State v. Gutierrez

                                                       Office of the
                                                           Director    New Mexico
                                                                       Compilation
                                                        2023.01.23     Commission
                                                   '00'07- 11:54:06
           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: September 26, 2022

No. S-1-SC-38367

CONSOLIDATED WITH

No. S-1-SC-38368

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Petitioner,

v.

DAVID GUTIERREZ,

      Defendant-Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,

and

CONNIE LEE JOHNSTON,

      Defendant-Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,

and

FRANCESCA ESTEVEZ,

      Defendant-Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,

and

DEMESIA PADILLA,

      Defendant-Cross-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Angie K. Schneider, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Steven James Forsberg, Assistant Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Gutierrez
Sitterly Law Firm, LLC
Nicholas Sitterly
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioners/Cross-Respondents Johnston and Estevez

Kennedy, Hernandez & Associates, P.C.
Paul John Kennedy
Jessica Hernandez
Albuquerque, NM

for Cross-Respondent

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Walter M. Hart, III, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner

New Mexico State Ethics Commission
Jeremy Daniel Farris
James Walker Boyd
Albuquerque, NM

for Amicus Curiae

                                        OPINION

BACON, Chief Justice.

{1}      This consolidated case requires us to determine whether the Legislature
intended for violations of NMSA 1978, Section 10-16-3(A)-(C) (2011) (“Subsections (A)-
(C)”) of the Governmental Conduct Act (GCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-16-1 to -18 (1967, as
amended through 2019), to be punishable as criminal violations and, if so, whether
Subsections (A)-(C) are unconstitutionally vague. In four separate and unrelated cases,
Petitioners/Cross-Respondents David Gutierrez, Francesca Estevez, and Connie Lee
Johnston (Petitioners) and Cross-Respondent Demesia Padilla were each charged
under two or all three of those subsections. District court orders dismissed the charges
in all four cases on different grounds, and Respondent/Cross-Petitioner State of New
Mexico appealed.

{2}    The Court of Appeals first concluded that the Legislature intended for violations
of Subsections (A)-(C) to be punishable as crimes, relying on its plain-meaning statutory
interpretation of the GCA’s penalty provision, § 10-16-17 (“Criminal penalties”). State v.
Gutierrez, 

, 

. On the void-for-vagueness issue,
the Court of Appeals concluded that Subsection (A) of Section 10-16-3 is not
unconstitutionally vague whereas Subsections (B) and (C) are unconstitutionally vague.
Gutierrez, 

. We reverse on the statutory interpretation issue,
thereby vacating the charges brought under Subsection (A). We hold that the
Legislature intended for Subsections (A)-(C) to be applied as ethical principles rather
than as criminal statutes. This holding forecloses any unconstitutional vagueness
analysis.

I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Relevant Statutes

{3}   We begin by providing the relevant sections of the GCA. We then summarize the
underlying district court cases and the Court of Appeals’ consolidated opinion.

{4}   Section 10-16-3 of the GCA provides:

      Ethical principles of public service; certain official acts prohibited;
      penalty.

              A. A legislator or public officer or employee shall treat the
      legislator’s or public officer’s or employee’s government position as a
      public trust. The legislator or public officer or employee shall use the
      powers and resources of public office only to advance the public interest
      and not to obtain personal benefits or pursue private interests.

             B. Legislators and public officers and employees shall conduct
      themselves in a manner that justifies the confidence placed in them by the
      people, at all times maintaining the integrity and discharging ethically the
      high responsibilities of public service.

              C. Full disclosure of real or potential conflicts of interest shall be a
      guiding principle for determining appropriate conduct. At all times,
      reasonable efforts shall be made to avoid undue influence and abuse of
      office in public service.

              D. No legislator or public officer or employee may request or
      receive, and no person may offer a legislator or public officer or employee,
      any money, thing of value or promise thereof that is conditioned upon or
      given in exchange for promised performance of an official act. Any person
      who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this subsection is
      guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the
      provisions of [NMSA 1978, ]Section 31-18-15 [(2007, amended 2022)].

{5}   Section 10-16-17, the penalty provision of the GCA, provides:

            Unless specified otherwise in the [GCA], any person who knowingly
      and willfully violates any of the provisions of [the GCA] is guilty of a
      misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one
      thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year
      or both. Nothing in the [GCA] shall preclude criminal prosecution for
      bribery or other provisions of law set forth in the constitution of New
      Mexico or by statute.

