Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches’s Empirical Analysis
523 F.2d 924 · 1975
Citation profile
28 federal appellate · 13 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 70 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2013 · most notably United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott (1983), James H. McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Company, International Brotherhood of Electricalworkers, Local 605 Electrical Workers (1977)
28 federal appellate · 13 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1985 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (§ 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Cort v. Ash · Griffin v. Breckenridge · Richardson v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc. · Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. · Dombrowski v. Dowling
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[The] [Griffin ] Court, recognizing that the statutory language, taken literally, might be construed to give a claim for every conspiratorial tortious interference with a legally protected interest (the equal status being to be protected by law from All intrusions on legal rights), limited the statute’s application to con form to the drafters’ perceived intent. (Emphasis added.) “The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose — by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. See the remarks of Representatives Willard and Shellabarger, quoted supra at 100. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.””
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“A complaint must allege that the defendant did (1) “conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another” (2) “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or cause to be done, “any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,” whereby another was (4a) “injured in his person or property” or (4b) “deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“As Griffin narrowed the cases in which a deprivation of equal rights is actionable to those where the injury is class motivated, it seems to us a necessary corollary that the class animus alleged be consistent with the deprivation of rights alleged . Of itself, the creation of a class of victims by tortious conduct does not bring a claim within § 1985(3); such a class is created by every tort. Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege, as they must if they would succeed, anything to distinguish them as intended victims other than that they belong to the class possessing the rights deprived — a circumstance true of all potential employees involved. Under Griffin we think the class status providing the motivating animus must be created by a fact other than the posses: sion of the right deprived — otherwise virtually every conspiratorial deprivation of a primary right would be actionable under § 1985(3) regardless of the pertinent statutory enforcement provisions.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.