Bennett v. Stutts’s Empirical Analysis
1975
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 27 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently May 2012 · most notably Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County (1981), Ezell v. Cockrell (1995)
4 federal appellate · 27 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham · White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Gunderson · Patton v. Chattanooga · Skelton v. Barnett · Badgett v. Broome
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Bennett’s reference to the district attorney general is simply a recognition of the unique role of the attorney general in suits of this nature. However, despite this unique role, Bennett makes clear that the attorney general cannot “act arbitrarily or capriciously” or “be guilty of palpable abuse of his discretion in declining to” pursue or allow such a suit to be pursued in the attorney general’s name. Bennett does not expressly say that the failure to act of a recalcitrant attorney general will, ipso facto, convert a plaintiff, without standing in the traditional sense, into a plaintiff with standing. In the absence of such an express holding by the High Court, we conclude that the failure of an attorney general to act or allow his or her name to be used, simply means that the attorney general’s preeminent role in this area will give way to a plaintiff with standing. We find no error in the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing on the “attorney general” issue discussed in Bennett .... The record clearly reflects that the plaintiffs do not “aver special interest or a special injury not common to the public generally.” We do not doubt that these plaintiffs are “public spirited citizens,” active in the political and public affairs of the community, “politically associated persons,” and that they have participated in the filing of many lawsuits in an effort to remedy and correct what they perceive to be wrongful and illegal conduct by public officials. None of this, howev”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage““We recognize that the requirement that suits in the nature of a quo warran-to and those seeking to redress public wrongs be brought by the District Attorney General can create insurmountable problems. Public spirited citizens should not be stifled or stopped in their search for solution to public wrongs and official misconduct. * * * “If the District Attorney General, in matters such as this, should act arbitran-' ly or capriciously or should be guilty of palpable abuse of his discretion in declining to bring such an action, or in authorizing its institution, the courts will take jurisdiction upon the relation of a private citizen, in the name of the State of Tennessee. * * * “When citizens sue to rectify a public wrong, under these circumstances, a copy of the complaint shall be served upon the District Attorney General. It shall be the duty of the trial court forthwith to conduct an in limine hearing designed to determine whether to permit plaintiffs to proceed. If it be determined that the District Attorney General’s refusal to bring the action, or to authorize the use of his name in its institution, was improper or unjustified, or that plaintiffs case is prima facie meritorious, the trial court shall permit the action to proceed.” Id. at 577 .”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage““In cases of purely public concern and in actions for wrongs against the public, whether actually committed or only apprehended, the remedy, whether civil or criminal, is as a general rule by a prosecution instituted by the state in its political character, or by some officer authorized by law to act in its behalf, or by some of those local agencies created by the state for the arrangement of such of the local affairs of the community as may be entrusted to them by law.” 59 Am. Jur.2d, Parties, Section 30, quoted with approval in Bennett et al. v. Stutts et al., supra, at p. 577.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.