State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`[t]he purpose of juvenile court proceedings is not to punish but rather to rehabilitate and correct a juvenile's behavior so as to avoid future confrontations with the law.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. People, in Interest of Zb · In Re SK

2. “(1)The seriousness of the alleged felony offense to the community and whether protection of the community requires waiver; (2) Whether the alleged felony offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (3) Whether the alleged felony offense was against persons or property with greater weight being given to offenses against persons; (4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint. The state is not required to establish probable cause to show prosecutive merit; (5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire felony offense in one proceeding if the child’s associates in the alleged felony offense are adults; (6) The record and previous history of the juvenile; (7) The prospect for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile, if the juvenile is found to have committed the alleged felony offense, by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Jensen

3. ““Barker explicitly recognized that impairment of one’s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.’ And though time can tilt the case against either side one cannot generally be sure which of them it has prejudiced more severely. Thus, we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Thomas J.