B.    The Underlying Cases in the District Courts

{6}   We restate here the Court of Appeals’ succinct recitation of the facts in the four
separate and unrelated underlying cases:

      [Petitioner] Gutierrez

              The State charged [Petitioner] Gutierrez with violating [S]ection[]
      10-16-3(A)-(C) of the GCA, alleging he pursued an unwanted sexual
      relationship with one of his employees during the course of his work as
      county treasurer by repeatedly commenting on her physical appearance
      and offering to give her money and use his authority as treasurer to
      expunge a prior disciplinary write-up in exchange for sex. [Petitioner]
      Gutierrez filed three motions, which included a motion in limine, a motion
      to dismiss, and a motion pursuant to State v. Foulenfont, 1995-NMCA-
      028, ¶ 6, 

, 

 (authorizing dismissal of a case in
      lieu of an evidentiary hearing or a trial on the merits where a case raises a
      purely legal issue). These motions made largely the same assertion—that
      the provisions of [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A)-(C) do not define or create criminal
      offenses, but instead are ethical principles intended to guide the behavior
      of public officials.

              The district court granted [Petitioner] Gutierrez’s motions and
      dismissed the indictment, reasoning that violations of [S]ection[] 10-16-
      3(A)-(C) were not crimes but “ethical considerations,” and that the grand
      jury indictment, therefore, “failed to allege the commission of a criminal
      offense.”

Gutierrez, 

.

      [Petitioner] Estevez

              The State charged [Petitioner] Estevez, in relevant part, with
      violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A) and (B) of the GCA, alleging she attempted
      to use her position as district attorney to manipulate or intimidate officers
      who were investigating allegations that she improperly used a state
      vehicle for personal use. [Petitioner] Estevez filed a motion to dismiss
      these counts, arguing the GCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district
      court concluded that although Section 10-16-3 establishes “advisory
      guideposts setting forth standards of ethical conduct[,]” insurmountable
      ambiguities existed regarding its intended scope and the applicability of
       Section 10-16-17’s provision for criminal penalties. As a result, the district
       court applied the rule of lenity and dismissed the charges.

Gutierrez, 

 (sixth alteration in original).

       [Petitioner] Johnston

               The State charged [Petitioner] Johnston, in relevant part, with
       violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A) and (B) based on allegations that, while
       acting in her capacity as a magistrate judge, [Petitioner] Johnston
       unlawfully recorded the communications of her colleagues and coworkers
       in secure areas within the Aztec Magistrate Court Building. [Petitioner]
       Johnston filed a motion to dismiss these charges, arguing that the
       subsections at issue set forth “aspirational provisions” rather than criminal
       offenses and are unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the
       charges, concluding that even if Subsections (A) and (B) provided for
       criminal offenses, they were nevertheless void for vagueness.

Gutierrez, 

.

       [Cross-Respondent] Padilla

               The State charged [Cross-Respondent] Padilla, in relevant part,
       with violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(B) and (C), alleging she used her position
       as the Secretary of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department to
       access the tax records of the accounting firm at which she worked prior to
       her appointment as well as the records of her former clients. [Cross-Respondent] Padilla filed motions to dismiss these charges, arguing the
       subsections at issue were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The
       district court granted [Cross-Respondent] Padilla’s motions and dismissed
       these charges.

Gutierrez, 

.

C.     The Court of Appeals’ Consolidated Opinion

{7}    In all four cases, the State appealed the district courts’ orders dismissing the
charges brought under Subsections (A)-(C). Gutierrez, 

. Though
the district courts dismissed those charges on different grounds, the Court of Appeals
consolidated based on the identical issues shared by the four cases. 

