521 So. 2d 1368 - Saffold v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) to allow the trial court to grant any necessary and reasonable continuance for good cause shown in open court with the defendant or his counsel present, ... [article] 111(a); (2) for as long as the defendant is unable to stand trial, ... [article] VI(a); or (3) for any period of delay in bringing the defendant to trial caused by the defendant’s request or to accommodate the defendant.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Greer v. State · State v. Schmidt

2. “The evidence offered by the prosecution to establish appellant's constructive possession of the cocaine is based largely on circumstantial evidence; therefore, we must view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Cumbo v. State , 368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), cert. denied , 368 So.2d 877 (Ala. 1979).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 563 So. 2d 29 - Mobley v. State · 570 So. 2d 818 - Boswell v. State

3. “"[W]e find that appellant waived the 180-day limitation. In Gillard v. State , 486 So.2d 1323 , 1327 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), we find the following: 'We are inclined toward the majority view that the rights afforded a prisoner under the agreement do not rise to the level of constitutionally guaranteed rights and can be waived.' See also Toro v. State , 479 So.2d 298 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985); Pethtel v. State , 427 N.E.2d 891 (Ind.App. 1981). Cf. Tombrello v. State , 484 So.2d 1190 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985) (wherein the court held that the appellant, by pleading guilty, waived the nonjurisdictional defect of a violation of the Act); Davis v. State , 469 So.2d 1348 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985) (same). "As noted above, on January 5, 1987, the court set appellant's trial for the March 16, 1987, term of court, and on February 10, 1987, the court set appellant's trial for the 'next criminal jury docket,' a known and ascertainable date. Appellant had different counsel on these two occasions. Significantly, we can only conclude from the record that both attorneys neither objected to the trial date at the time it was set nor objected during the days remaining under the 180-day time limit. If either had done so, the trial court could have set an appropriate trial date or granted a 'necessary or reasonable continuance.' Instead *Page 82 of putting the court on notice, appellant waited until the 180-day time limit had lapsed. "We construe appellant's silence, on both occasions when the trial court set the tria”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 599 So. 2d 79 - Glover v. State