Norman I. Suchomajcz, Administrator of the Estate of Norman Suchomajcz, a Minor v. Hummel Chemical Company, Newark, New Jersey’s Empirical Analysis
524 F.2d 19 · 1975
Citation profile
35 federal appellate · 9 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 99 later decisions — most recently April 2016 · most notably 26 Cal. 4th 465 - Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001), Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Company, Inc. (1978)
35 federal appellate · 9 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. · Cree v. Goldstein · Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. · CIPOLLA v. Shaposka · Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 99 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ * * * [W]e should apply the law of the predominantly concerned jurisdiction, measuring the depth and breadth of that concern by the relevant contacts each affected jurisdiction had with the specific transaction. The contacts are relevant only if they relate to the ‘policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.’ ” Id., at 23 .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“'[S]ummary judgment is never warranted except on a clear showing that no genuine issue of any material fact remains for trial....'”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The duties described [in sections 302, 302A, and 302B of the Restatement] attach to acts of commission, which historically generate a broader umbrella of tort liability than acts of omission, which are the subject of §§ 315 and 314A. This distinction is expressed in Comment a, Section 302 of the Restatement of Torts (Second): This section is concerned only with the negligent character of the actor's conduct, and not with his [or her] duty to avoid the unreasonable risk. In general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of a reasonable [person] to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act. The duties of one who merely omits to act are more restricted, and in general are confined to situation[s] where there is a special relation between the actor and the other which gives rise to the duty. In this case, plaintiff alleges that the government generated, tested and handled deadly laboratory organisms, but failed to employ adequate security procedures during the commission of these acts. Thus, plaintiff contends, the government exposed the public to an unreasonable risk of contamination as a result of unauthorized interception and disbursement of lethal materials. In other words, the complaint effectively alleges the commission of affirmative acts (ownership and handling of biohazards), which, under Section 302b, give rise to a corresponding duty to protect all others exposed to any "unreasonable ris”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.