{8}     As we recount below, being central to our determination, the Court of Appeals
first conducted statutory interpretation as to whether violations of Subsections (A)-(C) of
Section 10-16-3 are criminal offenses. Gutierrez, 

. Under de novo
review, the Court concluded in the affirmative. Id. ¶¶ 12, 19, 24.
{9}    The Court of Appeals then analyzed whether Subsections (A)-(C) are
unconstitutionally vague. Gutierrez, 

. The Court held that
Subsection (A) is not unconstitutionally vague. Gutierrez, 

.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district courts’ dismissals of the counts brought
under Subsection (A) and remanded to the respective district courts for reinstatement of
those charges against Petitioners Gutierrez, Estevez, and Johnston. Gutierrez, 2020-
NMCA-045, ¶ 43. The Court also held that Subsections (B) and (C) are
unconstitutionally vague and accordingly affirmed the district courts’ dismissals of the
counts charging Petitioners and Cross-Respondent under those subsections. Gutierrez,

. Because we reverse on the statutory interpretation issue,
we do not recount the Court’s unconstitutional vagueness analysis.

{10} In its statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals began by recognizing that if
the plain language of a statute renders its “‘meaning . . . truly clear—not vague,
uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise doubtful—it is of course the responsibility of the
judiciary to apply the statute as written.’” 

 ¶ 12 (quoting State ex rel. Helman v.
Gallegos, 

, ¶ 22, 

, 

). The Court stated that
“[w]e therefore first consider whether the language of the statutes at issue is clear, or
whether we must look further before applying the statutes to the facts of these cases.”

{11} The Court of Appeals then reviewed the plain language of Section 10-16-17.
Gutierrez, 

. The Court concluded that under that provision a
defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor when three requirements are satisfied: (1) “a
defendant must have violated a provision of the GCA,” (2) “the violation must have been
knowing and willful,” and (3) “the violation must not be subject to treatment otherwise
specified in the GCA.” 

{12} Noting the parties’ focus on Section 10-16-3(A)-(C), the Court of Appeals then
provided the text of Section 10-16-3. Gutierrez, 

. However, the
Court did not also conduct a textual analysis of Subsections (A)-(C). 1

{13} The Court of Appeals next considered Petitioners’ and Counter-Respondent’s
arguments that the heading of Section 10-16-3, “Ethical principles of public service;
certain official acts prohibited; penalty,” establishes legislative intent for Section 10-16-
3(A)-(C) to exist outside the scope of Section 10-16-17. Gutierrez, 

. They argued under the section’s heading (1) that, as ethical principles, “compliance
with Subsections (A)-(C) is merely aspirational and, therefore, any violations of those
provisions are not crimes,” and (2) “that criminal penalties are limited to [certain official
acts] set out in Subsection (D).” Gutierrez, 

.

{14} The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments regarding the heading of Section
10-16-3 under its plain-meaning construction of Section 10-16-17. Gutierrez, 2020-
NMCA-045, ¶¶ 17, 18. The Court noted that a section’s heading “‘ordinarily . . . may be


1We note that the Court of Appeals did subsequently analyze the plain language of Subsections (A)-(C)
as part of its unconstitutional vagueness analysis. See Gutierrez, 

.
considered as a part of the act if necessary to its construction,’” 

 ¶ 15 (quoting Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 

, 

), but may not be used “‘to produce an ambiguity in a statute which is
otherwise clearly drafted,’” 

 (quoting Serrano v. State Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 

, ¶ 12, 

, 

). Because the Court found
no ambiguity in the plain meaning of the body’s text, the Court concluded that
arguments relying on the heading to establish ambiguity were foreclosed. Id. ¶¶ 16-18.

{15} The Court of Appeals also considered Cross-Respondent Padilla’s argument that
absurdity would result from a strict application of the plain language of Section 10-16-17
to various provisions of the GCA. Gutierrez, 

 (“If adherence
to the plain meaning of a statute would lead to absurdity, we must reject that meaning
and construe the statute according to the obvious intent of the Legislature.”) (brackets
omitted) (citing State v. Maestas, 

, 

, 

)).
The Court reiterated our warning in Helman that the “beguiling simplicity” of the plain-meaning rule

      may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and
      unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to
      legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the
      statute’s meaning. In such a case, it can rarely be said that the legislation
      is indeed free from all ambiguity and is crystal clear in its meaning.

 ¶ 20 (quoting Helman, 

, ¶ 23) (internal quotation marks omitted).

