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522 F.2d 228

Docket No. 75-1033.

United States v. Lisk

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued April 18, 1975.

Decided July 2, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1975.

Certiorari Denied Jan. 19, 1976.

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1975-07-02

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“as far as defendant is concerned the case is the same as though the firearm had been found in plain view in a public place [where the defendant would have had no reasonable expectation of privacy].”

quoted by 7 later decisions, including United States v. Lisk, United States v. Keith Iven Cosse

““correct in pointing out that the evidence * * * might conceivably show that the seizure was unreasonable. If, for example, the police knew in advance that they would find the bomb in the trunk, they might be unable to justify a failure to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , [ 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 ].” 522 F.2d at 233-234 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. Lisk

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968)

Relies on Katz v. United States · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Jones v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1975-07-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 53 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2025 · most notably Rakas v. Illinois (1979), Texas v. Brown (1983)

26 federal appellate · 1 district · 10 state decisions

250197519801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1See 96 S.Ct. 865.

¶2*229William J. Mulligan, U. S. Atty., Randall J. Sandfort, Asst. U. S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., for appellant.

¶3Kenneth J. Murray, Milwaukee, Wis., for appellee.

¶4Before SWYGERT, PELL and STEVENS, Circuit Judges.

¶5STEVENS, Circuit Judge.

¶6The question is whether a firearm seized during an illegal search of a bailee’s automobile is admissible in support of a charge that the bailor illegally possessed the firearm five days before it was seized. The district court granted defendant’s motion to suppress; we reverse.

¶7The essential facts are stipulated. The indictment charged that defendant possessed an explosive bomb on September 25, 1972.1 On that date the bomb was placed in the trunk of an automobile owned by one Michael Hunt; defendant told Hunt to hold the bomb until defendant asked for its return. Defendant had no interest in Hunt’s car but, according to the stipulation, retained a proprietary interest in the bomb, including the right to its return.

¶8On September 30, 1972, the bomb was seized from the trunk of Hunt’s automobile by law enforcement officers. According to the stipulation, it “is conceded, for the purposes of this hearing, that the search of the automobile and the subsequent seizure of the firearm were unlawful.” Defendant was not in the automobile at any time on September 30, 1972.

¶9Defendant’s position may be simply stated. He had a property interest in the alleged firearm and therefore is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection against its seizure. The remedy for a violation of his constitutional right is *230suppression of the evidence and return of the property. The government’s response is equally simple: only Hunt’s privacy was invaded by a search of the trunk of his car, and therefore defendant has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search or to object to the admissibility of evidence obtained thereby. In short, defendant contends that his interest in the property establishes his standing; the government contends that the absence of any invasion of his privacy forecloses standing.2

¶10Although the issue seems simple and clear-cut, and certainly the problem must be one that frequently arises, we have been surprised to find no authority directly in point.

¶11There is a difference between a search and a seizure. A search involves an invasion of privacy; a seizure is a taking of property. The owner of a chattel which has been seized certainly has standing to seek its return.3 It does not necessarily follow that he may also object to its use as evidence; 4 moreover, he “may have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim and yet lose on the merits.’’ Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, at 190 n. 2, 89 S.Ct. 961, at 975, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, opinion of Harlan, J. (emphasis in original).

¶12In this case it is important to identify the precise Fourth Amendment violation which the defendant urges. For we have been frequently reminded “that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Aiderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171— 172, 89 S.Ct. 961, 965.

¶13Hunt’s car was searched and defendant’s property was seized. The invasion of Hunt’s privacy was a violation of Hunt’s Fourth Amendment rights, but this violation is clearly not available to the defendant as a basis for suppressing evidence acquired thereby. Defendant must rely on the seizure of the firearm as a violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights. But if we assume that his rights were untouched by the search of Hunt’s car, as far as defendant is concerned the case is the same as though the firearm had been found in plain view in a public place and then seized.5

¶14Defendant’s ownership of the bomb might give him standing to challenge such a seizure, but it would not establish its invalidity.6 If the seized item was *231contraband or the product of criminal activity, it was clearly subject to seizure; indeed, since the decision in Warden v. Hayden, even if it was mere evidence, a reasonable belief that it would aid in a particular apprehension or conviction would be sufficient justification for its seizure. See 387 U.S. at 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642.7 If the seizure was lawful, the evidence is admissible against defendant even though it could not be used against Hunt because it was found during a search which violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

¶15In sum, defendant has standing to object to the seizure, but no standing to object to the search. Having put the search to one side, he has not demonstrated that the evidence should be suppressed on the ground that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure.8

¶16Reversed.

