Penland v. Penland’s Empirical Analysis
1975
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 26 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently May 2007 · most notably Johnson v. Johnson (2001), Archer v. Archer (1995)
1 federal appellate · 26 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 29 Tenn. App. 463 - Osborne v. Osborne · 37 Tenn. App. 120 - Doty v. Doty · 29 Tenn. App. 124 - Atchley v. Atchley · Whitt v. Whitt · Weinstein v. Heimberg
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(3)(4) The authority of the courts to order child support and, if necessary, to enforce same by the process of contempt, is statutory, and generally exists only during minority, (citing authority) When the husband and wife contract with respect to the legal duty of child support, upon approval of that contract, the agreement of the parties becomes merged into the decree and loses its contractual nature. However, (citing authorities) it is clear that the reason for stripping the agreement of the parties of its contractual nature is the continuing statutory power of the Court to modify its terms when changed circumstances justify. It follows, and we so hold, that only that portion of a property settlement agreement between husband and wife dealing with the legal duty of child support, or alimony over which the Court has continuing statutory power to modify, loses its contractual nature when merged into a decree for divorce. [[Image here]] Paragraph 2(c) of the contractual agreement between the Penlands makes no reference, direct or indirect, to age, majority or minority. [[Image here]] Being without any limitation, it necessarily envisioned continuance of the obligation beyond age 21, the age of majority at the time the agreement was entered into. We hold that Paragraph 2(c) is a contractual obligation outside the scope of the legal duty of support during minority, and retained its contractual nature, although incorporated in the final decree of divorce. Mrs. Penland or the dau”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“(T)hat only that portion of a property settlement agreement between husband and wife dealing with the legal duty of child support, or alimony over which the court has continuing statutory power to modify, loses its contractual nature when merged into a decree for divorce. 521 S.W.2d at 224 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““When the husband and wife contract with respect to the legal duty of child support, upon approval of that contract, the agreement of the parties becomes merged into the decree and loses its contractual nature. However, it is clear that the reason for stripping the agreement of the parties of its contractual nature is the continuing statutory power of the Court to modify its terms when changed circumstances justify.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.