{16} Notwithstanding Helman’s warning, the Court of Appeals hewed to its plain-meaning construction of Section 10-16-17 in rejecting Cross-Respondent’s argument.
Gutierrez, 

. The Court noted that Cross-Respondent’s
argument pointed only to GCA provisions other than Subsections (A)-(C) to allege that
absurdity would result from strict application of Section 10-16-17 to the GCA. Gutierrez,

 (“[W]e need not pass judgment on the applicability of the
criminal penalty set out in Section 10-16-17 to the violations of other sections of the
GCA, as those violations are not before us today.”). In the absence of an absurdity
argument focused on violations of Subsections (A)-(C) themselves, the Court concluded
that “we cannot avoid the clear language of Section 10-16-17.” Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-
045, ¶ 23.

{17} The Court of Appeals’ “adherence to the plain[-]meaning rule” was bolstered by
the legislative history of Sections 10-16-3 and 10-16-17. Gutierrez, 

. Because those sections were enacted together, the Court presumed that the
Legislature “intended that a knowing and willful violation of [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A)-(C)
give rise to the misdemeanor criminal penalty called for in Section 10-16-17.” Gutierrez,

. The Court also noted that the Legislature has added to or
amended the GCA six times without amending Section 10-16-17, “suggesting its
continued intent to impose the criminal penalty set out in that section.” Gutierrez, 2020-
NMCA-045, ¶ 24.
{18} The Court of Appeals concluded its statutory interpretation analysis by rejecting
arguments that the penalty for a violation of Subsection (C) is limited to civil sanctions or
penalties and that the rule of lenity should apply. Gutierrez, 

.
The Court rejected the first argument because no relevant provision in the GCA “limits
the discretion of the attorney general or a district attorney to prosecute a knowing and
willful violation of the GCA.” Id. ¶ 26. In rejecting the second argument, the Court again
applied its plain-meaning construction of Section 10-16-17, noting that lenity “‘is
reserved for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s
intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and
motivating policies of the statute.’” Gutierrez, 

 (quoting State v.
Ogden, 

, ¶ 26, 

, 

).

{19} As discussed, the Court of Appeals reversed the district courts’ dismissals of the
counts charging Petitioners under Subsection (A), remanded for reinstatement of those
counts, and affirmed the dismissals of the counts charging Petitioners and Cross-Respondent under Subsections (B) and (C) based on those provisions being
unconstitutionally vague. Gutierrez, 

.

D.     Certiorari Granted

{20} Following the consolidated appeal, Petitioners timely petitioned this Court for
certiorari regarding the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of their charges under
Subsection (A). Concurrently, the State timely petitioned for certiorari regarding the
Court of Appeals’ holding that Subsections (B) and (C) are unconstitutionally vague.
This Court granted certiorari on the petitions and cross-petition and consolidated the
cases.

II.    DISCUSSION

{21} The first issue raised in this appeal is one of statutory interpretation: whether the
Legislature intended for violations of Subsections (A)-(C) of Section 10-16-3 to be
subject to criminal penalty. Because we hold that the Legislature did not so intend, we
do not reach the issue of whether those subsections are unconstitutionally vague.

A.     Standard of Review for Statutory Interpretation

{22} “We review questions of statutory . . . interpretation de novo.” State v.
Radosevich, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should
determine and effectuate the intent of the [L]egislature, using the plain language of the
statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent.” State v. Willie, 

, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State
v. Davis, 

, 

, 

 (“Under the plain[-
]meaning rule statutes are to be given effect as written without room for construction.”).
“If statutory language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the
words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, the court should reject the
plain[-]meaning rule in favor of construing the statute according to its obvious spirit or
reason.” State v. Adams, 

, 

 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We have said that

       [w]hile . . . one part of [a] statute may appear absolutely clear and certain
       to the point of mathematical precision, lurking in another part of the
       enactment, or even in the same section, or in the history and background
       of the legislation, or in an apparent conflict between the statutory wording
       and the overall legislative intent, there may be one or more provisions
       giving rise to genuine uncertainty as to what the [L]egislature was trying to
       accomplish. In such a case, it is part of the essence of judicial
       responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent—the
       purpose or object—underlying the statute.

Helman, 

, ¶ 23.

{23} “Statutes that define criminal conduct should be strictly construed and doubts
regarding their interpretation or construction should be resolved in favor of lenity.” State
v. Anaya, 

, 

, 

.

