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← 521 F.2d 1269 - Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of California

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of California’s Empirical Analysis

521 F.2d 1269 · 1975

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
1
states following
January 2007
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently January 2007 · most notably Southaven Land Co., Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc. (1983), Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. (1980)

9 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

2501975198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe MacHinery Corp. · Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino · Ohio v. Kentucky · Laskey Bros. of West Virginia, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. · New York Shipping Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Commission

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “. [T]he line between plaintiffs with standing and those who lack it may not in every case seem perfectly plain. But the ‘target area’ standing rule is well-established. . . . [E]ven parties whose injuries may be both immediate and foreseeable may lack standing to pursue a private remedy if that injury is indirect or incidental, or if their business was not in the target area of the allegedly illegal acts.” 521 F.2d at 1274.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““[The utilities] were not the objects of the alleged antitrust violation. Their injuries were the result of their relationship to [the refiner], an intermediate non-target. The cases recognize that suppliers, stockholders, employees, landlords, franchisors, licensors, and consumers are too remote for Clayton Act standing. The instant plaintiffs, customers of a non-target, are at least equally remote.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “practical rules of standing . . . (to) exclude remote parties with possibly speculative injuries.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.