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← 523 So. 2d 1293 - State v. Parms

523 So. 2d 1293 - State v. Parms’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

18
cited by 18 later decisions
5
states following
December 2005
most recently cited

18 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently December 2005

18 state decisions

90198819902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Delaware v. Prouse · Harris v. New York · Brown v. Texas · Perez. v. Campbell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of privacy.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The Louisiana Constitution protects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy. Under Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), seizures are reasonable only if there are neutral limitations on the discretion of the field officers. Other factors to be weighed are: (1) the gravity of the problem; (2) the degree to which the seizure serves the public concern; and (3) the extent of the interference with individual liberty. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)[J held that random spot checks of motorists without articulable and reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity were unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Because an individual’s expectation of privacy is not abandoned upon entrance into an automobile, a motorist’s freedom cannot be interferred (sic) with even for a limited time at the unbridled discretion of police officers. Absent an articulable basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Prouse prohibits regulatory automobile inspections unless there are previously established “neutral criteria” which prevent the unconstrained exercise of discretion by field officers. In dicta Prouse says that: “Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative” [to random stops]. [Footnotes omitted.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “(1) the degree of discretion, if any, left to the officer in the field; (2) the location designated for the roadblock; (3) the time and duration of the roadblock; (4) standards set by superior officers; (5) advance notice to the public at large; (6) advance warning to the individual approaching motorist; (7) maintenance of safety conditions; (8) degree of fear or anxiety generated by the mode of operation; (9) average length of time each motorist is detained; (10) physical factors surrounding the location, type and method of operation; (11) the availability of less intrusive methods for combating the problem; (12) the degree of effectiveness of the procedure; and (13) any other relevant circumstances which might bear upon the test.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.