B.     Analysis

1.     The plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) demonstrates legislative intent
       as expressions of ethical principles for the GCA rather than as criminal
       statutes within the scope of Section 10-16-17

{24} Petitioners and Cross-Respondent make multiple arguments supporting the
contention that the Legislature did not intend for criminal charges to result from
violations of the subsections under which they are charged. They assert that the
Legislature understood that the text of Subsections (A)-(C) constitutes the aspirational
language of ethical principles rather than elements of criminal statutes. They also argue
that the Legislature understood that absurdity would result from a strict application of
Section 10-16-17 to certain provisions of the GCA. Petitioners and Cross-Respondent
also contend that the heading of Section 10-16-3 indicates that Subsections (A)-(C)
were not intended to be criminally enforceable. In addition, they argue that any
persisting ambiguity as to the scope of the penalty provision should cause this Court to
apply lenity.

{25} Quoting Section 10-16-17, the State argues that the Legislature’s enactment of
that penalty provision authorizes imposition of a misdemeanor criminal sanction for the
knowing and willful violation of “‘any of the provisions of’” the GCA, including
Subsections (A)-(C). Citing State v. Ramos, 

, ¶ 10, 

, 

, the State asserts that the GCA is the Legislature’s lawful expression under
the police power of its substantial and significant interest in “defining the nature of [the
State’s] relationship with its public servants.” The State further argues that a lack of
statutory ambiguity in the body text of Sections 10-16-3 and -17 refutes and precludes
arguments regarding the heading of Section 10-16-3. In addition, the State contends
that the relevant statutes present no ambiguity sufficient to permit application of the rule
of lenity.

{26} The core question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended for
Section 10-16-17 to apply to Subsections (A)-(C) of Section 10-16-3. Resolution of that
question begins with plain-meaning analysis of both statutes to determine if they can be
enforced as written. Davis, 

 (“We begin the search for legislative
intent by looking first to the words chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of
the Legislature’s language.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). If ambiguity
results from that analysis, we then look beyond the plain meaning of the statutory
language to determine and effectuate legislative intent. Ortiz v. Overland Express,

, 

, 

.

{27} We agree with our Court of Appeals that the plain language of Section 10-16-17
appears to direct that all knowing and willful violations of the GCA, unless otherwise
specified, are criminally punishable. See Gutierrez, 

. However, as
we discuss below, the plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) does not allow their
enforcement as criminal statutes when considered in the light of fundamental principles
of criminal law. The Court of Appeals appears to have limited its plain-meaning analysis
of Subsections (A)-(C) to ascertaining the absence therein of otherwise specified
language. See generally Gutierrez, 

. Having so ascertained,
the Court relied on its plain-meaning construction of Section 10-16-17 for its conclusion
without further consideration of the text of Subsections (A)-(C). See generally Gutierrez,

. This limited analysis and reliance on one provision caused
the Court to ignore whether Subsections (A)-(C) could be enforced as criminal statutes.

{28} The importance of fully considering the texts of related provisions is
demonstrated in State v. Padilla, 

, 

, 

, which
turned on the relationship of the aggravated fleeing statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-22-1.1
(2003, amended 2022), to the Law Enforcement Safe Pursuit Act (LESPA), NMSA
1978, §§ 29-20-1 to -4 (2003).

{29} In Padilla, we considered “whether the Legislature intended the phrase ‘in
accordance with the provisions of the LESPA’ found at the end of the aggravated fleeing
statute to be an essential element of the crime of aggravated fleeing.” 

 (brackets omitted). Under a plain-meaning analysis of the aggravated fleeing statute
alone—without also analyzing the LESPA—the Padilla Court could have concluded that
“the Legislature intended the phrase [in question] to be an essential element, . . . and
[thus] a pursuit not [being] ‘in accordance’ with the LESPA would nullify an otherwise
valid arrest and prosecution for aggravated fleeing.” 

