federal claims, upon discovery of the injury) and is not tolled by subsequent injuries.... The office of the misnamed doctrine is to allow suit to be delayed until a series of wrongful acts blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought.... It is thus a doctrine not about a continuing, but about a cumulative, violation.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The term ‘enterprise’ as used in these instructions may also include a group of people associated in fact, even though this association is not recognized as a legal entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a name. Thus, an enterprise need not be a form[al] business entity such as a corporation, but may be merely an informal association of individuals. A group or association of people can be an ‘enterprise’ if, among other requirements, these individuals ‘associate’ together for a purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Common sense suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure. “Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts. Such an association of persons may be established by evidence showing an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and ... by evidence that the people making up the association functioned as a continuing unit. Therefore, in order to establish the exist ence of such an enterprise, the government must prove that: (1) There is an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and associates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose. “Regarding ‘organization,’ it is not necessary that the e”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Under Bell Atlantic, the complaint in a potentially complex litigation, or one that by reason of the potential cost of a judgment to the defendant creates the “in terrorem” effect against which Blue Chip [Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 , 95 S.Ct. 1917 , 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975) ] warned, must have some degree of plausibility to survive dismissal. It is true that the narrowest holding in Bell Atlantic is merely that an antitrust complaint charging an agreement between firms not to compete must contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made ...” But the concern is as applicable to a RICO case, which resembles an antitrust case in point of complexity and the availability of punitive damages and of attorneys’ fees to the successful plaintiff. RICO cases, like antitrust cases, are “big” cases and the defendant should not be put to the expense of big-case discovery on the basis of a threadbare claim.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.