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← 521 F.3d 202 - Boykin v. KeyCorp

Boykin v. KeyCorp’s Empirical Analysis

521 F.3d 202 · 2008

Citation profile

206
cited by 206 later decisions
February 2025
most recently cited

14 federal appellate · 22 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 206 later decisions — most recently February 2025 · most notably Harris v. Mills (2009), Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3 (2010)

14 federal appellate · 22 district ·

1390200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Sherman Antitrust Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 1658 · 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000D · 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (§ 801 of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968)) · 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (§ 805 of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968)) · 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (§ 810 of the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968))

Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Conley v. Gibson · Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Erickson v. Pardus

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 206 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he principle function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial.”) (citations omitted). 33 . See also Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007) ("[The Supreme Court] is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible 'plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “----The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s dismissal of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the court of appeals had “depart[ed] from the liberal pleading standards” of Rule 8(a). Id. at 2200. The Court reiterated that “[sjpecific facts are not necessary,” and that the complainant “need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). But Erickson also emphasized that the court of appeals’ departure from Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standard was particularly unwarranted because the complainant was pro se: “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.... But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.