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522 So. 2d 890

Docket No. 87-1890.

State v. Jenkins

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George M. JENKINS, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided February 17, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 1988.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1988-02-17

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently December 2009

6 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“intent, being a state of mind, must be inferred by the trier of fact from the defendant's acts and the surrounding circumstances”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 729 So. 2d 428 - VM v. State

Relies on CFM Distributing v. Alpert

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1988-02-17

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Alan L. Overton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

¶2Gaston J. Fernandez, Tampa, for appellee.

¶3LEHAN, Acting Chief Judge.

¶4The state appeals the trial court's dismissal of the criminal charge against the defendant. We reverse.

¶5Defendant was charged with attempted sexual battery. He filed a motion to dismiss the amended information. In response the state filed a traverse. The trial court granted defendant's motion upon a finding that the facts shown did not support the charge of attempted sexual battery.

¶6Without reciting the bizarre facts in any detail, suffice it to say that the facts as alleged in defendant's motion and the state's traverse, while not absolutely indicative of an attempted sexual battery, are sufficient to allow a jury to find defendant guilty of that crime. The defendant's intent, being a state of mind, must be inferred by the trier of fact from the defendant's acts and the surrounding circumstances and is ordinarily not to be determined on a motion to dismiss. See State v. Stenza,453 So.2d 169, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Similarly, whether defendant's conduct constituted a threat to cause serious personal injury and whether the victim had a reasonable belief that defendant had the ability to carry out that threat are for the jury to decide.

¶7Reversed.

¶8THREADGILL and PARKER, JJ., concur.

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