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← 524 F.2d 167 - United States v. Peterson

United States v. Peterson’s Empirical Analysis

524 F.2d 167 · 1975

Citation profile

189
cited by 189 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
22
states following
April 2014
most recently cited

119 federal appellate · 8 district · 38 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 189 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2014 · most notably Crosby v. United States (1993), United States v. Gordon (1990)

119 federal appellate · 8 district · 38 state decisions — followed in 22 states

75019751980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 18 U.S.C. § 2113 · 18 U.S.C. § 2312 · 18 U.S.C. § 3500 · 18 U.S.C. § 371

Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Glasser v. United States · Katz v. United States · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Mapp v. Ohio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 189 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a defendant may waive his right to be present at the commencement of his trial just as effectively as he can waive his right to be present at later stages of the proceedings.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Diaz provided almost verbatim the exception [to the right to be present] embodied in the second sentence of [former Fed.R.Crim.P.] Rule 43. It should be clear, however, that no “talismanic properties” attach to the point at which the trial begins. Government of Virgin Islands v. Brown (3d Cir.1975) 507 F.2d 186, 189 . In speaking of a defendant’s voluntary absence “after the trial has begun,” the Diaz Court was referring merely to the factual context in which that particular defendant’s voluntary waiver occurred—i.e., after the commencement of his trial. Nothing in Diaz should be interpreted as precluding a court from continuing with a trial if the defendant voluntarily waives his presence before the trial commences. [Footnote omitted.]”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. (b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress at the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present, (1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to remain during the trial)____”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.