 Such a law would be unusual in
conditioning criminal liability on “the officer’s conduct in purs[u]ing a suspect.” Id. ¶ 23.
The Padilla Court recognized the Legislature’s authority to enact such a law, but
nonetheless analyzed the LESPA as well, since “we would be remiss in our duties of
judicial review if we did not demand a high level of confidence before concluding that
the Legislature intended such an unorthodox result.” Id.
{30} Under that further analysis, the Padilla Court found that the text of the LESPA
“included an enforcement mechanism within . . . itself” that represented the Legislature’s
affirmative choice of an effective means to ensure compliance. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28. That
internal enforcement mechanism, the Padilla Court concluded, supported that “[t]he
Legislature did not intend to create an additional enforcement mechanism for
compliance” via the aggravated fleeing statute. Id. ¶ 33 (emphasis added). Full
consideration of the LESPA thus led this Court to hold that “the Legislature did not
intend the phrase [in question] to be an essential element of the crime” of aggravated
fleeing. Id. Padilla implicitly counsels that full consideration of the text of each provision
is warranted where the analysis turns on the relationship of those provisions.

{31} Here, we similarly would be remiss if we did not fully consider the text of
Subsections (A)-(C) before concluding that the Legislature intended to criminalize those
provisions. Applying Helman, the appearance of Section 10-16-17 as “absolutely clear
and certain” could nonetheless mask or distort “what the [L]egislature was trying to
accomplish” as to Subsections (A)-(C). See Helman, 

, ¶ 23.

{32} Accordingly, we analyze the plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) below,
considering the nature of criminal statutes. As a general principle, criminal statutes
“declare[] what conduct is criminal and prescribe[] the punishment to be imposed for
such conduct.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Crim. L. § 1.2, at 11 (3d ed. 2018).
“Typically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant’s culpable conduct, the actus
reus, coupled with a defendant’s culpable mental state, the mens rea.” Padilla, 2008-
NMSC-006, ¶ 12 (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Crim. L. § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed.
2003)). The actus reus is the “wrongful deed” or “forbidden act” that is defined by a
criminal statute. Actus reus, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A basic
characteristic of substantive criminal law is that a statute “will spell out what act . . . is
required for its commission.” 1 LaFave, supra, § 1.2 at 11-12 (3d ed.).

{33} Under these principles, the plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) does not
express conduct that would constitute a criminal actus reus. Subsection (A) requires
that a “legislator or public officer or employee shall use the powers and resources of
public office only to advance the public interest and not to obtain personal benefits or
pursue private interests.” Subsection (A) offers no definition as to which uses of the
powers and resources of public office would qualify as criminal conduct, either by not
advancing the public interest or by obtaining personal benefits or pursuing private
interests.

{34} Subsection (B) requires that a legislator or public officer or employee shall “at all
times maintain[] the integrity and discharg[e] ethically the high responsibilities of public
service.” Subsection (B) offers no definition as to what conduct would qualify as criminal
in not maintaining the integrity or discharging ethically the high responsibilities of public
service, at all times.

{35} Without specifying the governmental actors within its scope, Subsection (C)
requires that “[a]t all times, reasonable efforts shall be made to avoid undue influence
and abuse of office in public service.” Subsection (C) offers no definition as to what
conduct would qualify as criminal in not exercising relevant reasonable efforts, at all
times.

{36} Each relevant subsection communicates a general goal or proscription without
specifying a wrongful deed or forbidden act. We need not entertain hypotheticals to
recognize that the plain language of each subsection does not spell out what act or
omission is required for its violation and does not establish criminal elements that could
inform clear jury instructions.

{37} “We presume that the [L]egislature acted with full knowledge of relevant statutory
and common law,” State v. Tufts, 

, 

 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), including the necessity of a criminal statute to
provide a sufficiently defined actus reus. Criminal enforcement of provisions that do not
meet this standard would indeed be absurd. We presume as well that the Legislature
acted with full knowledge of “the rule that criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and
definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable.” Swafford
v. State, 

, ¶ 41, 

, 

. While this rule also
underlies unconstitutional vagueness analysis, our presumption of the Legislature’s
knowledge of the rule should not be viewed as an analysis on vagueness but rather as
bolstering our conclusion regarding the Legislature’s intent for Subsections (A)-(C).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude under our plain-meaning interpretation of
Subsections (A)-(C) that the Legislature did not intend for those provisions to be
enforced as criminal statutes.

