Platt Electrical Supply, Inc. v. Eoff Electrical, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
522 F.3d 1049 · 2008
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Relies on 44 Cal. 3d 1103 - Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. · 21 Cal. 4th 383 - Norgart v. Upjohn Co. · 35 Cal. 4th 797 - Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. · Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · 52 Cal. App. 4th 326 - LiMandri v. Judkins
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The record shows that Ms. Clark repeatedly and unequivocally suspected that Prudential was trying to get rid of her. In the 1980s when her premiums “started becoming quite enormous,” Ms. Clark notes that she “didn’t know what to think.” Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Clark’s testimony only reflects a lack of understanding at that time as to why her premium increases were so large. However, closer inspection indicates otherwise. Ms. Clark attests, “I couldn’t understand why my rates were becoming so enormous, unless, perhaps, they were trying to get rid of me.” Thus, Ms. Clark clearly inferred a connection in the 1980s between her premium increases and some wrongdoing by Prudential. Ms. Clark again confirms the connection between her injury and suspected wrongdoing when she believed in or around 1993 that Prudential was “trying to get me to drop the policy ... [b]y increasing my rates.” Indeed, because the premiums “made no sense” to her “whatsoeverf,]” Ms. Clark asked her bookkeeper to look into the issue in 1993. Those inquiries lead Ms. Clark to learn that the CHIP policy did not exist anymore. Additionally, in 1996, she wrote to her attorney that she “expected] a fight” from Prudential regarding an issue related to her living abroad, and reaffirmed that Prudential “no longer [has] this policy and don’t want it.” Under California law, the statute of limitations runs from the date that the complaining party learns, or at least is put on notice, that a representation is false. Pla”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 (1999), the California Supreme Court articulated: “[T]he plaintiff discovers the cause of action when he at least suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal theory, for its elements, even if he lacks knowledge thereof — when, simply put, he at least suspects that someone has done something wrong to him, wrong being used, not in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with its lay understanding. He has reason to discover the cause of action when he has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements. He has reason to suspect when he has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry; he need not know the specific facts necessary to establish the cause of action; rather, he may seek to learn such facts through the process contemplated by pretrial discovery; but, within the applicable limitations period, he must indeed seek to learn the facts necessary to bring the cause of action in the first place — he cannot wait for them to find him and sit on his rights; he must go find them himself if he can and file suit if he does.” Id. at 397-98 , 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 , 981 P.2d 79 (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original). The California Court of Appeal has observed that “[t]he courts interpret discovery in this context to mean not when the plaintiff became aware of the specific wrong alleged, but when the plaintif”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have ‘information of circumstances to put [them] on inquir/ or if they have ‘the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.’”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.