¶29SWYGERT, Circuit Judge

¶30(concurring).

¶31I concur in the reversal on the narrow ground that the defendant did not have any proprietary or possessory interest in Hunt’s automobile at the time of the search and that nothing contained in the stipulated facts suggests any other basis

¶32upon which Lisk could ground a contention that his privacy rights were violated by the opening of the trunk, or that the facts of this case require an application of the extraordinary standing concepts developed in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953), to allow him to contest the search. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1968). Once the trunk of the Hunt auto was opened, I agree that the police officers properly (in reference to Lisk) seized the pipe bomb inasmuch as it appeared to be an explosive device by its very configuration. I would emphasize that there is no indication in the record of this case that the search of Hunt’s auto was directed at Lisk. Had this been shown, my position regarding Lisk’s standing to contest that search would be different, see Alderman, supra; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), as would my view on the question of whether the search of Hunt’s auto violated Lisk’s own right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). On this latter question it is my belief that a *232person has a legitímate expectation that the Government, in pursuing him for whatever reason, will not intentionally and unreasonably violate the proprietary rights of others in order to seize property given to these others for safekeeping. It seems to me that this expectation falls within the privacy concepts which in part underlie the Fourth Amendment and is therefore protected by its proscription of unreasonable searches. Absent exigent circumstances, a warrant alone can legitimize such an intrusion.

¶33ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

¶34STEVENS, Circuit Judge.

¶35In his petition for rehearing defendant advances two arguments that merit additional comment: (1) that our separate analysis of the search of Hunt’s car and the seizure of defendant's property is inconsistent with the holding in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59; and (2) that in any event we should not foreclose an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress.

¶36I.

¶37In Jeffers the police seized narcotics belonging to the defendant during a warrantless search of his aunts’ hotel room. His aunts had given Jeffers a key to the room and permission to use it whenever he saw fit. The' police were told that Jeffers had “stashed” narcotics there; they conducted a search “for the sole purpose of seizing [Jeffers’] narcotics.” 1 On these facts, Jeffers’ standing to challenge the search as well as the seizure might have been sustained on three alternate theories. (1) As a regular invitee, even though he was not present at the time of the search, his interest in the premises was sufficient to make the search an invasion of his privacy as well as his aunts’; (2) the search was “directed at” him in the sense that the police were looking for his narcotics; or (3) that his interest in the seized property gave him standing to challenge the search that led to the seizure as well as the seizure itself.

¶38In later cases the Supreme Court has cited Jeffers as though it was decided on the first theory, that the defendant’s interest in the searched hotel room rather than in the seized property allowed him to challenge the search.2 This theory, of course, is of no assistance to the defendant in the case before us because he has stipulated that he had no interest in Hunt’s car.

¶39The Jeffers opinion itself emphasizes the fact that the police entered the hotel room “for the sole purpose of seizing respondent’s narcotics.” Thus, the Court seemed to rely on the second theory— that the search was directed at Jeffers— as the basis for its holding in that case that the search and seizure were not “isolable.”3 This theory is also of no *233benefit to defendant in this case. For, as Judge Swygert pointed out in his concurring opinion, there is no indication in the record that the search of Hunt’s car was directed at Lisk.4

¶40The Jeffers case supports defendant here only if we interpret it as accepting the third theory, that the defendant’s interest in the seized property is itself sufficient to confer standing to challenge the search even if the police were not looking for defendant’s property. If the court had intended to adopt that view, there would have been no need to refer to the purpose of the search, or, indeed, to describe Jeffers’ regular access to the premises. The Supreme Court has never cited Jeffers as adopting this third theory,5 and we are persuaded that it is not a correct reading of the Jeffers opinion itself. We therefore adhere to our original opinion.

¶41II.

¶42The Government stipulated that the seizure as well as the search was unlawful. Since it is manifest that Hunt’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the stipulation would require suppression of any evidence taken from the trunk of Hunt’s car in a trial of Hunt, but the stipulation is not a sufficient basis for excluding such evidence offered against Lisk. We therefore reversed the suppression order entered in this case.

¶43The record does not tell us the factual basis for the conclusion that the seizure was unlawful. We think defendant is correct in pointing out that the evidence which would have been presented in the absence of the stipulation might conceivably show that the seizure was unreasonable. If, for example, the police knew in advance that they would find the bomb *234in the trunk, they might be unable to justify a failure to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-472, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. We, of course, express no opinion about the facts; we do not, however, foreclose an evidentiary hearing if the district court deems it appropriate.

¶44The petition for rehearing is denied.

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