{38} However, as aspirational expressions of ethical principles, Subsections (A)-(C)
are effective and unambiguous. Subsection (A) grounds its proscription in the ideal of
“treat[ing one’s] government position as a public trust.” Subsection (B) grounds its
proscription in the ideal of “conduct[ing] themselves in a manner that justifies the
confidence placed in them by the people.” Subsection (C) grounds its proscription in the
ideal of “[f]ull disclosure of real or potential conflicts of interest [as] a guiding principle for
determining appropriate conduct.” Seen as ethical principles, these provisions provide
general guidance for the purpose and application of the GCA generally, and thus these
provisions are not surplusage. See State v. Vest, 

, 

(“A statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or
superfluous.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{39} Our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) is not eroded by the plain
language of Section 10-16-17. By way of analogy, if a provision of the GCA merely
stated “be good” in its entirety, then no penalty provision, regardless of the clarity of its
language, could transform that general aspiration into an actus reus for a proper
criminal statute.

2.     The heading of Section 10-16-3 supports that Subsections (A)-(C) are not
       criminal provisions

{40} Further, our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) is bolstered by
the Legislature’s express use of “Ethical principles of public service” in the language of
the heading of Section 10-16-3. Contrary to the State’s suggestion, we are not bound by
our canons of statutory interpretation to ignore such relevant evidence, as we discuss
below.

{41} First, as Petitioner Gutierrez cites, our “canons are not mandatory rules . . . [but]
guides . . . designed to help [this Court] determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied
in particular statutory language.” Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 

(2001); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 

 (1996) (“Canons of
construction . . . are simply rules of thumb which will sometimes help courts determine
the meaning of legislation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{42} Second, a relevant canon expressed in Tri-State, cited by both the parties and
the Court of Appeals, provides that “ordinarily [a section’s heading] may be considered
as a part of the act if necessary to its construction.” 

 (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Gutierrez, 

 (quoting Tri-State, 

). However, the underlying authority for
that proposition offers no bar to the use of a statutory title to help determine “the nature
and extent of [an] enactment.” State ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n v. Old Abe Co., 1939-
NMSC-046, ¶ 27, 

, 

; see generally id. ¶¶ 26-28. To the contrary,
the Old Abe Court stated that a “title is quite properly to be considered a part of an act,
particularly where it is a constitutional requirement that every act have a title, as is true
in this state.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing N.M. Const. art. IV, § 16). 2

{43} Third, we look to the heading of Section 10-16-3 neither “to produce an
ambiguity” nor “to establish a limitation that is not contained in the text”—two improper
uses of the heading expressed by the Court of Appeals. Gutierrez, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, we look to the express
language in the heading of Section 10-16-3 as affirming our plain-meaning interpretation
of Subsections (A)-(C) as ethical principles rather than criminal statutes.

{44} The remainder of the heading supports no contrary conclusion. We need not
determine whether “certain official acts prohibited” refers to Subsections (A)-(C), since a
prohibition need not be criminal and since that phrase refers at least to the prohibition
on bribery in Subsection (D). See § 10-16-3. Also, the heading’s use of “penalty” refers
at the least to Subsection (D)’s express penalty of a fourth-degree felony, and we find
no basis to conclude that the heading’s use of “penalty” applies as well to Subsections
(A)-(C). See § 10-16-3. In sum, the language of the heading of Section 10-16-3
supports that Subsections (A)-(C) of Section 10-16-3 were not legislatively intended to
be criminal statutes.

III.    CONCLUSION

{45} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Legislature intended for Subsections
(A)-(C) of Section 10-16-3 to be applied within the GCA as ethical principles excepted

2We find no compelling reason to view the proper use of a section’s heading differently from that of a
statutory title. Cf. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-13 (1997) (“Headings and titles may not be used in construing a
statute or rule unless they are contained in the enrolled and engrossed bill or rule as adopted.”).
from the scope of Section 10-16-17 rather than as criminal statutes. Under this holding,
we determine no ambiguity exists within Subsections (A)-(C) of Section 10-16-3, and
thus we have no need to apply the rule of lenity in the cases before us.

{46} We reverse the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Legislature intended to
make violations of Subsections (A)-(C) of Section 10-16-3 subject to criminal liability.
Accordingly, the district courts’ orders dismissing charges under Section 10-16-3(A)-(C)
against Petitioners and Cross-Respondent are affirmed.

{47}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

BRYAN P. BIEDSCHEID, Judge,
Sitting by Designation