¶1OPINION ON REHEARING
¶2Larry Wayne Stuart, hereinafter referred to as defendant, has petitioned for rehearing following the decision handed down by this Court on April 29, 1974, wherein we affirmed the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him by the District Court, Canadian County, for the offense of Manslaughter in the First Degree.
¶3On rehearing, defendant again argues that reversible error occurred in the method used to select the jury panel from which his jurors were chosen. Briefly stated, the procedure which was used was as follows: the District Judge, Court Clerk, and Sheriff, met in the District Courtroom with the Bailiff posted outside the door under orders to prevent anyone from entering while the selection process was underway. Defendant claims that this was not in substantial compliance with the provisions of 38 O.S.1971, § 21, which require that the jury panel selection be done “in open court.”
¶4On rehearing defendant takes specific exception to that part of our earlier opinion in which we stated that there was little chance of taint in the procedure followed by the District Court because “. . . the drawing was visible to the public through the glass windows of the courtroom door.” Defendant claims that the windows in the Canadian County Courthouse doors were so small that it cannot be said that they afforded an actual view of the proceedings to the public. Assuming *298arguendo that defendant is correct, we find our overall view of this assignment of error to be unchanged. We refer first to the language of 22 O.S.1971, § 634:
“A challenge to the panel must be taken before a jury is sworn, and must be in writing, specifying plainly and distinctly the facts constituting the ground of challenge.”
¶5We also rely on 38 O.S.1971, § 29, which, in referring to the statutes governing the selection of grand and petit jury panels, states:
“ . . .A substantial compliance with the provisions of this Chapter, shall be sufficient to prevent the setting aside of any verdict rendered by a jury chosen hereunder, unless the irregularity in drawing, and summoning or empaneling the same, resulted in depriving a party litigant of some substantial right; pro-videdhowever, that such irregularity must be specifically presented to the court at or before the time the jury is sworn to try the cause. [Emphasis added]
¶6We realize fully that defense counsel did not discover the alleged irregularity until well after trial, and that this was not due to a lack of diligence on his part; however, the matter of due diligence relates to the question of newly discovered evidence as grounds for new trial — it does not relate to the question of whether Motions to quash the jury panel are in proper form or are timely made. Thus, the absence of a lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel did not relieve him from the obligation of complying with the above cited statutes. Because he did not present a challenge to the panel, in writing, before the jury was sworn, as required by 22 O.S. § 634, supra, and because he did not specifically present the irregularity to the court at or before the jury was sworn, as required by 38 O.S. § 29, supra, we must again reject this assignment of error.
¶7An additional word might be in order as to the correct procedure to be followed in jury panel selections. While the method of selection employed in the instant case has, in our view, achieved substantial compliance with the statutory requirements, we strongly suggest that a somewhat different procedure be followed in future cases. The goal would be to avoid future controversies as to whether the drawing was “in open court,” as per 38 O. S. § 21, which states in pertinent part:
“ . . . The officers attending such drawing shall not divulge the name of any person that may be drawn as a juror to any person . . . ”
¶8We believe that the two requirements can be reconciled by allowing the public into that part of the courtroom reserved for spectators, while excluding them from the area behind the railing reserved for counsel table, jury box, and bench, wherein the selecting officers should conduct the drawing. Dowell v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 86, 248 P.2d 256 (1952). Allowing the public to observe the drawing from within the courtroom would completely negate any inference of impropriety. At the same time, the selecting officers, on the other side of the railing, could maintain the anonymity of the names chosen by properly folding the ballots so that no names would be visible to the spectators, and by refraining from calling the names aloud.
¶9The other assignment of error raised by defendant on rehearing is a reiteration of proposition no. 8 in his appellate brief. We reject it now for the same reasons as stated in our original opinion.
¶10For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the Petition for Rehearing is denied. The Clerk of this Court is directed to issue the Mandate forthwith.